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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Requirement of Notice for Appointment of
Guardians Ad Litem and Next Friends
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Hagins v. Redevelopment
Commission1 recently set forth procedural requirements that substan-
tially affect the process of appointing guardians ad litem and next friends.
Under the rules laid down in this case, any person for whom a guardian
ad litem or next friend is proposed must be notified of such proposal
and be given an opportunity to be heard if there is objection to the ap-
pointment.
The case arose from the Greensboro Redevelopment Commission's
premature destruction of plaintiff Hagins' buildings pursuant to at-
tempts to condemn her land.2 Subsequent to the condemnation proceed-
ing, Mrs. Hagins instituted an action in the superior court against the
commission to recover 407,460 dollars as damages for the loss of her build-
ings. On the day set for trial Mrs. Hagins was unable to proceed with
the cause because she had fired her two attorneys after a dispute over
the litigation. The trial judge nonsuited her and informed her that she
had one year to re-institute the action. The two discharged attorneys
then filed affidavits alleging that Mrs. Hagins had a "fixation" about
the loss of her property and that she was incompetent to manage this
particular case. Acting in his discretion,' the trial judge thereafter va-
275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969).
On August 7, 1961, the commission instituted condemnation proceedings
against Mrs. Hagins' land in the Guilford Superior Court under section 160-454
of the North Carolina General Statutes. Mrs. Hagins filed a self-prepared answer
alleging her buildings were not dilapidated and the commission had no power to
condemn her land. The superior court upheld the commission's right of eminent
domain and adjudged title be transferred to the commission. Mrs. Hagins ap-
pealed and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Redevelopment Comm'n v.
Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962), reversed, holding that the commis-
sion's petitions were fatally defective. While that appeal was pending, on or
about May 24, 1962, the commission demolished the buildings. On January 14,
1963, the commission brought a second condemnation proceeding to acquire title
to Mrs. Hagins' lots. She was awarded 3,000 dollars as just compensation by the
jury in superior court and title was adjudged to have vested in the commission. The
supreme court, in Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 267 N.C. 622, 148 S.E.2d
585 (1966), affirmed the superior court decree and noted the pendency of Mrs.
Hagins' action for damages for the premature destruction of her buildings.
8 During a term of court all judgments and orders are in fieri and, except for
those entered by consent, may be opened, modified, or vacated by the court upon
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cated the nonsuit, continued the case for the term, and appointed a next
friend to manage the litigation for Mrs. Hagins pursuant to section
1-64 of the North Carolina General Statutes.4 All of this action was
taken without notice to the plaintiff. Mrs. Hagins first learned of the
judge's orders after the term had expired by reading about them in
a newspaper.
The next friend notified Mrs. Hagins of his appointment and of his
intention to ask the court to approve a forty-thousand-dollars settlement
and a one-thousand-dollars fee for his services. The superior court subse-
quently approved both of the next friend's recommendations and granted
judgment releasing the redevelopment commission from all liability. Sev-
eral months later, Mrs. Hagins filed a motion to vacate the appointment of
the next friend and all judgments entered thereafter. She contended that
her constitutional rights had been violated because she was sui juris and her
property had been taken without notice and a hearing. The superior court
denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed.5 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina the judgment was reversed with the
court acceding to Mrs. Hagins' contentions."
A next friend or prochien ami is appointed to bring or prosecute
some proceeding in behalf of a party under a disability while a guardian
ad litem is appointed only to defend,' but there is no substantial dif-
ference in the law between the two.' The most common disabilities
for which guardians ad litem and next friends are appointed are infancy
and incompetency.' At common law, the king was the general protector
its own motion. Shaver v. Shaver, 248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E.2d 791 (1958) ; Hoke v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 42 S.E.2d 407 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-64 (1967):
In actions and special proceedings when any of the parties plaintiff are
infants, idiots, lunatics, or persons non compos mentis, whether residents or
nonresidents of this state, they must appear by their general or testamentary
guardian, if they have any within the State; but if the action or proceeding
is against such guardian, or if there is no such guardian, then said person
may appear by their next friend.
'1 N.C. App. 40, 159 S.E.2d 584 (1968). The court based its affirmance on
the fact that both the vacation of the nonsuit and the appointment of the next
friend were ordered during the same term in which Mrs. Hagins brought the
action, thus "fixing" her with notice. The court also held that Mrs. Hagins had
actual notice of the actions from a phone conversation with the next friend. The
court said that an inquisition was not necessary to have a next friend appointed;
rather, the matter was within the discretion of the trial judge.
'Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969).
7 Johnson County v. Ellis, 226 N.C. 268, 38 S.E.2d 31 (1948).
844 C.J.S. Insave Persons § 140 (1945).
' However, statutes in many states provide for appointment of guardians ad
litem in other cases of disability. See e.g. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-883 (1947)
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of persons with disabilities."0 Consequently, when a person under a
disability needed assistance in court, the king issued a letter patent ap-
pointing a guardian." The chancery court later acquired jurisdiction
over infants and incompetents by a delegation of duty by the crown and
a grant of authority from the crown respectively. 12 American courts
were quick to adopt the English policy of protecting persons with dis-
abilities,'" but unlike the delegation of the power in England, the courts
of America recognized an inherent power to appoint guardians ad litem
and next friends to protect infants and incompetents.' 4
Guardians ad litem are special guardians' whose powers are co-
terminous with the beginning and ending of the particular litigation for
which they are appointed.' 6 Due to the limited nature of the guardian
ad litem's duties, rules governing them cannot be said to be a part of the
general law of guardianship ;17 however, the general rationale that moves
the courts to protect persons under disability by appointment of guardians
of the person or of the estate is also operative in the appointment of
guardians ad litem and next friends.'8 Still, the appointment of guardians
ad litem and next friends is more practically a matter of procedure since
state and federal rules of procedure normally control their appointment. 10
Under the North Carolina General Statutes, there are various sit-
uations in which next friends or guardians ad litem can be appointed.
Judges of superior courts can appoint next friends or guardians ad litem
for idiots, infants, lunatics, or persons non compos mentis when they
have no general guardian, 0 as occurred in Hagins. A guardian ad litem
may also be appointed by the court in actions where unborn persons
would have an interest if living;21 for non-existent corporations, trusts,
(guardian ad litem appointment for persons in prison); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-
2(c) (1966) (guardian ad litem appointment for missing persons in action to have
receiver appointed for the estate).
2 J. FONTBLANQUE, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 225 (2d Am. ed. 1820).
112 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, TiE HISTORY OF ENGLISHi LAW 441 n.6
(2d ed. 1911).
2 J. FONTBLANQUE, supra note 10, at 232.
"8See, e.g., Kesler v. Penninger, 59 Ill. 134 (1871) ; Fisher v. Stilson, 9 Abb.
Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859).
14 Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 438 (1880) (dictum) ; Zaro v. Strauss,
167 F.2d 218, 220 (5th Cir. 1948).Till v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 124 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1941).
16Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964).
"5 J. HENDERSON, PROBATE PRAcTICE § 1366 (2d ed. 1950).
" Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 Iowa L. REv. 376 n.5 (1960).
"9E.g., FED. R. Cwv. P. 17(c); N.C. SuPnE. CT. R. 16, 17.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-64, 1-65.1 (1967).' 1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-65.2 (1967).
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or other entities ;22 for missing persons when a receiver is sought to be
appointed ;21 and for insane or incompetent non-residents having prop-
erty within the state.2 4  The clerk of superior court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for a person who is committed to a state-supervised
hospital if its superintendent provides a certificate declaring the person
to be insane or mentally retarded.25
Although North Carolina statutes specify the situations in which
guardians ad litem may be appointed, they do not contain any procedure
for appointing them or next friends. Instead, the procedure is controlled
by rules 16 and 17 of the superior courts,26 which do not contain any
provision about the two issues raised in HaginsS--(1) whether the
plaintiff was entitled to actual notice of the proposed appointment of a
next friend and (2) whether she was entitled to an opportunity to be
heard upon the competency issue before the trial judge could properly ap-
point a next friend.28
There is case law in North Carolina indicating that notice and an
opportunity to be heard are constitutional requirements in all cases; how-
ever, no case specifically mentions notice to allegedly incompetent per-
sons.29 One case has held that an alleged incompetent was entitled to be
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-65.3 (1967).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2(c) (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §35-3.1 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-3 (1966). For a discussion of North Carolina commit-
ment procedures and due process see Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
31 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1958).
-' N.C. SUPER. CT. R. 16:
In all cases where it is proposed that infants shall sue by their next friend,
the court shall appoint such next friend, upon the written application of a
reputable, disinterested person closely connected with such infant; but if
such person will not apply, then, upon the like application of some reputable
citizen; and the court shall make such appointment only after due inquiry
as to the fitness of the person to be appointed.
This rule also governs the appointment of guardians ad litem for persons other
than infants. Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N.C. 99, 31 S.E. 268 (1898).
N.C. SUPER. CT. R. 17. "All motions for a guardian ad litem shall be made in
writing, and the court shall appoint such guardian only after due inquiry as to
the fitness of the person to be appointed, and such guardian must file an answer
in every case."
27 Possibly because infancy and incompetency are the two major disabilities
to which these rules of practice are applicable. Infancy is seldom disputed, and an
incompetent who owns property normally has a general guardian to represent him.
2 Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 98, 165 S.E.2d 490, 495
(1969).
" See Collins v. Highway Comm'n, 237 N.C. 277, 74 S.E.2d 709 (1953) (con-
demnation proceeding); National Sur. Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N.C. 98, 59 S.E.2d
593 (1950) (notice to creditors in insolvency proceeding) ; In re State v. Gordon,
225 N.C. 241, 34 S.E.2d 414 (1945) (notice to owners of liquor confiscated under
state laws).
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heard upon timely objection,"° but an inquisition to determine competency
was not a condition precedent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem
or next friend.31 The right to a hearing is of little value if there is no
requirement that the alleged incompetent must receive notice. In fact,
under the practice followed by the North Carolina superior courts, notice
almost never reaches the ward."
It was in this context that the Supreme Court of North Carolina de-
cided Hagins. The court first looked at the jurisdictional facts that allow
appointment of guardians ad litem and next friends and determined that
Mrs. Hagins should have been non compos mentis if a next friend was ap-
pointed. The court also noted, as pointed out above, that neither section
1-64 of the North Carolina General Statutes nor North Carolina Superior
Court Rule 16 contains any provision for notice or for an adjudication of
incompetency where there is a dispute. Relying upon the history of
legislative and judicial protections of the right of one accused of incom-
petency to traverse the allegations, the court concluded that such person
was entitled to notice as in the case of an inquisition under section 35-2
of the North Carolina General Statutes. The supreme court held that if
the person upon notice asserts his competency, in the absence of an
emergency situation the trial court must then proceed under the lunacy
statute 3 and hold an inquisition. 4 Since Mrs. Hagins had neither notice
nor an opportunity to be heard, the court deemed void the appointment
of the next friend and the subsequent judgments.
Requirements of notice and hearing set forth in Hagins will ap-
parently govern the procedure for appointing guardians ad litem after
the new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure become effective in
January, 1970. The case will be of continuing validity since the new
rules, while repealing superior court rules 16 and 17, fail to provide for
"° Moore v. Lewis, 250 N.C. 77, 108 S.E.2d 26 (1959).
" Id.; Smith v. Smith, 106 N.C. 498, 11 S.E. 188 (1890). But see Tt re Wil-
son, 257 N.C. 593, 597, 126 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
3" In an interview with the writer, several superior court judges indicated that
proceedings to appoint a next friend or guardian ad litem were pro forma in that
the clerk of court or judge would grant such appointment on affidavits, without
notice to the proposed ward, and would rely on the guardian ad litem's verified
answer to set forth the details of the ward's incompetency. The judges stated
that they had no problem in this respect and that if at some point in the litigation
the alleged non compos mentis objected to such appointment, he would be given
an opportunity to be heard. Interview with four superior court judges in Chapel
Hill, N. C., on Sept. 5, 1969. See also Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 556, 109
S.E. 568, 570 (1921).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (1966).
"4Accord, Borough of East Paterson v. Karkus, 136 N.J. Eq. 286, 41 A.2d
332 (Ct. Ch. 1945); Graham v. Graham, 40 Wash. 2d 64, 240 P.2d 564 (1952).
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notice and an opportunity to be heard or contest an issue for infants, in-
competents, and others in proceedings to appoint a guardian ad litem. 5
Hagins is particularly significant for the future for its treatment of
notice. The court indicated that not only are alleged incompetents (as in
Hagins) entitled to notice before appointment of a guardian ad litem,
but also any person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is entitled
to such notice in the absence of an emergency.3" The court stated:
[A] person for whom a next friend or guardian ad litem is proposed
is entitled to notice as in case of a [sic] inquisition of lunacy under
G.S. Section 35-2. This statute does not specify the time, but by
analogy to G.S. Section 1-581, ten days notice would be appropriate
unless the court, for good cause should prescribe a shorter period.s
Any interpretation that this rule applies only to persons allegedly non
compos mentis is illogical because the court before laying it down already
had discussed notice to them.8  Thus the requirements of Hagins would
seem to apply to all cases in which a guardian ad litem can be appointed
under any North Carolina statute.39
If this interpretation is correct, infants would have a right to notice
if they are old enough to comprehend it. Moreover, when a guardian ad
litem is proposed for a person who already has a general guardian,4" the
potential ward still would be entitled to notice. Hagins may even require
that when a guardian ad litem is to be appointed for non-existent trusts,
corporations, or other entities under Rule 17(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, some or all persons who will be a part of or
have an interest in the nonexistent entity be given notice.
Hagins would also affect section 28A-2(c) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which provides for appointment of a guardian ad litem
1 N.C.R. Civ. P. 17 (N.C. GEx. STAT. § 1A-4 (Advance Legis. Pamp. No. 7
1969) ). The separate terminology of next friend and guardian ad litem is dropped;
guardian ad litem is used for both plaintiff and defendant. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-64, 1-65.1 to -65.3 are incorporated into Rule 17 without significant change.
Is "In an emergency, when it is necessary, pendente lite, to safeguard the
property of a person non compos mentis whose incompetency has not been ad-
judicated, the protection of the court may be invoked in his behalf by one acting
as next friend." 275 N.C. at 103, 165 S.E.2d at 499.
37 Id. at 102, 165 S.E.2d at 498.
58Id.
o See note 20 and p. 94 supra.
'o N.C.R. Civ. P. 17(b) (3) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-4 (Advance Legis. Pamp.
No. 7 1969)). ". . . a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person may
be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action is
pending expedient to have the infant or insane or incompetent person so repre-
sented notwithstanding such person may have a general or testamentary guardian."
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to represent a missing person in an action to appoint a receiver. While
section 28A-5 provides for notice by publication to the missing person,
it fails to require notice of the appointment of the guardian ad litem.41
Assuredly, it is most difficult to conceive of one being able to notify a
missing person, but under Hagins he must be notified; and constitu-
tionally notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to inform
him of the proceedings.4"
A further problem created by Hagins is that the decision requires
notice to be served upon the alleged incompetent. Even where a person
is a known incompetent but has not yet been so adjudged, Hagins would
require notice to him before a guardian can be appointed. In Covey v.
Town of Somers,43 the United States Supreme Court held that notice
to a person known to be an incompetent and without the protection of a
guardian does not measure up to constitutional standards.44 The potential
impasse created by the two cases yields to common sense, but it is diffi-
cult to solve mechanically. Perhaps Covey simply adds the further require-
ment of notifying someone other than the alleged incompetent, such as a
close friend or relative, while sustaining the Hagins requirement of notice.
If, after receiving notice, the alleged incompetent objects to the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem, Hagins requires (in the absence of an
emergency) an inquisition similar to that in section 35-2 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, which provides for a jury of twelve men to
inquire into the person's competency. Should the inquisition reveal that
the party is not incompetent to manage his own affairs but is incompetent
as to the particular subject matter of the litigation, then a guardian ad
litem cannot be appointed. 5 Thus Hagins, while no doubt providing ad-
ditional safeguards for alleged incompetents, fails to protect a person
who is only mentally unable to comprehend his interests in the litigation
even though he has retained counsel.
Where the inquisition finds the proposed ward incompetent, another
" See McCall, Estates of Missing Persons in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV.
275 (1966).
'2 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
' 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
"Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314.
"'275 N.C. at 104, 165 S.E.2d at 499. "[W]e understand the word affairs
to encompass a person's entire property and business-not just one transaction or
one piece of property to which he may have a unique attachment."
[Vol. 48
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problem, which the court failed to examine, is raised: what is the effect
of the determination of incompetency? This question was left unanswered
because the court did not specify that the determination should be a bind-
ing judicial decree as in the case of the lunacy proceeding under section
35-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes. A person found incom-
petent under section 35-2 loses power over his estate, and a guardian is
appointed for him. If incompetency is adjudged in an inquisition proceed-
ing specified by the decision in Hagins, a guardian ad litem rather than a
general guardian will be appointed, unless the determination is given the
effect of a binding judicial decree under section 35-2. But a guardian
ad litem has no power to administer an incompetent's estate.40 The lack
of a general guardian might well mean that the person adjudged incom-
petent will be unable to conduct his affairs or deal in business with others
due to their fear of his transactions being deemed void.
Another, and perhaps the most significant, aspect of Hagins is the
court's discussion of the effect of failure to comply with the prescribed
requirements of notice. Prior to this decision, an irregularity in the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem or next friend was considered a pro-
cedural rather than a jurisdictional defect so that the judgment was
voidable and could only be attacked directly by the parties to it.47 The
attacking party had to show that his rights had been prejudiced before
the judgment could be set aside.4" But in Hagins the court considered the
lack of notice and an opportunity for a hearing as jurisdictional defects
that left the lower court's judgment completely void rather than simply
voidable :" "[T]he order appointing Franks as her next friend was void
and his settlements of her actions, notwithstanding they were approved
by the court, are not binding upon her." If void, a judgment rendered
without notice or an opportunity to be heard can be collaterally attacked
by persons other than the ward.
Although the result in Hagins is unquestionably just, the case leaves
many questions unanswered. Until these problems are clarified, the care-
ful lawyer should make certain in all cases where a guardian ad litem is
to be appointed that all reasonable means are used to inform the person
for whom the proposed appointment is to be made and that an oppor-
tunity for him to be heard is provided. ODEs L. STROUPE, JR.
" Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964).
'" It re Barker, 210 N.C. 617, 188 S.E. 205 (1936); Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C.
19, 2 S.E. 176 (1887).
" Moore v. Lewis, 250 N.C. 77, 108 S.E.2d 26 (1959).
,1 275 N.C. at 102, 103, 165 S.E.2d at 498.
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Conflict of Laws-Survival of Support and the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act
" 'Confusion now hath made his masterpiece,' "' said Justice Jackson,
referring to the legal chaos engendered by the often conflicting matri-
monial laws of the various states. When further complicated by the well-
trod path to a foreign jurisdiction and a quick, ex parte divorce, more
often than not the domestic and divorce laws of the respective states,
rather than the spouses, become entwined in "holy deadlock.'"'
Perhaps the Rhode Island Supreme Court has begun to apply the
sword to the Gordian knot of legal problems that surround a foreign ex
parte divorce decree and its effect upon prior and subsequent support
proceedings. In Rymanowski v. Rymanowski,3 the court utilized the con-
cept of "divisible divorce"4 to uphold the validity of the husband's ex
parte Nevada divorce decree and, at the same time, granted the wife sur-
vival of a prior Massachusetts support order on the public policy grounds
that underlie the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA).' The uniqueness of this decision is found in the fact that
under Massachusetts law the right to support granted in a prior support
order does not survive a final divorce decree.' It may well be that in
reaching its decision, the Rhode Island court, by implication, has proved
the obsolescence of the normal conflict-of-laws rule in this area of matri-
monial jurisprudence.
After nine years of marriage, Joseph Rymanowski left his marital
domicile of Massachusetts and resided in Rhode Island. He commenced
divorce proceedings against his wife, Mary, in Massachusetts in August,
1962. Although his prayer for divorce was denied, the Massachusetts
court ordered Joseph to pay $180 per month for her support.
Shortly after his retirement from the Navy, Joseph's search for em-
ployment led him to Nevada. He arrived in Las Vegas on June 7, 1965,
and filed for divorce there on July 20, 1965. Although Mary received
' Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 676 (1949) (dissenting opinion) quoted in Baer,
The Aftermath of Williams vs. North Carolina, 28 N.C.L. REV. 265, 289 (1950).
'A. HERBERT, HOLY DEADLOCK (1934).
- R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407 (1969).
'Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
- R.I. at -, 249 A.2d at 412. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-11-1 to
-32 (1956). See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -20 (1966); UNI-
FORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT, §§ 1-43 (1958 version) in
9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1967).
' MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 209, § 32 (Supp. 1969) construed in Rosa v.
Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936).
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notice of the pending suit, she did not make an appearance. Joseph
secured a divorce decree in the Nevada district court in August, 1965.
The decree omitted any provision for Mary's support. Joseph returned
to Rhode Island in November, 1965, and subsequently remarried.
Upon learning of the Nevada decree, Mary instituted a declaratory
judgment proceeding in Massachusetts to determine her marital status.
Joseph did not appear in this proceeding although he received notice
by publication. In December, 1965, the Massachusetts court adjudged
that Joseph's Nevada divorce was invalid and that he was still married
to Mary.
Mary then commenced support proceedings against Joseph in Massa-
chusetts under the Massachusetts version of the URESA.7 Both parties
appeared in the Rhode Island family court. Joseph contended that he
owed Mary no duty of support, since under the Nevada divorce decree
she was no longer his wife. The trial court found that Joseph was a
bona fide domiciliary of Nevada at the time of the divorce, which there-
fore was entitled to full faith and credit, and dismissed Mary's petition
for support. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
Joseph's Nevada divorce decree was valid, but that Mary was entitled to
survival of support on the public policy grounds that underlie the
URESA.8
A brief examination of the evolution of the doctrine of "divisible
divorce" will be beneficial in order to appreciate the significance of the
court's disposition of the case.'
In Williams v. North Carolina,'° the State of North Carolina relied
on the ruling in Haddock v. Haddock" in prosecuting a couple for
bigamous cohabitation. After abandoning their respective spouses, the
couple obtained ex parte Nevada divorces and married each other there
before returning to North Carolina. Reversing their convictions, the
' MASs. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 273A, §§ 1-17 (1954). For an explanation as
to the procedural nuances of the URESA see Brokelbank, The Problem of Family
Support: A New Uniform Act Offers A Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93 (1951); Note,
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act: Procedural Problems and
a Technological Solution, 41 TEmP. L.Q. 325 (1968); 44 TEXAS L. REV. 814
(1966).
'R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 15-11-1 to -32 (1956).
'The United States Supreme Court first grappled with ex parte divorce de-
crees in Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901), and Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U.S. 562 (1906), where it held that a divorce decree was entitled to full
faith and credit only when entered by a forum that had personal jurisdiction over
both parties or by a court of the state wherein the parties were married.
10317 U.S. 287 (1942). See Baer, supra note 1.
11201 U.S. 562 (1906). See note 9 supra.
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Supreme Court expressly overruled Haddock" and held that ex parte
divorce decrees are to be accorded full faith and credit despite the fact
that the abandoned spouse was neither served with notice nor appeared
in the state that decreed the divorce. However, the Court expressly
reserved the question of whether North Carolina had to accord full faith
and credit to the Nevada decree when it in fact found that no bona fide
domicile was established in Nevada.1
3
The Supreme Court dealt with this question in the second Williams
v. North Carolina"4 case (Williams II). North Carolina had secured con-
victions of the couple based on a finding that they had not established
a bona fide domicile in Nevada. The Supreme Court affirmed the con-
victions, holding that full faith and credit did not preclude North Caro-
lina from examining the jurisdictional facts to determine if a bona fide
domicile had indeed been established in Nevada. 5
Estin v. Estin'6 is the case generally credited with setting forth the
doctrine of "divisible divorce."'" In Estin the husband established a valid
domicile in Nevada, obtained an ex parte divorce, and promptly ceased
the support payments to his wife that had been ordered by a prior New
22 317 U.S. at 304.
" Id. at 302.
1325 U.S. 226 (1945). See Powell, And Repent At Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv.
930 (1945). The rule that an ex parte divorce decree granted by a foreign state
may be collaterally attacked by proving that the spouse who obtained the decree
was not in fact domiciled in the granting state has been subsequently restricted by
the Supreme Court. The later cases hold that if both parties appeared in the
original proceeding the finding of domicile becomes res judicata and may not be
collaterally attacked even if the issue of domicile was not in fact contested. Cook
v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 278 (1948). See
Carey & MacChesney, Divorces By The Consent Of The Parties And Divisible
Divorce Decrees, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 608, 611 (1948).
"On the same day that Williams II was decided, the Court handed down its
decision in Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
In this case the husband contended that his obligation to furnish support to his
wife under a prior Pennsylvania support order terminated when he obtained an
ex parte Nevada divorce. The Court held that under Williams II, the wife could
defeat this contention by showing that the husband had not established domicile
in Nevada.
10334 U.S. 541 (1948). See Baer, The Law of Divorce Fifteen Years After
Williams v. North Carolina, 36 N.C.L. REV. 265 (1958); Morris, Divisible Di-
vorce, 64 HAIv. L. REv. 1287 (1951).
1 As early as 1869 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a wife's alimony award
when her husband asserted his ex parte divorce in bar of her claim. The court
said, "It is not essential to the allowance of alimony that the marriage relation
should subsist up to the time it is allowed." Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, 512
(1869). Also, it appears that Justice Douglas in Esenwein foreshadowed the result
reached in Estin. See 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1945) (concurring opinion).
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York decree. Upon being sued in New York for arrearages, the hus-
band pleaded his Nevada divorce in bar of his wife's claim. Stating that
New York had a legitimate interest in the wife's right to support "lest
she become a public charge,"' the Supreme Court held that the prior
New York support order was a property right belonging to the wife and
that this right could not be taken away by a court lacking personal juris-
diction over her. "The result in this situation is to make the divorce
divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony.""1
The decision left undecided the effect of an ex parte divorce on a sub-
sequent support order. The Court dealt squarely with this question in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.2  Mrs. Vanderbilt left her marital domicile of
California and moved to New York before her husband obtained an ex
parte Nevada divorce. After the Nevada decree was entered, she com-
menced support proceedings in New York. Mr. Vanderbilt appeared,
contending that the Nevada divorce terminated his obligation to support
his wife. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the decree
terminated the marital status, it did not extinguish Mrs. Vanderbilt's
right to support under a New York statute authorizing support after
divorce.2' The Supreme Court affirmed. The majority relied on the due
process considerations enunciated in Estin-that a court could not pro-
ceed to extinguish a property right without having personal jurisdiction
over the individual.22 Since the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over Mrs. Vanderbilt, it could not terminate her right to secure
financial support from her husband under New York law.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court drew on many of the principles
enunciated in the aforementioned cases in reaching its decision in Ryma-
8 334 U.S. 541, 547 (1948).
19 Id. at 549.
20 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
"See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1964), as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1968). This section incorporates the language of N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT
§ 1170-b (1963), which was in effect at the time Vanderbilt was decided.
" But see Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'1 Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965),
where the Court held that Florida could constitutionally extinguish an absent
spouse's dower interest in Florida property by means of an ex parte divorce
obtained by the husband in Florida. Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that
the Court's opinion constituted a partial retreat from Vanderbilt. Id. at 86-87.
justices Douglas and Black, concurring, rejected the notion that Simons was a
retreat from Vanderbilt and argued that the dower right "simply never came into
existence." Id. at 88. See generally Currie, Suitcase Divorce In The Conflict
of Laws, 34 U. Cni. L. Rxv. 26 (1967). See also Note, Divorce Ex Parte Style,
33 U. Cni. L. REv. 837, 844 (1966), wherein it is submitted that dower is a
valuable property right entitled to due process protection.
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nowski. The court, citing Williams II as its authority for examining
Joseph's domiciliary intent, held that he had indeed established domicile
in Nevada, and that therefore his divorce was valid. As to the question of
Mary's right to support, the court employed the concept of "divisible
divorce" enunciated in Estin: While Joseph's ex parte divorce was effec-
tive in terminating the marital status, it was wholly ineffective in ter-
minating Mary's right to support.
Turning to the law of Rhode Island, the court stated that a wife's right
to alimony survives a valid divorce, subject only to the defenses of laches
and waiver.23 It matters little, continued the court, whether Mary's
claim is denominated "alimony" or "support"; what matters is that a
husband should not be relieved of his responsibilities to his abandoned
spouse. Following the "course of equity," the court felt no hesitancy in
holding that a wife's right to support continues undiminished when her
spouse leaves the state and obtains a foreign ex parte divorce.
2 4
The court declared that the purpose of the URESA25 was to remedy
the deplorable situation that exists when an individual abandons his de-
pendents and leaves them to fend for themselves. To that end, the court
believed the statute should be liberally construed: To deny Mary her due
support would nullify the legislature's efforts. 20
The normal conflict-of-laws rule is that a disinterested forum2 7 will
look to the law of the wife's domicile as determinative of her right to
survival of support.28 If the laws of her domicile afford her survival of
support, then the forum state will do likewise. The court recognized
but refused to follow this procedure because (1) no evidence of Massa-
chusetts law was before the court and it would not, sua sponte, notice ju-
dicially the laws of a foreign state, and (2) it could not ignore the public
policy evidenced by Rhode Island's adoption of the UJRESA2
21 Wilford v. Wilford, 38 R.I. 55, 94 A. 685 (1915).
2- R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407, 413 (1969).
"R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 15-11-1 to -32 (1956).-6 R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407, 413 (1969).
2 The term "disinterested forum" refers to the situation whereby Rhode Island
looks to the laws of Nevada and the laws of Massachusetts as being dispositive of
the case. This situation is distinguished from the one in which the forum state
is concerned with the laws of only one other state.
8 E.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal. 2d 389, 394, 317 P.2d 987, 991 (1957) ; Worth-
ley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 468, 283 P.2d 19, 21 (1955). It is interesting
to note that in each of these cases the laws of the wife's domicile afforded her
survival of support. See also Krauskopf, Divisible Divorce And Rights To Sup-
port, Property And Custody, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 346, 355 (1963); Morris, supra
note 16, at 1301-03; Paulsen, Support Rights And An Out-of-State Divorce, 38
MINN. L. REv. 709, 717 (1954).
2- R.I. -, 249 A.2d 407, 412 (1969).
[Vol. 48
SURVIVAL OF SUPPORT IN DIVORCES
What is the Massachusetts law that the court refused to notice ju-
dicially? Apparently, Massachusetts adheres to the principle that sup-
port is dependent upon the existence of a marital relationship.30 When
that relationship is terminated, the obligation to continue support pay-
ments under a prior order also ends.31
There are several practical reasons behind the court's refusal to follow
normal conflict-of-laws procedure. For one thing, to have held invalid
the Nevada divorce would have bastardized the issue of Joseph's second
marriage. For another, the court, by granting survival of support to
Mary, perhaps desired to prod Massachusetts into joining the weight of
authority.32 And from a practical standpoint, the court probably desired
to avoid making Rhode Island into a haven for deserting husbands from
Massachusetts.
Although the result in Rymanowski may well be socially desirable,33
"'Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 348 Mass. 209, 210-11, 202 N.E.2d 820, 821 (1964);
Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 272, 5 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1936). But see Adams v.
Adams, 338 Mass. 776, 157 N.E.2d 405 (1959).
"' There are several other jurisdictions, albeit a distinct minority, that also
afford a wife no survival of support after entry of a final divorce decree ter-
minating the marital relationship. See Yates v. Yates, 155 Conn. 544, 547, 235
A.2d 656, 658 (1967); Meeks v. Meeks, 209 Ga. 588, 591, 74 S.E.2d 861, 864
(1953,); Shaw v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 722, 728, 61 N.W. 368, 371 (1894) (by impli-
cation) ; Lowry v. Lowry, 174 Kan. 526, 529, 256 P.2d 869, 871 (1953) ; Walker v.
Walker, 246 La. 407, 415, 165 So. 2d 5, 8 (1964) ; Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261,
265, 208 A.2d 611, 613 (1965); Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So. 2d 781
(1951) (by implication); Hanna v. Hanna, 224 Mo. App. 1142, -, 32 S.W.2d
125, 126 (1930); Brown v. Brown, - Ore. -, -, 437 P.2d 845, 847 (1968);
Lorusso v. Lorusso, 189 Pa. Super. 403, 406, 150 A.2d 370, 372 (1959); Loeb v.
Loeb, 118 Vt. 474, 484, 114 A.2d 518, 526 (1955); Brady v. Brady, 151 W. Va.
900, -, 158 S.E.2d 359, 364, 366-67 (1967).
Most support statutes refer to a "wife" and "husband." This has been ju-
dicially construed by some courts to mean that the marriage relationship must be
in existence in order for the wife to qualify for support. Paulsen, supra note 28,
at 712.
It has been pointed out that statutes concerning a wife's right to support were
enacted in the pre-Williants I era when the states felt no need to protect their
domiciliaries from foreign ex parte divorces. Support was incidental to local
decrees of separation and divorce. Hence, the statutes were not intended to de-
prive a wife of support should her husband obtain a foreign ex parte divorce.
See Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARv. L. REV. 123,3, 1241 (1963).
Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959). See Note, Conflict
of Laws: Divisible Divorce in California-Hudson v. Hudson, 48 CALIF. L. REv.
303 (1960). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953).
t" Query: Is there a likelihood that Joseph may become a public charge of
Rhode Island due to the fact that he must now support two families? But see
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946): If enforcement of the wife's rights
jeopardizes the welfare of the husband or of his newly acquired family, a support
order usually can be modified on the ground of changed circumstances. Id. at 238
(dissenting opinion).
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the decision raises serious problems of full faith and credit.34 At the out-
set one is confronted with the question of whether Rhode Island should
have given full faith and credit by judicial notice to the Massachusetts
statute terminating the wife's right to support." While there is some
authority suggesting that foreign statutes be given full faith and credit,80
the general rule is that there is no federal constitutional mandate requir-
ing that extra-territorial effect be given the statutory law of a sister
state.3
Rhode Island has adopted the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act,38 the purpose of which is to provide an expedient means of
34U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, provides in part:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) provides in part:
Such Act, records, and judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory, or
Possession] or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full
faith and credit within . . . the United States and its territories and Pos-
sessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or possession from which they are taken.
" The court cites Potemkin v. Leach, 65 R.I. 1, 13 A.2d 250 (1940), as au-
thority for refusing to notice judicially Massachusetts law. This was a tort case
wherein the court, without citing any precedent or supporting authority, said:
The plaintiff contends in his brief that the Connecticut law applies to
this case; but there was no evidence introduced that the law of that state
. . . was any different from that of Rhode Island. Hence, if Connecticut
law should be applied, we must assume that the applicable lav of that state
is the same as the law of this state on this subject.
Id. at 8, 13 A.2d at 254. But see Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co., 11 R.I. 411 (1877),
where the court said:
The first question is, whether we can take judicial cognizance of the law of
New York, or must presume it to be the same as ours until it is shown...
to be different. The decisions upon this point are conflicting, but we think
•.. State of Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479, rests upon the better reason.
The court there held that, when the judgment impleaded is the judgment
of a sister state, the court will notice ex officio the law of the state in
which it was rendered . . . We think the reasoning is sound, and that it is
not satisfactorily met by courts which adopt a different view.
Id. at 415-16.
" The Constitution requires full faith and credit to be given to the public
acts, as well as to the records and judicial proceedings of other states.
Although Congress has not prescribed the effect to be given statutes in other
states, as it did in the case of records and judgments, this has not prevented
the Supreme Court from requiring their recognition; with regard to
statutes, the Court has apparently considered the clause self-executing.
H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 609 n.22 (3d ed. 1949).
" Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939); Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914); Tennessee Coal,
Iron, & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
8R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 9-19-2 to -8 (1956).
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ascertaining the law of any other state.3 9 A literal reading of the first
section of the Act would require Rhode Island to notice judicially Massa-
chusetts law.4" While there is authority that a court may take judicial
notice of foreign law on its own initiative,41 the Act has also been inter-
preted as imposing no obligation on a court to do so;42 and many states
require that the foreign law not only be brought to the court's attention
by way of pleadings or allegations in the brief, but that reasonable notice
be given to the adverse party as well.43 Rhode Island apparently adheres
to this latter principle, and failure to provide reasonable notice will result
in the application of the law of Rhode Island.44
An additional threshold issue is whether the full faith and credit
clause demands that Rhode Island be bound by the Massachusetts declara-
tory judgment that Joseph's Nevada divorce was invalid. Although
"' [t] he principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well
as to other issues,' "" it should be noted that the declaratory judgment ac-
tion was wholly ex parte; and Rhode Island could therefore legitimately
inquire into the jurisdictional facts of Joseph's Nevada domicile under
the broad language of Williams 11.46
Another problem is that the court, by granting Mary survival of sup-
port, impliedly gives full faith and credit to the prior Massachusetts
support order. The court thus runs afoul of the traditional limitation
that only final and conclusive judgments are entitled to full faith and
credit47 as well as the rule that a duty of support imposed by one state
"is of no special interest to other states and ... is not enforceable else-
where under principles of the Conflict of Laws." 48 However, it is widely
Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 375, 60 A.2d 704, 707 (1948).R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-3 (1956), provides: "Every court of this state
shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory
and other jurisdiction of the United States."
"E.g., Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A.2d 241 (1949).
"E.g., Scott v. Scott, 15a Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951).
"E.g., Leatherbury v. Leatherbury, 233 Md. 344, 196 A.2d 883 (1964).
"Cliff v. Pinto, 74 R.I. 369, 60 A.2d 704 (1948).
"Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939), quoting American
Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932).
"' "To permit the necessary finding of domicile by one State to foreclose all
States in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable." Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945). But see Baer, supra note 16, at
268: "Whether any other state, or any interested person who was not a party to
the Nevada proceedings would have the same privilege that was accorded to
North Carolina was not decided in Williams 2nd."
' Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
"RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 458, comment a (1934). The in-
correctness of this provision is recognized in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
rLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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recognized that one state may honor another state's support order as a
matter of comity.
49
Although the Rhode Island court reached a decision in Rymanowski
that is desirable in light of today's mobile society, one can only speculate
as to the final outcome had evidence of Massachusetts law been before
the court. It is submitted that the outcome would have been the same
and that the Rhode Island court has determined not to follow the usual
conflicts rule of the spouse's domicile being determinative of her right
to survival of support."
It is arguable that Rhode Island was in reality an ordinary forum
rather than a disinterested one5 because Nevada really had no compell-
ing interest in the litigation, other than the efficacy of its ex parte divorce
decree. By the court's upholding the validity of Nevada's divorce decree,
the interests of that state were entirely accommodated. On the other
hand, Rhode Island had a compelling interest in the suit because Joseph,
his second wife, and his child of that marriage were domiciled there. In
upholding Joseph's ex parte divorce, the court protected an interest of
Rhode Island-preventing the issue of Joseph's second marriage from be-
ing bastardized. Massachusetts likewise had a compelling interest in the
litigation-that Mary be furnished with support sufficient to prevent
her becoming a public charge. By granting Mary survival of support,
Rhode Island accommodated this interest. If Rhode Island could deem
itself cast in the role of an ordinary forum, under the URESA it could
look to its own law as dispositive of the issue of support,"2 thus reaching
the same result obtained in Rymanowski.
Moreover, the court could have grounded its decision strictly on
the language of the URESA, and avoided the normal conflicts rule.53
The policy that the Act stresses is that a husband should not be capable
of extinguishing his obligation to support his dependents by the simple
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)
§ 436(a) (2). See also Note, Interstate Enforcement of Modifiable Alimony And
Child Support Decrees, 54 IOWA L. REv. 597, 600 n.27 (1969).
o See note 28 supra.
See note 27 supra.
"Wheeler v. Wheeler, 196 Kan. 697, 414 P.2d 1 (1966); Lambrou v. Berna,
154 Me. 352, 148 A.2d 697 (1959); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Me. 161, 125
A.2d 863 (1956); Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 123 A.2d 3 (1956); Green v. Green,
309 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1957); Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 402 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1966).
"'R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-11-2(6) (1956) provides: "Duty of support in-
cludes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order,
decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a pro-
ceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or otherwise."
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expedient of crossing state lines. The language of the Act purports to
give a mandate to the responding state (Rhode Island) to utilize its laws
to determine whether a duty of support exists.54 If under the laws of the
responding state a duty of support is found, it is not necessary that the
responding state look to the laws of the abandoned spouse's domicile to
determine her survival rights; it can look to its own laws. Hence, the
judge-made conflict rule applying the law of the wife's domicile should
not survive under uniform support legislation.
There is authority that a wife should not be allowed to migrate to a
foreign forum in order to seek the benefits of its more favorable support
laws after the husband has secured an ex parte divorce." To allow her
to do so would violate the substantive due process rights of the hus-
band. 6 It is conceivable that Rhode Island has in fact allowed the wife
to "migrate" to its forum, figuratively speaking, in order to benefit from
its laws, which afford her survival of support. Rhode Island thus ob-
viates the necessity of the wife's literally migrating to a forum in order to
secure survival of support and enables her to avoid the due process
problems that she would confront if she were to seek refuge in a more
favorable forum expressly for this purpose. And this result is accom-
plished within the mandate of the URESA.
Rhode Island impliedly has shown the way to dispose of the normal
conflicts rule that the law of the wife's domicile is determinative of her
right to survival of support. The URESA has been enacted by every
state in the Union.57 Each state can utilize the language of the Act to
grant the wife survival of support as a matter of public policy and, on
the basis of its own laws.
Rhode Island, however, is one of the few states that retained the lan-
guage of the 1950 version of the Act granting the wife an "election"
of either the laws of her domicile or the laws of the state wherein the
" R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-11-13 (1956) provides: "Duties of support en-
forceable under this chapter are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any
state where the alleged obligor was present during the period for which support
is sought or where the obligee was present when the failure to support com-
menced, at the election of the obligee."
" Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1957) (dissenting opinion);
Morris, supra note 16, at 1302.
" The situation in which the wife pursues the husband into a foreign juris-
diction in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over him for the purposes of en-
forcing a prior support order by litigating it as any foreign money judgment
should be distinguished.
" HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS
SEVENTY-SEVENTH YEAR 223 (1968).
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obligor resides."8 Such an election provides the wife with a forum-shop-
ping opportunity. To combat this result, the Act was amended in 1952
to provide that the only applicable law is that of the state where the
pbligor was present during the period for which support is sought."0 The
amended version, while destroying the opportunity of the wife to forum
shop, allows the husband to shop for a favorable state in which to reside.
The states operating under this amended version and at the same time
affording a spouse no survival of support"0 face a dilemma. If they fol-
low the Act and revert to the support law of their jurisdiction, the wife
has no right to survival of support-their own laws terminate it. In
such a situation, they may resort to the normal conflicts rule and find that
the wife is afforded the right of survival under the law of her domicile.
But what if the laws of her domicile likewise terminate her right to sur-
vival? The wife may then find herself without a remedy, and once again
matrimonial law is found in its familiar state of frustration. In order
to solve this problem, it would be beneficial if the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended legislation to in-
sure uniform survival of support in the form of an amendment to the
URESA.
Since the present language of the URESA affords the husband an op-
portunity to forum shop, the Commissioners would also do well to
amend section seven to give the courts-not the obligee-the power of
election in order that they may exercise discretion in applying either
the law of the jurisdiction where the obligee resided when the failure
of support commenced or the law of their own jurisdiction."1
JOSEPia E. ELROD III
Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-The Permissible Scope
of a Frisk
Antagonism between the police and the judiciary is perhaps an
inevitable outcome ... of the different interests residing in the police
as a specialized agency and the judiciary as a representative of wider
community interests. Constitutional guarantees of due process of
law do make the working life and conditions of the police more diffi-
" R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-11-13 (1956). See note 54 supra.
" For a list of the states which adopted the 1952 amendment see 9C UNIFORM
LAws ANN. (Supp. 1967).
o See note 31 supra.
1This solution has been suggested previously. See Note, 44 TEXAs L. REv.
814, 818-19 (1966).
[Vol. 48
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A FRISK
cult. But if such guarantees did not exist, the police would of course
engage in activities promoting self-serving ends, as does any agency
when offered such freedom in a situation of conflicting goals. Every
administrative agency tends to support policies permitting it to pre-
sent itself favorably. Regulative bodies restricting such policies are in-
evitably viewed with hostility by the regulated. Indeed, when some
hostility does not exist, the regulators may be assumed to have been
"captured" by the regulated. If the police could, in this sense, 'capture'
the judiciary, the resulting system would truly be suggestive of a
"police state."'
Thus does Jerome Skolnick view the importance of regulating police be-
havior. One police practice that in the eyes of some has "captured" the
judiciary is the "stop and frisk" search of a suspect. The Supreme Court
granted this practice limited legitimacy in Terry v. Ohio.2 This note will
explore the permissible bounds of a frisk, particularly in light of the evi-
dentiary limitation announced recently by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Tinney v. Wilson.'
The fourth amendment to the Constitution was enacted in response to
abusive and unrestrained official searches in colonial America4 when of-
ficers acting under general warrants known as "writs of assistance" had
unlimited power to search for smuggled goods.5 The amendment' divides
conveniently into two sections, one containing the basic safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the other dealing with the require-
ments for issuance of a warrant. The difficulty concerns the proper rela-
tionship between the two sections.7 If a search is conducted under au-
thority of a warrant, can it be unreasonable? And, more importantly, can
J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 229 (1966).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
D. REISIG, SEARCHES AND SEIzUREs HANDBOOK 58 (1968). For a complete
history of conditions leading up to the adoption of the fourth amendment, see J.
LANDYSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-49 (1966); N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-105 (1937); Leagre, The Fourth Amendment
and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 393, 396-98 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Leagre].
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
'For five possible interpretations of how the two sections are related, see
Leagre 398-99.
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a search conducted without a warrant and without probable cause ever
be reasonable?
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not forbid
all searches, but only unreasonable ones.' Originally, the Court defined
a reasonable search as one occurring under authority of a search warrant.'
This requirement has been waived in those exceptional situations where
it is impossible to get a warrant and still make the search, as when deal-
ing with moving vehicles,'" when the police are in hot pursuit," or when
objects are in plain view of an officer making an arrest.12
The Court later developed the principle that when a police officer
makes a valid arrest, a search of the accused and the area under his
immediate control is reasonable.' 3 The search "incident to an arrest"
has come to be one of the most prevalent forms of search.14 Throughout
the development of the incident-search doctrine remained the requirement
that there be probable cause.' 5 Furthermore, the Court continued to
stress the importance of the search warrant by requiring its use whenever
possible. 6
Then, in Camara v. Municipal Court,17 the Court announced that an
8 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See also Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which held that the fourth and fifth amendments
must be considered together in determining the reasonableness of a search:
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man
to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned by
the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 633.
'See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958)."0 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
"1 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
1 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
1 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). For the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine of searches incident to arrest and its present limitations, see
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
1, Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433,
435 (1969).
"See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959). A representative definition of probable cause is:
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
1 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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investigatory search in a criminal prosecution requires more justification
to be reasonable than a "search" that is merely an administrative in-
spection. No longer would the reasonableness of a search be determined
solely by the presence of probable cause. Instead, the process was in-
verted: The Court first looked to see whether the search had been a
reasonable one; then, having deemed it such, it declared that there was
probable cause for a warrant to be issued. This concept, which some com-
mentators have denominated the "variable probable cause" standard,"
means that the quantum of evidence a police officer needs for probable
cause will vary indirectly with the reasonableness of the search that he
intends to make. The reasonableness of the search is determined by
balancing the government's need for the particular search against the in-
dividual's interest in his privacy. As the degree of police intrusion in-
creases, more probable cause must be shown in justification; stated other-
wise, the greater the intrusion, the less reasonable the search.' 9
The Supreme Court balanced interests recently in Terry v. Ohio20
and held that a police officer with a "reasonable suspicion"'" that an in-
dividual is engaging in criminal activity can stop him for questioning
and, if the policeman reasonably believes that the individual is armed and
presently dangerous, may lawfully "make a carefully limited search of
the suspect's outer clothing for weapons and any weapons found will be
admissible in evidence."22 However, the search must be reasonable not
only at its inception, but throughout.2"
Terry dealt with the on-the-street detention of the suspect and a com-
panion, who had been observed pacing back and forth in front of a store.
The observing police officer believed they were "casing" the store for a
" La Fave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 Micn. L. REv. 40, 55 (1968); Note, 78 YALE L.J., supra note 14,
at 438.
" See Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
- 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court there said, "[T]here is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize)
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."' Id. at 21, quoting
from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
"1 Reasonable suspicion is a quantum of evidence less than probable cause.
The difference between probable cause and reasonable grounds to stop a person,
according to Justice Harlan, is that "reasonable grounds to stop do not depend
on any degree of likelihood that a crime has been committed." Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 78 (1968) (concurring opinion).
"Note, Constitutional Law---Search and Seizure-Police nay Conduct Limited
Search for Weapons in Course of Field Investigation Without Probable Cause
for Arrest, 21 VAND. L. Rnv. 1109, 1110 (1968).
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
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robbery and tried to question them. When he received no response, he
frisked them for weapons and found a revolver in Terry's overcoat pocket.
Terry was arrested and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court for the reasons given
above.
Handed down the same day as Terry were Sibron v. New York24
and Peters v. New York,25 two cases in which the Court attempted to
clarify its position. Sibron, while loitering outside a restaurant, was
observed by a police officer to have met and talked with several known
drug addicts. After Sibron entered the restaurant and ate a meal, the
police officer told him to come outside; once there, he said to Sibron,
"You know what I am after." When Sibron mumbled and reached for
his pocket, the officer thrust his hand into the same pocket and discovered
several packets of heroin, which he seized. The Supreme Court ruled
that this evidence must be excluded from trial since the police officer had
neither probable cause for an arrest (thus there could be no incident
search) nor a reasonable suspicion that Sibron was committing a crime
or was armed and dangerous (thus under the principles laid down in
Terry there could be no frisk). The Court made clear in Sibron that
a frisk must be used only for the protection of the officer and not as a
method for gathering evidence when the police have less than probable
cause.
In Peters, police officer Lasky heard a noise at his apartment door
but was unable to investigate because he received a telephone call. After
the call, he looked through a peephole in his door and saw Peters and a
companion tiptoeing out of the alcove toward the stairway. Believing
that the two were attempting a burglary, he dressed, got his revolver, and
gave chase. He caught Peters on the stairs below but was unable to
catch the other man. Peters said that he was visiting a girl friend but
refused to name her. At this point officer Lasky patted Peters down for
weapons and discovered a hard object, which he thought might be a
knife. He removed the object from Peters' pocket and found that it was a
plastic envelope containing burglar tools. The Supreme Court found that
officer Lasky had probable cause to arrest Peters by the time he caught
him on the stairs, and it did not need to apply the Terry frisk rule. The
2 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
"Id. Peters is reported within the Sibron opinion. Hereinafter when Peters
is referred to it will be designated: Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
(Peters).
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burglar tools were properly admitted into evidence since they were seized
lawfully in a search incident to an arrest.
Left unresolved in the Terry trilogy was the scope of intrusion consti-
tutionally permissible in a frisk. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to provide the answer in Tinney v. Wilson.26 On the night of
April 17, 1965, police officer McGill was approached by a prostitute.
She arranged to engage in an act of prostitution with him at a nearby lo-
cation if a second girl could follow in another car as a lookout. The second
girl got her car and followed them to a parking lot, where, unknown to the
girls, McGill's partner waited. There officer McGill arrested the first
girl for prostitution. The two officers then proceeded to the second car
where they observed Tinney lying on the back seat. The officers asked
Tinney to get out and frisked him for weapons. Officer McGill testified
that he thought that Tinney was in a position to rob him had he driven
into the alley where he and the girl had agreed to go. During the frisk,
officer McGill felt what he thought were pills in Tinney's pocket. He
asked the defendant what they were, and Tinney replied that they were
"nerve pills." Officer McGill advised the defendant of his right to remain
silent and then asked if he had a prescription for the pills. Tinney
answered that he did not. McGill removed the seconal pills from the de-
fendant's pocket, placed him under arrest, handcuffed him, and then made
a more complete search, during which he found a marijuana cigarette.
The trial court admitted the cigarette in evidence, and Tinney was
convicted for possession of marijuana. The California Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction on the theory that his evidence was the result
of a search incident to a lawful arrest. It held that there was probable
cause for the arrest when the police officer felt the pills in Tinney's pocket
and Tinney said that he had no prescription for them.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt the reasoning of
the California courts; and, relying on Terry, ruled the evidence inad-
missible.27 It reasoned that the original frisk of Tinney must be seen as a
limited search based on "reasonable suspicion of the possibility" of
criminal conduct as in Terry, rather than as a search incident to a lawful
arrest, as in Peters. Prior to the removal of the pills from Tinney's poc-
ket, the police knew only that he had some "nerve pills" without a pre-
scription. As there are many such pills that can be purchased without a
" 408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
" After exhausting his post-conviction remedies in the state courts, Tinney filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. That court
in an unreported opinion denied his petition and Tinney appealed.
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prescription, the police did not have sufficient knowledge reasonably to
believe that Tinney had committed an offense. Since there was no
probable cause to arrest, there could be no search incident thereto.
Under the Terry doctrine, there is no doubt that the police had the right
to frisk Tinney for weapons, because the officer could reasonably believe
that the defendant had planned to assault him. But a search conducted
without probable cause to arrest must be strictly confined to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover weapons that could be used for an assault
on the police officer. Although the frisk was initially valid, when the
officer felt the pills and pursued his quest of what he knew was not a
weapon, he transgressed the limits of the search permitted by Terry.
28
The search was thus an unconstitutional extension of the frisk, and any
evidence seized thereby could not be admitted at Tinney's trial.20
The court in Tinney could have reached a different conclusion and
decided that all evidence seized during a frisk is admissible at trial.80
Such a holding would have meant the pills in the defendant's pocket were
lawfully seized. The argument then would be that the pills (seconal),
being lawfully seized, provided officer McGill with the probable cause
necessary to arrest Tinney for possession of dangerous drugs; the arrest,
in turn, sanctioned the incident search during which the marijuana
cigarette was discovered. Thus the legality of the search that turned up
the marijuana would depend on the legality of the seizure of the "nerve
pills."
It can be argued that the exclusionary rule forbids only the admission
8 Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1969).
" "Since Officer McGill's discovery of the pills or capsules in Tinney's pocket
did not follow lawful arrest and resulted from an unconstitutional extension of
his 'frisk" for possible weapons, it follows that any 'fruit' of this search should
have been excluded from Tinney's trial." Id. at 917.
" See, e.g., The Memorandum of the Institute of Government at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on Terry, which was sent to all police depart-
ments in North Carolina:
Again, it must be stressed that the only purpose of a frisk can be for
protection against dangerous weapons. The Court did not answer the ques-
tion, however, of whether the seizure of evidence would be legal if it were
accidentally uncovered while seeking to disarm a suspect whom a frisk
had revealed to be carrying a weapon or if what was thought to be a weapon
turned out instead to be other evidence. The Court probably will permit
the use of such accidentally discovered evidence, although it might not if
it suspects that in many cases the discoveries are not truly "accidental."
Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, Memorandum-Stop and
Frisk Cases, June 14, 1968 (Permanent Institute of Government Library File No.
68.74), at 3.
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of evidence seized in an unreasonable search ;31 if the conditions set forth
by the Supreme Court in Terry are met, then the frisk is reasonable and
any evidence seized should be admissible.32 Justice Harlan advanced this
view in his concurring opinion in Peters v. New York.33 He argued that
the evidence seized during the frisk of Peters should be admitted as the
fruit of a lawful frisk rather than as the fruit of a lawful search incident
to an arrest: "[A]Ithough the frisk is constitutionally permitted only in
order to protect the officer, if it is lawful the State is of course entitled
to the use of any other contraband that appears."3 Dissenting in Sibron
v. New York,"5 Justice Black agreed. Unlike the majority, he concluded
that the police officer there had reasonable cause to believe Sibron armed
and that the frisk was lawful: "Since, therefore, this was a reasonable and
justified search, the use of the heroin discovered by it was admissible in
evidence."36 Justice White's somewhat more limited view of the per-
missible scope of a frisk is that if a police officer, in a "pat down," feels
an object that he believes to be a weapon, he can seize it for admission at
trial even though the object in fact turns out not to be one.
37
Another possible indication of the permissible scope of a frisk is
found in the majority opinion in Sibron. The majority there held the
search illegal only after deciding that there could have been no reasonable
belief that the suspect was engaged in criminal activity or was armed.
Under Terry, absent grounds for such a belief, no frisk of Sibron was
permissible. Arguably, it would have been immaterial for the majority
to have considered whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the
petitioner was armed unless it was prepared to hold admissible all evi-
dence seized as a result of a legal frisk."
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt any of the foregoing arguments in
deciding Tinney. The court acknowledged that a frisk is justified solely
for the protection of the police officer and must be limited to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover only those objects that might be used in
assaulting him. All other objects discovered during a frisk must, there-
8 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule in
Weeks was applied to state action in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 647 (1960)."Note, The Limits of Stop and Frisk-Questions Unanswered by Terry, 10
AnIz. L. REv. 419, 430 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law--Search and Seizure-
"Stop and Frisk," 57 ILL. B.J. 404, 410 (1969).
" Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74-79 (1968) (Peters).
" Id. at 79 (Peters).
" Id. at 79-82 (dissenting opinion).
I01d. at 82.
Id. at 69-70 (Peters) (concurring opinion).
Note, 57 ILL. B.J., supra note 32, at 410-11.
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fore, be seen as the fruits of a search that, though lawful at its inception,
became unreasonably broad in its scope. Since the search becomes un-
reasonably broad at the point where something other than a weapon is
seized, it is unconstitutional; and the evidence must be excluded."0 Thus
in Tinney the "nerve pills" could not be used to show probable cause for
the arrest, and, absent this probable cause, there could be no arrest or
search incident thereto. The marijuana seized from Tinney was therefore
excluded as the result of an unconstitutional search. Much of the lan-
guage in Terry supports this reasoning:
The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that
"limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself."
Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means
of a seizure and search which are not reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation.
40
A search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. 41
The Court also stated:
The former [a search incident to an arrest], although justified in part
by acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault
with a concealed weapon is also justified on other grounds and can
therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A
search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however,
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation. Thus it must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby, and may be characterized as something
less than a "full" search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
42
But the Supreme Court in Terry postponed determination of the exact
limits of a frisk: "We need not develop at length in this case, however,
the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective
seizure and search for weapons.
' 4
A hint as to what the Court may ultimately decide these limits to be
Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
'Id. at 18.
42 Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 29.
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can be found in Peters. There the majority seemed to strain to find
probable cause for the arrest. Once this standard was met, the search was
incident to a valid arrest and therefore reasonable. The Court thus
avoided deciding whether evidence other than weapons seized during a
frisk will be admissible as the fruit of a lawful frisk. But if the Court
viewed as admissible evidence other than weapons obtained during a
frisk, surely it would have avoided weakening the probable cause standard
for incident searches44 and would have declared the evidence admissible as
the lawful fruit of a valid frisk.
The Supreme Court's recent decision limiting the physical scope of
searches incident to an arrest also gives strength to the conclusion in
Tinney. In Chimel v. California,45 defendant was arrested in his home
for burglary; the police, although they did not have a search warrant,
then searched his entire house, including the attic, the garage, a small
workshop, and various drawers. They found evidence that was used to
convict him. The Supreme Court reversed,4" holding that since the search
of the defendant's home went far beyond his person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or potentially ad-
verse evidence, and that since there was no constitutional justification,
in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that
area, the breadth of the search was unreasonable under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments.
The scope of an incident search was thus made clear by Chimel. There
must be probable cause for the search, and its purpose is not only to pro-
tect the arresting officer but also to seize evidence within the accused's
control. While a frisk may be made upon less than probable cause, its
only justification is to protect the arresting officer; therefore, its scope
should be even more restricted than that of the full-scale search incident
to an arrest. The "variable probable cause" standard requires this re-
sult ;47 since there is less probable cause required for a frisk, the permis-
sible intrusion must be more restrained. As Justice Stewart has said,
"The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment
"Justice Harlan, concurring in Peters, warned of the possible weakening of the
standard for probable cause. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74-75 (1968)
(Peters).
45395 U.S. 572 (1969).
'8 In reversing Chimel's conviction the Supreme Court overruled Rabinowitz
v. United States, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947).
" See p. 113 supra.
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demands that the showing of justification match the degree of in-
trusion. '"48
Just as the Court in Chimel confined incident searches to their original
purpose and justification, so it is proper that frisks be confined in ac-
cordance with their purpose to prevent them from becoming "fishing ex-
peditions" for evidence in circumstances where the police have less than
probable cause for the search. That the police would abuse their privilege
to frisk cannot be doubted. Justice Douglas, speaking on the importance
of a search warrant, stressed this fact: "This right of privacy was deemed
too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection
of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and his-
tory shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.""0
Other commentators have voiced similar misgivings about police use of
the frisk: "[I] t is hard to ignore the fact that here, at least, any power
at all will be abused .... Police will use this power not really to protect
themselves but to seize and confiscate weapons and other contraband."' 0
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice has found that
[i]n some cities, searches are made in a high proportion of instances
not for the purpose of protecting the officer but to obtain drugs or
other incriminating evidence. In New York, for example, where
searches are permitted only when the officer reasonably believes he is
in bodily danger, searches were made in 81.6 percent of stops reported.
However, a Commission survey of police practices in several large
cities, found that [only] one out of every five persons frisked was car-
rying a dangerous weapon .... 51
In Tinney an officer, upon finding the suspect unarmed, nevertheless
continued the frisk to discover evidence. A more difficult situation occurs
when a frisking officer detects what he believes to be a weapon but what
turns out to be other incriminating evidence. The officer has met all the
conditions set down in Terry, but happens to turn up burglar tools in-
4" Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68-69 (1967). This interpretation is also
that of the court in United States v. Clark, 289 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1968) :
"As demonstrated in Terry itself, however, there is a hierarchy of these forms of
interference and the Constitutional standard with which police must comply
varies in relation to the type of arrest they are making." Id. at 618.
" McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
"0 Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police),
58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433, 461 (1967).
"1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 185 (1967).
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stead of a weapon. Here it is difficult to insist that the exclusionary rule
be applied. 2 Nevertheless, it is important that evidence other than
weapons be excluded when discovered in this situation because "there may
be strong incentive for [the police officer] to fabricate grounds for a
frisk since evidence leading to a conviction may be obtained thereby. As a
result, the reliability of the officer's testimony in these cases should be
subject to considerable doubt.""
Police misuse of searches incident to arrests-after Rabinowitg v.
United States4 allowed the police great latitude in making such searches-
became so great that it overshadowed the valid reasons for allowing
warrantless incident searches and led to the limitations enunciated in
Chimel.55 It seems clear that unless the scope of the frisk is limited then
the police will also misuse the frisk procedure. Restricting potential mis-
use by requiring the exclusion of all evidence, other than weapons, dis-
covered during a frisk should have the salutary effect of maximizing
individual freedom from official intrusion without sacrificing the effec-
tiveness of the frisk as a protective device.
J. DAVID JAMES
Criminal Procedure-The Potential Defendant's Right to a
Speedy Trial
In recent years the long quiescent sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial has undergone re-analysis by various federal and state courts.' The
Supreme Court of North Carolina in a recent decision, State v. Johnson,'
"The police find the exclusionary rule particularly repulsive in these circum-
stances. As Professor Skolnick has pointed out, "the impact of the exclusionary
rule, as the police view it, has not been to guarantee greater protection of the
freedom of 'decent citizens' from unreasonable police zeal, but rather to compli-
cate unnecessarily the task of detecting and apprehending criminals." J. Skolnick,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 227 (1966). Rather than alter his actions in response
to the rule, the policeman often attempts "to infuse the character of legality-
perhaps after the fact-into his actions." Id. 227.
' Comment, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
158, 170 (1966). "While there are serious objections to barring evidence of crime
discovered in a lawful search, the admissibility of evidence such as betting slips
or narcotics found during a stop may encourage the misuse of the search power."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, supra note 50, at 186.
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
5Note, 78 YALE L.J., supra note 14, at 435-36.
'See gewrally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Note, Justice Overdue-Speedy Trial
for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REv. 95 (1952); Note, The Right to a
Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476 (1968).
2275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274, rev'g 3 N.C. App. 420, 165 S.E.2d 27 (1969).
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revolutionized what had been the accepted constitutional criminal pro-
cedure in the state regarding the right to a speedy trial. North Caro-
lina has moved from a position that was mildly castigated by the United
States Supreme Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina3 to one more far
reaching than anything said in Klopfer. The North Carolina court has
shifted from a position holding that a defendant has no general right to
be tried at all' to the present stance suggesting that a defendant has a
right to be arrested.
In Johnson the defendant alleged that his right to a speedy trial had
been violated when he was not formally indicted and tried until four
years after the alleged armed robbery had occurred. Seven days after
the occurrence, the sheriff of Nash County went with a sworn warrant
to a neighboring county jail where Johnson was being held on other
robbery charges. Although he read the Nash County warrant to Johnson,
the sheriff did not formally serve it because he felt that he did not have
any jurisdiction outside his own county.' On that same day Johnson
confessed to the Nash County robbery; about one month later he en-
tered pleas of guilty to four other charges of armed robbery that had
occurred in Edgecombe and Wilson Counties and received four con-
current sentences. Johnson remained in the North Carolina state prison
without any action being taken in connection with the Nash County rob-
bery until almost four years later when an indictment was returned and
a detainer filed against him for this offense. At the then ensuing trial,
the defendant moved that the case be dismissed because of the violation
of his right to a speedy trial.
The North Carolina court, construing the right to speedy trial con-
tained in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,( re-
'386 U.S. 213 (1967).
' State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 350, 145 S.E.2d 909, 910 (1966), rev'd, 386
U.S. 213 (1967).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-42 (1965) would seem to indicate that the sheriff could
have served the warrant:
When a felony is committed in any county in this State, and upon the com-
mission of the felony, the person or persons charged therewith flees or flee
the county, the sheriff of the county in which the crime was committed,
and/or his bonded deputy or deputies, either with or without process, is
hereby given authority to pursue the person or persons so charged, whether
in sight or not, and apprehend and arrest him or them anywhere in the
State.
See also N.C. GEN. STAT § 15-22 (1965).
'In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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versed the conviction. It held that when there has been an atypical delay,
deliberately and unnecessarily caused by the prosecution, and when the
length of the delay has created a reasonable possibility of prejudice, the
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial.' The court spe-
cifically held that the same consideration must be given the potential
defendant as the formally accused whose trial has been unduly post-
poned.' In order to apply this right to a potential defendant, the court
treated the problem of the unserved warrant as if there had been no war-
rant at all.
Courts have universally held that every "accused" has a right to a
speedy trial.9 This right applies to those persons in jail,'" those out on
bond," those incarcerated in the state's prison for another offense,"2
and those serving a prison sentence imposed by another jurisdiction.3
However, most courts have refused to apply the right to a speedy trial
to the pre-indictment stage. They have held instead that the right at-
taches only when a formal complaint is lodged against the defendant
4
or when prosecution is begun.' Most courts also have held that delay
before the commencement of prosecution is controlled exclusively by the
applicable statute of limitations,' 6 but North Carolina is one of a few
275 N.C. at 277, 167 S.E.2d at 283.Id. at 272, 167 S.E.2d at 279.
*E.g., Jacobson v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 14, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (1966) ; State
v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 51, 145 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1965); see U.S. CONST. amend.
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
... trial .... ").
1" Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd sub. num. United States
v. Provoo, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
"1 Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 26, 364 P.2d 877 (1961); People v. Den Uyl,
320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948).
" People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955). See Note, Con-
victs-The Right to a Speedy Trial and The New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERS
L. REv. 828 (1964).
1" Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
"' Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1959); Iva
Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 350 (9th Cir. 1951);
People v. Aguirre, 181 Cal. App. 2d 577, -, 5 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960); State v. Le Vien, 44 N.J. 323, 328, 209 A.2d 97, 100 (1965); State v.
Jestes, - Wash. 2d -. -, 448 P.2d 917, 920 (1968). But see Lucas v. United
States, 363 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1966) (right normally attaches when complaint
filed but in cases of special circumstances may attach earlier).
" Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1962); Foley v. United
States. 290 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1961); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 296 F. Supp.
591. 594 (M.D. Fla. 1969) ; State v. Burrell, 102 Ariz. 136, 137, 426 P.2d 633, 634
(1967): State v. Caffey, 438 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Mo. 1969). Generally in these
cases tihe courts considered the prosecution begun when the indictment was filed.
1 United States v. Fanczko, 367 F.2d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 1966); Nickens v.
United States, 323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Harlow v. United States, 301
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states 17 that has no statute of limitations for securing an indictment on a
felony charge.
Johnson has gone much further than Klopfer by advancing the right
to a speedy trial to a point even prior to the grand jury indictment.
Klopfer dealt with the "cloud of an unliquidated criminal charge";18
Johnson considered delay before there was any formal charge at all. The
United States Supreme Court in Klopfer required the states to apply fed-
eral standards to the right of a speedy trial, but the North Carolina
Supreme Court has joined a few other jurisdictions" in adhering to a
new and enlarged sixth amendment standard. The North Carolina court
extended the federal framework of right to speedy trial, which in the past
was only applicable to the formally accused, to encompass also the po-
tential defendant.
A majority of courts have adhered to the demand doctrine,2" which
requires that the right to a speedy trial is waived if the defendant does not
demand trial. Courts have rationalized this doctrine by labeling speedy
trial "a personal right which may be waived by action inconsistent with
assertion of that right.' 2 ' Klopfer in no way disturbed the law as to the
requirement of demand. But the court in Johnson reasoned that the de-
mand doctrine is inapplicable to the potential defendant ;22 since he has no
formal knowledge of the pending charge, a court cannot realistically re-
quire him to demand a speedy trial.
The right to speedy trial has been said to serve three purposes:
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and op-
pressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern
F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1962). But see Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md. 1955).
17 South Carolina and Wyoming have no statute of limitations. Kentucky,
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and West Virginia have no limitation
for bringing indictments for felonies. See N.C. GE-,. STAT. § 15-1 (1965) for a
statute of limitations on misdemeanors.
"S Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 227 (1967) (concurring opinion).
" People v. Hryciuk, 36 Ill. 2d. 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967) ; Bell v. Mississippi,
- Miss. -, 220 So. 2d 287 (1969) ; cases cited notes 35, 37, 38 & 39 infra; see
Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982, 984 (1963) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); cf.
Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd sub. norn. United States v.
Provoo, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam); Rost v. Municipal Ct., 184 Cal. App.
2d 507, 7 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1960).
2-E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1958); United
States v. McIntyre, 271 F. Supp. 991, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Hollars,
266 N.C. 45, 52, 145 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1965). But see People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.
353, 358, 130 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1955).
"1 Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1602
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Lagging Right to Speedy Trial].
22 275 N.C. at 272, 167 S.E.2d at 280.
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accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long
delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.23
The first two have no relevance to the situation of the potential defen-
dant. -owever, the third purpose is pertinent: The potential defendant
is even more susceptible to the hazards of a long-delayed trial than is one
formally accused. The latter is aware that prosecution is impending
and will seek out witnesses in his behalf; on the other hand, the potential
defendant "who is oblivious to the fact that the police have focused
suspicion upon him . . . has no reason to marshall his evidence or even
fix in his mind the events of the time in question.
'2-
One f actor often considered 25 in determining if a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial is whether he has been prejudiced by
the delay. There are two basic types of prejudice that can result from
a denial of speedy trial-prejudice to the ability of the defendant to
receive a fair trial and prejudice to the defendant in such ancillary post-
trial matters as sentencing 2' and parole. In Johnson the court focused on-
prejudice in these post-trial matters. A defendant, like Johnson, who is-
already serving a sentence for another offense faces a great likelihood of
prejudice in ancillary matters if his trial is delayed. In its opinion the
North Carolina court disclosed a strong probability of prejudice as far
as sentencing is concerned:
Had this case been tried during the fall of 1963 the record suggests
(1) that defendant would have plead guilty in Nash just as he had done
in Edgecombe, and Wilson, and (2) that Judge Fountain, who had
imposed concurrent sentences for the ... [other] crimes . . . would
have permitted the Nash County sentence to run concurrently with
the others.27
In a recent decision, Lawrence v. Blackwell,2s a federal district court
also recognized the problem of ancillary prejudice likely to result from
the state's delaying indictment on other charges when the defendant is
already serving a sentence. Smnith v. Hooey2" was interpreted by that
'^"United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
' Lagging Right to Speedy Trial 1613.
-'State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).
" In North Carolina a sentence imposed runs concurrently as a matter of law
with other sentences already in force unless the sentencing judge orders to the
contrary. State v. Efrid, 271 N.C. 73i, 157 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1967) (per curiam).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-6.2 (1965).
" 275 N.C. at 275. 167 S.E.2d at 282.
'298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
" 393 U.S. 374 (1969). The Supreme Court extended the right to speedy
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court as requiring that no additional restrictions be imposed upon a
prisoner who has had a detainer filed against him if the state filing the
detainer has not made a diligent, good faith effort to bring him to trial
within a reasonable time after the filing.30 The court recognized that
prisoners with detainers filed against them suffer more restrictions than
their fellow inmates: The detainers have the effect of limiting their
eligibility for parole,31 of causing them to live in more restricted quar-
ters, and often of preventing them from taking part in a work release
program.
Because the court in Johnson found prejudice to the defendant in
sentencing and parole rights, it was unnecessary for it to reach and
discuss prejudice in the trial of the case itself-such as the inability of a
defendant to reconstruct an alibi.32 In recent years other courts that have
applied the right to speedy trial to the potential defendant 3 have had
to wrestle with this problem. Quite likely North Carolina courts in the
future will face it when they are presented with speedy trial cases that,
unlike Johnson, do not disclose post-trial prejudice.
The issue of prejudice at the trial stage involves a dual problem: the
quantum of prejudice that must be shown and the placement of the burden
of proof. Although several courts have dealt with the problem, "[i]t is
quite clear that no uniform test has yet been devised which has gained
universal acceptance."3 One view is that an accused, claiming that he
was denied a speedy trial when he was a potential defendant, must show
trial to encompass those persons already serving a prison sentence in another
jurisdiction. The Court was unclear as to the remedy that must be provided such
a defendant.
"o Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 714 (N.D. Ga. 1969). If the state
were required to attempt to secure the prisoner for speedy trial in its jurisdiction
as soon as it had probable cause to arrest and it had discovered his whereabouts,
much of this ancillary prejudice could be eliminated. Certainly if a defendant is
incarcerated in the same jurisdiction as the one seeking to try him, the state would
have no difficulty in providing the defendant with a speedy trial.
" It was pointed out in Johnson that the defendant was prejudiced with regard
to his parole rights by the filing of the detainer against him. 275 N.C. at 274,
167 S.E.2d at 281.
2 Johnson's counsel raised the possibility of this type of prejudice toward his
client at both the superior court trial and at the appellate level, but the supreme
court did not discuss the issue. Record at 22-23, State v. Johnson, 3 N.C. App.
420 (1969); Brief for Appellant at 6-7, State v. Johnson, 3 N.C. App. 420 (1969).
" Most of the cases dealing with the potential defendant have been narcotics
cases where undercover agents had operated in an area for several months and
then indicted at one time all of those persons from whom they had made illicit pur-
chases. See cases cited notes 35, 37, 38 & 39 infra.
", State v. Rountree, 106 N.J. Super. 135, -, 254 A.2d 337, 344 (Middlesex
County Ct. 1969).
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actual prejudice."5 Courts holding the defendant to a showing of actual
prejudice are in reality saying that the right to speedy trial rarely at-
taches to the potential defendant; it is almost impossible for a defendant
to prove actual prejudice if he cannot remember his activities on the date
of the offense. Although the North Carolina court did not have to reach
this issue, it indicated that a showing of actual prejudice probably would
not be required. 6
In Ross v. United States3 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the defendant's inability to reconstruct his where-
abouts on the date of the alleged offense was sufficient to show prejudice
and that the prosecution's inability to show good cause for delaying the
indictment must result in a determination that the defendant's right to a
speedy trial was denied. Thus a showing of the possibility of prejudice
was adequate; the burden was placed on the defendant to prove possible
prejudice, but on the state to show that the delay was necessary.38
In State v. RountreeN9 a New Jersey county court reached what
seems to be the most workable and desirable solution to the problem of
prejudice and the burden of proof. The court recognized that a purposeful
delay, caused by the use of undercover agents in the detection of narcotics
offenses, must be accepted to some extent in the interest of effective prose-
cution. The court found that only when the delay reaches such proportions
that the ability to conduct a defense is materially affected is there pre-
sumptively a violation of the guarantee of the right to a speedy trial.
40
The initial burden, therefore, should be on the accused to demonstrate
a plausible claim of inability to remember the events of the day of the
offense and to show that he has consequently been prejudiced. This
burden should be one of a "preponderance of the probabilities, that is,
something beyond a mere assertion of an inability to recall or recon-
struct."
41
.United States v. Curry, 278 F. Supp. 508, 513 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
"State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 276-77, 167 S.E.2d 274, 283 (1969).
349 F.2d 210, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
But in a decision following Ross, Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705,
708 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court stated that the burden of proof was on the de-
fendant to establish both that there was no legitimate reason for the delay and that
he was prejudiced by it.
" 106 N.J. Super. 135, 254 A.2d 337 (Middlesex County Ct. 1969).
,o Id. at -, 254 A.2d at 345.
' Id. When a defendant cannot remember his whereabouts on the date of the
offense, the court should take into account the length of delay in determining
whether a showing of inability to reconstruct the events demonstrates a probability
of prejudice.
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Although this quantum of proof is greater than the reasonable pos-
sibility of prejudice referred to in Ross v. United States,42 it nonetheless
seems warranted. Otherwise all that would be necessary for a defendant
to establish a prima facie showing of prejudice would be merely to assert
that he did not remember where he was or what he was doing on the
date of the alleged offense. But if the accused should make a showing of
prejudice by a preponderance of the probabilities, under Rountree the bur-
den of proof shifts to the prosecution to show that the pre-arrest delay was
necessary.43 This procedure seems wiser than leaving the burden on the
defendant to show that the delay was unnecessary. It is the state that has
caused the delay; therefore, the state should be in a better position to
show why it delayed.
A further analysis of the approach in Rountree seems to indicate that,
as an alternative to proving necessary delay, the state should be allowed
to rebut the defendant's showing of prejudice. For instance, most nar-
cotics cases involve the uncorroborated testimony of the undercover agent
that he has made a "buy," and it would be virtually impossible for the
prosecution to rebut the showing of prejudice although it might win its
case on establishing necessary delay. In Johnson, an armed robbery case,
the state's evidence consisted of a confession and an eye-witness identifi-
cation. Such evidence alone, absent a showing of ancillary post-trial
prejudice, should be sufficient to try the defendant over his assertion
that he was prejudiced , because he could not remember his whereabouts
on the date of the offense.
The most intrigping question raised by applying the right to speedy
trial to -the potential defendant is determining at what precise point
this right attaches. The court i. Johnson provided no clear answer. The
defendant was- apprehended almost immediately after the crime was com-
mitted; he confessed and implicated another person in the armed robbery.
The state claimed that it did not indict Johnson immediately because it
was looking for the odier person' and felt that Johnson would not testify
against his accomplice if he himself had already 'been tried, and sentenced
,42 349 F.2d 210 (D.C.. Cir, 1965).
.. State v. Rountree, 106 N.J. Super. 135,,-,, 254 A.2d 337, 345 (Middlesex
County Ct. 1969). The court in Johnson also recognized that certain reasonable
delays on the part. of theprosecution were justified, but it never made clear what
would be reasonable. Delay caused by the state's identifying or locating a co-
defendant hopefully -would be sufficient; to constitute a reasonable delay, In' nar-
cotics cases evidence of a reasonable delay, might consist of a showing up until the
time, of.the indictment the, undercover agent was making initial "buys" from new
sellers or was making contacts with suppliers.
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for the offense. Over four years later the state gave up its effort to ap-
prehend the accomplice and proceeded to indict Johnson. At some point
in this sequence of events the right to speedy trial attached.
If the right to speedy trial attaches at the moment the prosecution
acquires probable cause to arrest, the state would be required to make
public the fact of its investigation, perhaps a still ongoing one, by taking
the defendant into custody and warning him of his rights. In many cases
the prosecution's chances of gathering sufficient evidence to convince a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt would be lessened.
The state's ability to protect society from criminals would be greatly
burdened. Such a concept of the right to speedy trial runs contrary to
the generally accepted latitude allowed the police by the courts regarding
the time when they must press charges. "Law enforcement officers have
a right to wait in the hope that they may strengthen their case by ferret-
ing out further evidence or discovering and identifying confederates and
collaborators."44
The court in Johnson recognized these problems and pointed out' that
the state could delay "to protect and promote further responsible, police
investigation"45 and indict when the "case against a suspect, is-complete
and the testimony to convict him is at hand."4  This statement would
seem to indicate that even if the right to speedy trial -attaches at the,
moment of acquiring probable cause, the state would, be 'justified in a
delay based on the need for further investigation., ,However, the' court
raised further problems when it set forth this guideline for-'reaisonable de-'
lay by the prosecution. Such a rule necessarily requires : 'g reat deal of
hindsight. It is impossible for the prosecution t6 dterfi'ine the preciie
moment at which it has enough evidence t6'convict. 'A 'determinatioh of
guilt is left up to the members of the jury, and it is- never- lear just what
evidence will convince them beyond a reasonable doubt of'thle defendant's
guilt. In addition, how will the prosecutiont ever determine that -its
case is complete, that it has all the evidenceit will'eve obtain, or that it
will be unable to find the evidence it'had been hoping to find ?' In, the
future' the prosecution will have t6 balanice the desiiabil y of postp0ing
formal charges in order further to investigate 1against the possibility that
"Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,, 366 U.S.
944 (1961).
"275 N.C. at 273; 167 S.E.2d at 280. . . ... i
' Id. , . , ' '
'In Johnson the court found, that a four-year delay while attempting to 'findaI
collaborator was, unreasonable. Id. - ' ," , 1 o.. ' ,,
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such delay might later be declared unreasonable and thus void the prose-
cution's efforts altogether.
The court also stated that the state has the "duty . . . to file formal
charges when their case against a suspect is complete."4 This duty is
tantamount to a duty to arrest. If the state has this duty, then it would
seem to follow that the defendant has the correlated right to be arrested.
This constitutional doctrine is one that the United States Supreme Court
itself has declined to adopt.
49
If the right to a speedy trial and the right to be arrested attach at the
point of the prosecution's acquiring probable cause, all that the defendant
needs to show is prejudice to his defense resulting from the state's delay
in arrest. If he can make such a showing and the state is unable to show
necessity for the delay, then the defendant is entitled to the remedy of
dismissal of his case.5" This remedy has normally been reserved only
for those who have been denied a speedy trial after they have been in-
dicted.
Having both the right to a speedy trial and the right to be arrested
attach at the moment of probable cause creates a new problematic situa-
tion. This new possibility is the specter of an evidentiary exclusionary
rule for the enforcement of sixth amendment rights,5 ' something never
fashioned or declared by any court in this country. Such a possibility
would occur, for example, in a case where the state delayed arrest for
six months after it had acquired probable cause, and at the trial the de-
fendant could not show that this delay prejudiced his own defense on the
merits but could show that the interval between probable cause and actual
arrest was a "fruitful" period for the state in the gathering of evidence.
If in fact the defendant's rights had been violated because he was not
48 275 N.C. at 273, 167 S.E.2d at 280.
"' Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Nothing ... in any ... case that has come to our attention, even remotely
suggests this novel and paradoxical constitutional doctrine, and we decline
to adopt it now. There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police
are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they
have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth
Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if
they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty
to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum
evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall
short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.
Id. at 310.
"o State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 277, 167 S.E.2d 274, 283 (1969).
1 The exclusionary rule has been applied to the states in cases involving fourth
and fifth amendment rights. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search
and seizure); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confession).
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arrested earlier, why would he not be entitled to have excluded from use
against him any evidence acquired by the state during the delay? Taken
to its logical conclusion, such a new interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment leads to an illogical result because the right to a speedy trial as a
shield for the defendant's protection will have become a sword for his
escape.
5 2
By extending the right to a speedy trial to the period before indict-
ment, the North Carolina court has opened "a Pandora's box of nice
distinctions" :53 problems of proof, the precise point at which the right
attaches, and the possibility of an exclusionary rule. But at least North
Carolina has faced the problem of the potential defendant's right to a
speedy trial. Other courts have availed themselves of the protective .cloak
provided by statutes of limitations 4 to avoid resolution of this problem.
Such a cloak will have to be shed in the future, for a statute of limitations
merely puts a maximum limit on the time for indictment; only the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial can put the minimum limit on it.
North Carolina, in this area among the legal pioneers, has taken its first,
and therefore the most difficult, step in recognizing that a potential de-
fendant has, just as a defendant already under indictment, a basic right to
a speedy trial.
JOAN G. BRANNON
Domestic Relations-Evidence-Testimony by One Spouse against the
Other of Adultery Excluded under North Carolina Law
At common law neither husband nor wife was a competent witness
in any action to which the other spouse was a party.' Except in crim-
inal cases, this rule of disqualification has been largely overturned by
statute or by judicial decision in American jurisdiction's.2 In North Caro-
12 State v. Patton, 260 N.C. 359, 364, 132 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1969); Note, The
Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 853 (1957).
" Lagging Right to Speedy Trial 1617.
" See generally Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Pene-
trable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1954).
" C. M CORMIICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; D. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 58 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANSBURY].
'Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against The Other in Criminal
Cases Where The Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications:
Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359-60 (1952). Both husband and wife are fully
competent to testify either for or against their respective spouses in civil cases in
the majority of jurisdictions. MCCORMICK § 66.
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lina husband and wife are generally "competent and compellable to give
evidence, as any other witness on behalf of any party" in a civil action.3
The purpose of this section, North Carolina General Statutes § 8-56
(1953), is to abrogate the common law disability in civil actions and to
list the exceptions thereto. One exception is that neither spouse is com-
petent to testify "for or against the other in any action or proceeding in
consequence of adultery, or in any action or proceeding for divorce on
account of adultery."4
Though worded differently, a similar exception is found in North
Carolina General Statutes § 50-10 (1966)
The material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce shall
be deemed to be denied by the defendant, whether the same shall be
actually denied by pleading or not, and no judgment shall be given in
favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been
found by a jury, and on such trial neither the husband nor wife shall be
a competent witness to prove the adultery of the other, nor shall the ad-
missions of either party be received as evidence to prove such fact ....
It is significant that this provision in Chapter 50, Divorce and Alimony,
is cross referenced to section 8-56 and that these statutes are often con-
sidered together.'
The proper application of these statutory rules of evidence was ques-
tioned recently in Hicks v. Hicks.7 The plaintiff husband sued for absolute
divorce on the grounds of a one-year separation.$ The defendant wife
answered by denying plaintiff's allegations. Alleging abandonment and
indignities on the part of the plaintiff, she sought temporary alimony and
alimony without divorce by cross action.' Plaintiff replied denying her
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-56 (1953).
'Id. The other exceptions are not material to this note.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1966) (emphasis added).
E.g., 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 65 (3d ed. 1963) [herein-
after cited as LEE].
'275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969).
' The plaintiff also alleged his wife's adultery; however, he was nonsuited on
this cause of action.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (1966), providing for alimony without divorce, was
repealed by the 1967 General Assembly. Ch. 1152, § 1 & ch. 1153, § 1 [1967] N.C.
Sess. L. 1766, 1772. Mrs. Hicks had filed her cross action prior to Oct. 1, 1967,
the effective date of repeal, and the court held that she had proceeded pursuant to
this section. 275 N.C. at 373, 167 S.E.2d at 762-63. The court also held that an
action for alimony without divorce under section 50-16 was a divorce action within
the purview of that portion of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1966) that prohibits the
husband or wife from testifying to prove adultery of the opposing spouse. Id. at
375, 167 S.E.2d at 764.
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allegations and asserting defendant's adultery as a bar to them 10 and as
justification of his separation from her.
At trial the plaintiff offered testimony of his wife's adultery both as
recrimination" to her cross action and as rebuttal to her defense of
willful abandonment. If allowed to testify, the plaintiff would have stated
that on January 8, 1964, he returned home and discovered his wife
engaged in an act of adultery.' 2 The trial court ruled that this evidence
was excluded by statute.'3 The record does not indicate upon which statute
the trial court was relying nor does it include any judicial interpretation
of either pertinent statute.
The court of appeals reversed,' 4 reasoning:
At the time the challenged testimony was offered, plaintiff's action
for divorce on the grounds of adultery had been dismissed; Therefore,
it was not offered "in any action or proceeding for divorce on account
of adultery" as forbidden by G.S. 8-56. For the same reason, the pro-
hibition set forth in G.S. 50-10 was not applicable because a divorce
action grounded on adultery was not being tried at the time.'Y
The remainder of the court's opinion is concerned chiefly with whether the
challenged testimony offended that portion of section 8-56 barring spousal
testimony "in any action or proceeding in consequence of adultery." Hence,
for all practical purposes, the court of appeals dismissed section 50-10
with only a sentence. In arriving at the conclusion that the testimony did
1* N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (1966) in part provided "that in all applications for
a!imony under this section it shall be competent for the husband to plead the
adultery of the wife in bar of her right to such alimony . .. ."
" The doctrine of recrimination provides, in effect, that "if both parties have
a right to a divorce, neither of the parties has." 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 67 (1959).
The court in Hicks considered the plaintiff's plea in bar as provided for in section
50-16 as a defense of recrimination, though the defendant was asking for alimony
without divorce.
Recrimination has often been criticized and many jurisdictions have limited its
application. It is not the purpose of this note to analyze the validity of the doc-
trine. However, for a thorough discussion of recrimination and its applicability to
modern society, see Moore, Recrimination: An Examination of the Recrimination
Doctrine, 20 S.C.L. REv. 685 (1968). It has been observed that this doctrine
tends to breed collusion. 24 A~m. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 226 (1966).
Thus, recrimination appears to be in direct conflict with the legislative intent of
N.C. GE-N-. STAT. § 8-56 (1953) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1966). See note 22
infra.
" Brief for Appellant at 6, Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681
(1969).
" Record at 56, Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681 (1969).
"' Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681 (1969).
'r Id. at 32, 165 S.E.2d at 683.
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not offend section 8-56, the court of appeals explored the former North
Carolina case law on the subject and emphasized that the purpose of the
statute is to prevent collusive divorces.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed,'" although it agreed
that section 8-56 was not controlling for the reasons given by the court
of appeals I However, the court distinguished section 50-10 from section
8-56 on the basis that:
The provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-10 are not limited to "any
action or proceeding for divorce on account of adultery" or "actions or
proceedings in consequence of adultery," but includes "every complaint
asking for a divorce.""'
The court relied heavily upon the statement of Justice Ruffin in Perkins
v. Perkins :"9
The provision of the statute is so pointed and its language so plain-
that in such trials, neither the husband nor the wife shall be a com-
petent witness to prove the adultery of the other, nor shall the admis-
sions of either be received as evidence to prove such fact-as to leave no
room for doubt or construction.
2 0
However, Perkins needs to be explored only to the next sentence of
that opinion for an authoritative statement of the legislative intent behind
the statute:
This prohibition, as has been often said by the court, proceeds out
of'. . . that interest which society has at stake in the preservation of
the marriage relations of its members, . . .and it is the duty of the
courts to see that neither this policy of the law nor public interest is
impaired through the collusion of the parties, and in fact that it shall
not even encounter the risk of being so impaired: for . . . this policy
of excluding the admissions of the parties depends, not so much upon
the ground that there is collusion between them, as upon the danger
that there may be.2 1
"8Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969).
11Id. at 374, 167 S.E.2d at 763.
1 Id. at 378, 167 S.E.2d at 766.
1988 N.C. 41 (1883).
20 Id. at 43, quoted in Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 378, 167 S.E.2d 761, 766
(1969). The court in Hicks pointed out that Justice Ruffin in Perkins was inter-
preting what is now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10.
"1 88 N.C. at 43 (emphasis added).
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In Perkins the husband's divorce action on the grounds of adultery was
pending at the time he proposed to testify that his wife had admitted to
him her commission of an act of adultery. Thus, there existed a possi-
bility of collusive divorce on those grounds. In the words of Justice
Ruffin:
It is impossible to conceive of a case more certainly coming within
the mischief of the statute than the present, or one in which its enforce-
ment could be more necessary, because of the opportunity for collusion
afforded by the very nature of the accusation and the length of the time
since the offence is said to have occurred.
22
In a collusive divorce the parties are working together through a
corrupt agreement toward a common goal of divorce.' The collusion
may consist of "(1) the commission of an offense for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, or (2) the introduction of false evidence of an
offense not actually committed, or (3) the suppression of a valid de-
fense."'24 In any instance, the objective of collusion is divorce by mutual
consent. 5 In such a case, the court, which is an interested party in
every divorce action because of society's high regard for the marital rela-
tionship,28 must assume the role of adversary, "probe for . . . collusion
and deny a divorce if [it] seems to be present."
27
"Id. at 44 (emphasis added). For further authority that "[t]hese statutes
are designed not only to prevent collusion where the same exists, but to remove
the opportunity for it," see 1 LEE § 65, at 265. See Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10,
16, 116 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1960) ; Hooper v. Hooper, 165 N.C. 605, 608, 81 S.E. 933,
934 (1914) ; STANSnURY § 58.
An argument may be found in Broom v. Broom, 130 N.C. 562, 564, 41 S.E. 673,
674 (1902), that "in view of the strong feeling incident to contested divorce pro-
ceedings," a further purpose of the statutes is to prevent perjury. The possibility
of perjury may be great in all contested divorce proceedings and does not appear
to warrant a disqualification statute in the area of adultery alone. The argument
in Broom has not been cited in recent opinions nor by the scholars in the field.
1 LE § 85.
Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36
CoLum. L. REv. 1121, 1122-23 (1936).
" Divorce is not to be granted upon mutual consent of the parties alone. Id. at
1121. N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-6 (1966), which allows divorce after a voluntary
separation for a period of one year, is an indication of a breakdown in the historical
requisite of fault before divorce. Approximately ninety-seven percent of divorces
in North Carolina are granted under this statute. 1 LEE § 68. This change in
policy in both North Carolina and other jurisdictions may foreshadow adoption of
divorce by mutual consent. The thrust of such legislation would definitely mitigate
the mandate against collusive divorces. Interestingly enough, though the court
warns constantly of the danger of such divorces, a divorce has never been refused
in North Carolina on the basis of collusion. Id. § 85.
" 1 LEE § 85.
2"' d.
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As reaffirmed in the supreme court's opinion, North Carolina recognizes
the doctrine of recrimination 2 -- a common law rule that bars the moving
party's right to divorce (or, as interpreted in Hicks, alimony without
divorce) 29 if it is proved that the moving party has himself been guilty of
misconduct that would entitle the opposing spouse to a divorce.30 Though
offered in this context-to bar his wife's cross action for alimony without
divorce-the husband's testimony was excluded as incompetent under
section 50-10, a statute drafted to prevent collusion. Where one spouse
pleads recrimination, however, the relationship of the parties is different
from their relationship in a collusive proceeding. Successful recrimina-
tion precludes divorce, thereby frustrating the ultimate result of success-
ful collusion.
Where such a plea is offered as a bar to the moving spouse's action,
there is a true adversary proceeding. The parties, rather than being
allied, are opposing one another; and the integrity of the court is not in
jeopardy through collusion. Furthermore, it is quite doubtful that a
husband would ever collude in his wife's action for alimony without divorce
or that society is greatly concerned in a proceeding where the marital bond
is not to be severed completely. Allowing the husband to testify to his
wife's adultery in this instance would in no way offend the purpose of the
statute.
The challenged testimony was also offered to justify the husband's
leaving his wife. In this regard, such testimony would serve two pur-
poses. First, it would be invaluable as a defense to his wife's cross action
on grounds of abandonment. One issue presented to the jury was whether
the plaintiff had unlawfully abandoned his wife "without adequate provoca-
tion."31 Certainly, if the husband's contentions were believed by the
jury, it should not have been answered in the affirmative.
3 2
In addition, the testimony would have been beneficial to the husband's
action for divorce on the basis of a one-year separation. The plaintiff
would normally have been entitled to divorce upon a finding by the jury
that the plaintiff and defendant had lived separate and apart within the
meaning of North Carolina General Statutes § 50-6 (1966) for a period
= Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 373, 167 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1969).
29 See note 11 supra.
30 275 N.C. at 373, 167 S.E.2d at 763.
"1Record at 19, Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681 (1969) (em-
phasis added).
" "The general rule is that the commission of adultery by one of the spouses
justifies the other in leaving, or in remaining away from, the matrimonial dom-
icile .... ." 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 56(4) (1959).
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of one year next preceding the filing of the complaint. A recognized
defense to divorce under section 50-6 is that the separation was brought
about by the plaintiff's willful abandonment.3 3 The burden of proof on
this latter issue was upon the defendant wife, 4 and she presented evi-
dence to the effect that she had been abandoned. The husband sought
to testify, as rebuttal to his wife's defense, that he felt justified in leaving
upon finding her in the act of adultery. This testimony was also ruled
incompetent for purposes of such rebuttal.
The policy of the statute by which the testimony was excluded would
not have been violated if such testimony were ruled admissible in either
of the above two instances. As a successful defense, the testimony would
have defeated the wife's cross action based on abandonment. Collusion
cannot succeed without a prevailing party. If the testimony were allowed
as rebuttal to the wife's abandonment defense, and if such testimony were
found as a fact by the jury, the husband would have succeeded in his
divorce action-not on the grounds of adultery, but on the grounds of
separation. It is doubtful that the policy against collusive divorces is
applicable to proceedings under section 50-6,85 for the nature of the statute
presupposes an agreement between the parties to do an act that will
entitle them to divorce. Furthermore, it is self-evident that if the wife
had agreed to divorce on these grounds, she would not have raised the
defense.
In analyzing Biggs v. Biggs,6 a decision in which testimony offered
in a different context was held to violate neither section 8-56 nor section
50-10 Justice Branch said in his opinion in the instant case: "[The] [d] e-
cision in Biggs rested largely on the interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8-56 and upon the reasoning that the public policy against collusion or
the opportunity for collusion in divorce actions was not violated.3 7 The
" O'Brien v. O'Brien, 266 N.C. 502, 504, 146 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1966).
"Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 132, 125 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1962).
" See 1 LEE § 85. Certainly the court would refuse a divorce if it determined
that the parties had colluded to defraud the court by testifying falsely to the fact
of separation or in regard to the residency requirement. However, in Hicks the
"separation" was established, and the issue before the court was whether the plain-
tiff was at fault in bringing it about.
- 253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960).
"'Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 377, 167 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1969) (emphasis
added). Justice Branch continued, "In instant case it would seem that public
policy would also demand that the wife be protected against the absolute defense
of adultery which the husband sought to prove by his own testimony." Id. at 377,
167 S.E.2d at 765 (emphasis added). It is unclear to what public policy Justice
Branch referred in the above-quoted portion of the opinion. Certainly, "the public
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opinion in Hicks indicates that the court, though appearing to approve
the decision in Biggs and to recognize the policy behind section 8-56 upon
which that decision was based, either overlooked or dismissed the fact
that the policy behind section 50-10 is the same and should be controlling.
The court turned from any discussion of policy, distinguished the two
statutes on the fact that they are worded differently, 8 and rested its
holding upon the quotation from Perkins0 while ignoring completely
the policy that Justice Ruffin found so important to that decision.
The effect of Hicks is that section 50-10 is extended beyond its
policy-oriented base. Such an extension can lead only to future injustice
and underhanded methods of procuring "competent" testimony. The in-
significance of collusion in North Carolina divorce law40 may indicate
the advisability of repeal of both this statute and its counterpart in
section 8-56. At least, Hicks suggests the need for a closer look by both
the legislature and the court.
JAMES LEE DAVIS
Federal Jurisdiction-Federal Court Intervention as Protection
Against Illegal Police Harassment
"I found there's no correlation between a clean-shaven cheek and
morality-and there's no correlation between long hair and immo-
rality."1 The words might well have been those of the district judge
who in the recent case of Wheeler v. Goodnwn2 observed:
Hippies, like more conventional householders, are entitled to the pro-
tection of the constitution, and the court would be remiss if it allowed
policy against collusion or the opportunity for collusion in divorce actions" was not
violated.
Historically, preservation of family harmony has also been an important policy
consideration of the court. There is no indication, however, that this policy has
valid application to the statutory disability under consideration. Certainly, if the
facts are as the husband contended, the parties in Hicks are beyond reconciliation.
275 N.C. at 378, 167 S.E.2d at 766.
s' See text at note 20 supra. The court also relied partially upon Becker v.
Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964), a case presenting a similar factual
situation, in which the testimony was summarily excluded without any discussion of
policy.
,' See note 25 supra.
1NEwswEEK, Sept. 1, 1969, at 22A, quoting Beverly Hills, California, police
chief Joseph Kimble after observing the White Lake, New York, rock festival.2 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (McMillan, J.)
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the length of a man's hair or the thinness of his purse to affect the
measure of his civil rights 3
In Wheeler, the "hippie" plaintiffs were living in a rented house in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Over a short period of time, members of the
Charlotte police force made several searches both of the house and of
its occupants. The police also seized from the house several items that
were not returned. Finally, on January 9, 1969, after hearing "profane
talk," several police officers entered and arrested the persons within
for vagrancy. In district criminal court the next day, a nolle prosequi
with leave was taken by the prosecution. Both before and after this in-
cident, the police warned visitors and occupants of the house to leave and
not to return. These practices continued after the vagrancy charges until,
aided by police presence, the owner of the house evicted the "hippies."
The "hippies" then brought an action as plaintiffs in federal court
for injunctive and other relief against the Charlotte Police Department.
The court found that the police had violated the plaintiffs' first amend-
ment rights of free expression and free association and that they had
conducted several illegal searches and seizures in violation of the fourth
amendment.4 The court issued a broad injunction, prohibiting the de-
fendant police from investigating, detaining, or prosecuting the plaintiffs
or any other persons under the North Carolina vagrancy statute; from
conducting any unreasonable searches and seizures; and from harassing
the plaintiffs in a manner to discourage them from the exercise of their
first amendment rights. Finally, the court ordered that a three-judge
district court be convened to consider the constitutionality of the North
Carolina vagrancy statute.5
Federal jurisdiction was based upon the alleged deprivation of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The plaintiffs asserted that the general
police harrassment, and specifically the vagrancy violation if the statute
be unconstitutional, deprived them of due process of law. Relief was
sought under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code6 and
3Id. at 942.
lId. at 937-41.
'Id. at 942-44. On November 14, 1969, while this note was in the process of
publication, the three-judge district court ruled the North Carolina vagrancy
statute unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. Raleigh
News & Observer, Nov. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 1-4.
642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction
1969l
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the corresponding jurisdictional statute, section 1343 of Title 28 of the
United States Code.7 These provisions are the basis for federal juris-
diction and relief as to both statutory and non-statutory problems in
Wheeler." The statutory problems, which concern the alleged unconsti-
tutionality of the state vagrancy statute and its application against the
plaintiffs, are within the scope of section 1983 since the vagrancy
statute, if unconstitutional, would under color of state law deprive the
plaintiffs of due process.9 The non-statutory problems, which concern
the police harassment and the infringements of first and fourth amend-
ment rights exclusive of the application of the vagrancy statute, also
state a claim for relief under section 1983 because the "under color of"
wording has been held to encompass even unconstitutional police actions
in excess of legal authority.'
In spite of the proper invocation of federal jurisdiction, certain re-
straints upon its exercise can be examined in the context of Wheeler.
These restrictions, both judicial and statutory, are an effort to control
areas of conflict between state and federal courts and to encourage a har-
monious relationship between the two court systems. The restrictions in-
clude (1) the requirement that in some circumstances original federal
jurisdiction be exercised by three judges rather than one, (2) the pro-
hibition on injunction of a pending state proceeding, and (3) the judicial
concept of abstention as modified by Dombrowski v. Pfister."1
The first restriction concerns the action of the single federal judge in
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
(Emphasis added.)
For a discussion of the "minority group" test under the statute, see Note, Federal
Iurisdictio-Expansion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 47 N.C.L. R.. 922
(1969).
"28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964), provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or im-
munity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including
the right to vote.
8298 F. Supp. at 940.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
1oMonroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
1380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Wheeler in issuing an injunction as relief for both statutory and non-
statutory problems.'" The judge in enjoining enforcement of the va-
grancy statute may have exceeded his powers because it appears that he
was authorized only to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent
irreparable injury.3 The injunction issued against enforcement of the
statute may have, in fact, been relief on the merits and solely within the
province of the three-judge district court. The United States Supreme
Court has pointed out:
When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to
a district court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to deter-
mining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial,
whether the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable
relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the re-
quirements of the three-judge statute. Those criteria were assuredly
met here, and the applicable jurisdictional statute therefore made it
impermissible for a single judge to decide the merits of the case, either
by granting or withholding relief. 14
There would, of course, be no similar bar to the single judge's issuing
an injunction on the merits of the non-statutory claims because no three-
judge court was required to decide them.
Two further restrictions on the exercise of federal jurisdiction remain
to be considered regardless of whether an injunction or a temporary re-
straining order was appropriate. The first is whether federal relief should
be granted to stop "pending" state proceedings in view of the anti-
injunction statute ;15 the second whether federal relief should be withheld
or suspended because of the abstention doctrine.'
The court in Wheeler in discussing the two above restrictions did not
distinguish between the statutory and non-statutory problems. It also ap-
pears to have concluded that the test for both the anti-injunction statute
and abstention doctrine is the same-the seriousness on the merits of the
12298 F. Supp. at 942.
1828 U.S.C. § 2284(3) (1964); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 50, at 166
(1963)." Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962)
(per curiam) (footnote omitted).
1528 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay pro-
ceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effect-
uate its judgments. (emphasis added)
"0See Douglas v. City of Jeannete, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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state deprivations of substantive constitutional rights. In fact, closer
analysis reveals that the statutory and non-statutory problems should
have been considered separately and that the tests for the two restrictions
on jurisdiction are different and distinguishable.
Since there was no state proceeding concerning the alleged unconsti-
tutional infringements exclusive of the vagrancy statute, the non-statutory,
problems created no restriction under the anti-injunction statute on the
federal court's issuance of an injunction. There also was no reason for
application of the abstention doctrine since the sole issues involved federal
constitutional questions; state constitutional or legal provisions, if there
were any, were clear.'8
In considering the statutory questions, the single judge could have
concluded that because only a temporary restraining order should be is-
sued, the anti-injunction statute and abstention doctrine were inap-
plicable. The purpose of the temporary restraining order would have
been to protect the plaintiffs from irreparable injury until the three-judge
court could act on a request for an injunction. By discussing the two
restrictions on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the judge anticipated
a three-judge court and to some extent matters within its discretion. 0
On the other hand, he could have taken the position that a restraining
order should not be issued in respect to the statutory problems if the anti-
injunction statute were a bar or if the three-judge court would properly
abstain on the merits. This supposition will be a basis for a further dis-
cussion of Wheeler.
Plaintiff's central contention concerning the North Carolina vagrancy
statute20 was that it should be held unconstitutional for both vagueness
17298 F. Supp. at 940.
1 8See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1963). North Carolina has
adopted the UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253
to -267 (1953). Even though relief might have been sought in state courts for the
constitutional infringements, abstention was nevertheless improper because the
purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to provide a federal forum. McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
" It appears the single judge could not abstain on the merits because a three-
judge district court was required to determine the constitutionality of the
vagrancy statute. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713,
715 (1962) (per curiam). See also Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1964).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-336 (1953) provides:
If any person shall come within any of the following classes, he shall be
deemed a vagrant...
1. Persons wandering or strolling about in idleness who are able to work
and have no property to support them.
2. Persons leading an idle, immoral or profligate life, who have no prop-
erty to support them and who are able to work and do not work.
3. All persons able to work having no property to support them and who
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and overbreath. The state supreme court has not ruled on the constitu-
tional issue in cases brought under the present statute,21 but recent de-
cisions of other courts suggest that it cannot withstand constitutional at-
tack. Vagueness should refer to the lack of certainty in meaning, over-
breath to the extent of the conduct made criminal by the statute. However,
the term "vagueness" has to some extent been adopted to convey both
meanings. If the North Carolina statute is vague, it is vague not because
of lack of clarity but because it, in fact, makes "conduct" that should not
be subject to such sanctions criminal. Therefore, the statute's constitu-
tionality is open to attack as a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment by an overreaching of the police power of the
state.23
Since the plaintiffs were prosecuted under the vagrancy statute, the
initial problem of the restriction of the federal anti-injunction statute24
is whether it would bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction. This statute
would not apply if section 1983, under which the plaintiffs brought their
action, were an express exception to it. Since the wording of section
1983 creates only broad equity jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the
have not some visible and known means of a fair, honest, and reputable
livelihood.
4. Persons having a fixed abode who have no visible property to support
them and who live by stealing or by trading in, bartering for or buying
stolen property.
5. Professional gamblers living in idleness.
6. All able-bodied men having no other visible means of support who shall
live in idleness upon the wages or earnings of their mother, wife, or minor
children, except of male children over eighteen years old.
7. Keepers and inmates of bawdy-houses, assignation houses, lewd and dis-
orderly houses, and other places where illegal sexual intercourse is
habitually carried on: Provided, that nothing here is intended or shall
be construed as abolishing the crime of keeping a bawdy-house, or
lessening the punishment by law for such crime.
21 State v. Millner, 240 N.C. 602, 83- S.E.2d 546 (1954) ; State v. Harris, 229
N.C. 413, 50 S.E.2d 1 (1948); State v. Oldham, 224 N.C. 415, 30 S.E.2d 318
(1944); State v. Walker, 179 N.C. 730, 102 S.E. 404 (1920); State v. Price,
175 N.C. 804, 95 S.E. 478 (1918).
"Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969) (three-judge court);
Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (municipal vagrancy ordinance);
Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (three-judge court);
Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967); Fenster v.
Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967). In each of
these cases a vagrancy statute or ordinance was held unconstitutional.2 2Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 426, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
24 The background of the anti-injunction statute was fully discussed in Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3.14 U.S. 118, 129-34 (1941), where Justice Frank-
furter outlined the exceptions to the statute existing at that time. The present
version of the anti-injunction statute, adopted in 1948 to overturn the result in
Toucey, allows the federal courts to protect their judgments by enjoining reliti-
gation in state courts. C. WRIGHT, EDERAL CouRTs § 47, at 154-55 (1963).
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Fourth Circuit has held that no such express exception can be implied."
Nevertheless, the history and purpose of section 1983 (though not ex-
pressed in it) suggest strongly that it was intended as an exception, 20 and
another circuit has so held.
7
It is not surprising that the court in Wheeler did not attempt to re-
solve the question of whether section 1983 is an exception to the anti-
injunction statute. Recently the United States Supreme Court has ex-
pressly declined to decide this issue."' The Court did strongly suggest
that the anti-injunction statute applies only if state proceedings are begun
prior to the filing of the federal complaint. The priority for adjudication
is set by the "first in time" principle rather than by the type or nature
of the rights and statutory questions to be resolved.
Thus the precise issue in Wheeler is whether a nolle prosequi with
leave is a "state proceeding" within the meaning of the anti-injunction
statute. 9 It is clear that the state proceedings commenced prior to the
federal action and that the prosecutor decided to delay indefinitely while
controlling whether there would ever be a state trial on the vagrancy
charges. The federal court, in deciding if there was "state proceeding"
"Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 586-96 (4th Cir. 1964). Wheeler
cited this case for its comprehensive review of the issue. 298 F. Supp. at 940."For a discussion of the history and purpose of section 1983, suggesting it
should be an exception to the anti-injunction statute, see Boyer, Federal Injunc-
tive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal Prosecutions De-
signed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51,
88-93 (1967); Note, Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State
Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 92,
97-125 (1966).
2" Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950). Contra, Smith v. Vil-
lage of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220
(6th Cir. 1956).
" The Court declined to decide the issue even though the three-judge district
court held the anti-injunction statute a bar to relief. Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611, 613-14 n.3 (1968), aff'g on other grounds 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss.
1966).
" Possibly the use of nolle prosequi with leave was a violation of plaintiffs'
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, but such a determination is uncertain.
There is no indication in Wheeler that plaintiffs (defendants in the vagrancy ac-
tion) demanded a speedy trial nor is it certain whether a demand is necessary to
prevent a waiver. Clearly the right to a speedy trial is violated when the de-
fendant objects to a nolle prosequi with leave and demands a trial. However,
even without a demand, there may be a violation of the right since the device
allows the prosecutor to delay the trial indefinitely without justification and with-
out defendant's affirmative assent. K-lopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967), noted in 46 N.C.L. REv. 387 (1968), rev'g State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349,
145 S.E.2d 909 (1966), noted in 44 N.C.L. R-v. 1126 (1966). See also State v.
Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969), noted in Note, Criminal Pro-




within the protection of the anti-injunction statute, could have distin-
guished between a normal good-faith delay of the state criminal prosecu-
tion and a delay calculated to threaten or harass the plaintiffs rather than
resolve the actual charges. Of course, the federal courts should not at-
tempt to evaluate ordinary delays in state criminal prosecutions, but the
delay here was no ordinary one. It showed the intention of the prosecu-
tion to avoid trial and a state constitutional test of the vagrancy statute.
So in Wheeler, the federal judge could have applied a test of practical con-
siderations"0 and thus interpreted the state action as "threatened" rather
than "pending." The anti-injunction statute based on the Dombrowski
implication 1 could be construed as applicable to a state proceeding that
was progressing, but not to one where eventual action was merely threat-
ened owing to the peculiar nature of the nolle prosequi with leave.
The final restriction on the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the ab-
stention doctrine, which requires a federal court to decline to adjudicate
a constitutional issue if a subsequent state court ruling on threshold
state law could make the federal adjudication superfluous.3" This doctrine
may be invoked in actions in which a federal injunction is sought against
possible state criminal prosecutions. 3 The federal courts should interfere
in such cases only where abstention is improper and there is clear and
imminent irreparable injury.3 4
Whether a federal court must abstain in a given situation depends
upon several factors, including the following: (1) the probability of a
future constitutional construction of the statute in question by the state
courts; (2) the federal court's evaluation of the alleged vagueness or
overbreath of the statute; (3) the statute's effect on its face on first
amendment rights; and (4) bad faith enforcement of the statute by the
state.3 5 Thus the showing of irreparable injury to avoid abstention de-
pends upon the nature and application of the state statute involved. The
O "As a practical consideration, it is recognized that federal interference with
pending prosecutions would cause greater abrasion between federal and state
courts than interference with threatened prosecutions." Boyer, supra note 26, at
96. = Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
82Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The primary
reasons for the doctrine are (1) to avoid a premature decision of a constitutional
question, (2) to avoid unnecessary conflict with the states, which have the primary
responsibility for deciding the status of their own laws, and (3) to promote federal
judicial economy. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 169 (1963).
" Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
"Id. at 163-64.
"5See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620-21 (1968); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mere possibility that the state courts may not correctly determine its con-
stitutionality is not a sufficient showing of irreparable injury to justify
the issuance of a federal injunction. 0 On the other hand, a showing that
defense of the criminal charges in state court will not adequately protect
the constitutional right of freedom of expression is sufficient. 7 For ex-
ample in Dombrowski, where the state had passed a broad statute to con-
trol subversive activities and propaganda, the Supreme Court found that
even a defense to a criminal prosecution would not adequately protect
freedom of expression because of the impairment of that right during the
long period of trial and ultimate appellate review.'8 In making such a
determination, the Court will almost certainly accord the first amend-
ment right of freedom of association the same level of importance as free-
dom of expression.39
The North Carolina vagrancy statute on its face does not threaten
freedom of expression or association; rather that threat derives from its
selective application against groups unpopular with the police.40 Indeed,
the possibility of such selective enforcement may in itself be a significant
threat to first amendment freedom.4" The criteria for determining selec-
tive enforcement, of course, necessitate an evaluation of the state's good
faith in applying the statute. If the statute has been invoked by the state
in bad faith, the resulting harassment may be sufficient to show irreparable
injury
42
The single factor of bad faith application of a statute is probably not
alone sufficient to preclude abstention. The decision in Cameron v.
"8 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 621 (1968) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
"Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
I88 d.
The Court emphasized the importance of the right of association in NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). While the Wheeler plaintiffs as a group were
not engaged in activity for an important political or social purpose, it seems clear
that the first amendment rights of freedom of expression and association would
fully extend to them even if the purpose of their association were, in terms of com-
munity norms, antisocial or anti-cultural.
,' The pattern of police behavior suggests apprehension that the "hippie house"
would be the center of some criminal activity. However, police assumptions can-
not serve as a basis for the forfeiture of constitutional rights. Likewise, depriva-
tions of constitutional rights cannot be justified as "social control" over an un-
popular and nonconformist group. The police should not attempt to circumvent
the bounds of the Constitution in response to community pressures. In Wheeler,
excluding the vagrancy charges, no criminal activity was proved to have occurred
at the house. 298 F. Supp. at 937.
,Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
" Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620-21 (1968); Dowbrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
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Johnson43 suggests that the nature of the enactment is more determina-
tive in a decision whether to abstain than is just good or bad faith ap-
plication. It is reasonable that a federal court should abstain when a
state statute appears constitutional on its face so that the issue becomes the
bad faith enforcement of a constitutional enactment. If the statute is
constitutional, then the state courts and possible appellate review in the
United States Supreme Court should be adequate to protect the accused's
rights. The alleged bad faith application is then in a sense irrelevant
because the problem is whether the accused committed a provable offense
under the statute.
In Dombrowski the Court held abstention improper because the
statute in question was vague and because
[T]he conduct charged in the indictment is not within the reach of
an acceptable limiting construction readily to be anticipated as the
result of a single criminal prosecution and is not the sort of "hard-
core" conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any construc-
tion.4
4
As was noted earlier, the primary problem with the vagrancy statute at-
tacked in Wheeler is not its uncertainty of meaning but its overbroad
character. Abstention is improper unless the state statute is uncertain
but can be limited to a constitutional construction by state courts.
45 If
the meaning of the vagrancy statute is certain, and it appears for the most
part that it is, then the only remaining problem is whether a state court
could give it a constitutional construction. The conclusion of the court in
Wheeler was that the state courts could not give the vagrancy statute a
constitutional construction.46 It appears that even a narrowing construc-
tion of the statute would still leave significant questions as to its constitu-
tionality.
The court in Wheeler, while determining that the vagrancy statute
was clearly defined, could have concluded that irreparable injury was
'1 390 U.S. 611 (1968). The Court said that bad faith application of a valid
statute was not established by the facts. However, the application of the Mis-
sissippi anti-picketing statute to Negro demonstrators protesting racial discrimina-
tion in voter registration suggests that the state did apply the statute to stifle
protest and not solely to protect access to the local courthouse. The court could
have found bad faith in the passage of the state statute after demonstrations be-
gan, and in its use to protect segregationist state policies. See id. at 620.
"380 U.S. at 491-92.
,Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967).
o298 F. Supp. at 941. Does the judge's decision on this point usurp the de-
cision making process of the three-judge court? See note 19 and accompanying
text supra.
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shown because the delay in prosecution tended to suppress the constitu-
tional rights of the plaintiffs to free association. If such a determination
had been made, even defense of the state criminal prosecution would not
suffice to protect the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. But the court,
relying on Dombrowski, concluded that the vagrancy statute is uncertain
in meaning and that its vagueness chills first amendment rights.47 The
court's reliance is misplaced because the weakness of the vagrancy statute
is not vagueness but overbreath; and unlike the type of enactment in
Dombrowski, the vagrancy statute on its face has nothing to do with
first amendment rights. Dombrowski's application is proper only to
enactments that on their face directly deal with first amendment rights
because it is the threat of the vague statute in relation to those rights
that is the basis of that decision.
The principles of Dombrowski cannot be invoked by the factors of
alleged vagueness and selective enforcement of the statute alone. Vague
state statutes call forth a basic abstention principle-to allow state courts
to construe them in a constitutional manner, if possible, prior to federal
court intervention. Only a statute that is both vague and that on its face
affects first amendment rights should be exempt from abstention. The
factor of selective enforcement of a vague statute actually supports ab-
stention because such enforcement encourages the state courts to interpret
the enactment in question. Abstention applies more clearly where the
interpretation of state law is uncertain.4"
The court in Wheeler, while perhaps not applying the correct prin-
ciples to difficult issues, illustrated that there can be federal relief for
substantial and systematic police harassment. This case involved the ap-
plication of section 1983 to civil rights questions involving neither racial
discrimination nor a mass demonstration; such cases brought under this
statute are rare. The result of the relief granted in Wheeler for the non-
statutory constitutional deprivations could produce a new wave of juris-
prudential problems 49 that may lead to narrower guidelines and limita-
tions if more violent and politically-minded groups seek broad federal
protection against police activities."0
' 298 F. Supp. at 941."8 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
"'For a discussion of how a federal injunction could be used to control con-
stitutional violations, see Note, Federal Injunctions as a Remedy for Unconsli-
tutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 142 (1968).
"0 Such protection could, of course, hamper legitimate police investigations if
the injunctions issued are as broad and comprehensive as the one in Wheeler. The
threat of contempt action against the police under such injunctions could be a
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Only the failure of state law enforcement bodies to observe federal
constitutional principles and the lack of faith in state court implementa-
tion of those principles are responsible for the continuing trend toward
federal intervention in civil rights cases such as Wheeler. State enforce-
ment agencies should be better trained and better supervised to prevent
systematic unconstitutional police harassment. State courts and prose-
cutors both should be careful that procedural devices, such as the nolle
prosequi with leave, are not abused where there is a lack of evidence or a
desire to avoid a constitutional question. The proper forum for matters
of state criminal law enforcement and state criminal statutory interpre-
tation is in the state courts rather than in the federal district courts. But
the principles of Dombrowski can be held to their narrowest construction
by the federal courts only if the states through their law enforcement and
judicial institutions provide adequate safeguards against the deprivation
of constitutional rights.
NORMAN E. SMITH
Income Tax-Tests under Section 117 for Exclusion of
Educational Grants
Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the exclusion
from gross income of amounts received as scholarships or fellowships.'
Prior to its enactment there was no specific statutory provision covering
educational stipends. Instead, the inquiry was "[w]hether such grants
. ..fell within the broad provision excluding from income amounts re-
significant deterrent to effective police action. For a discussion of possible limita-
tions on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions and the policy considerations behind such
limitations, see Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in tie Wake of Monroe
v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486 (1969).
1 The section reads in part:
§ 117. Scholarships and fellowship grants.
(a) General rule-In the case of an individual, gross income does not in
clude-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151(e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
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ceived as 'gifts.' 2 The intent of Congress in passing section 117 was
to exclude scholarships and fellowships as a separate category of income,
thereby avoiding the artificial income-gift distinction.' In doing so, Con-
gress evidently hoped to prevent inconsistent ad hoc court determinations
of qualifying stipends.
The Treasury Department has provided guidelines for application of
the statute in a regulation defining a scholarship as ".... an amount paid
or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an undergraduate
or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies."'4 In addi-
tion to satisfying this definition, the income in question must not fall
within either of two categories established in section 1.117-4(c) of the
Treasury Regulations. First, the exclusion is denied for any amount
paid to enable an individual ". . . to pursue studies or research, if such
amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future em-
ployment services or represents payment for services which are subject
to the direction or supervision of the grantor."' An employment rela-
tionship between the scholar and his sponsor usually is sufficient to place
the income within this category. Second, the stipend is taxed if the
recipient pursues ". . . studies or research primarily for the benefit of
the grantor."' The "primary purpose" test has been developed to de-
termine whether the grant is covered by this language. In Bingler v.
Johnsonj the Supreme Court had its first occasion to apply section 117
and to rule on the validity of the tests furnished by section 1.117-4(c)
of the Treasury Regulations. In Johnson, a corporation offered a pro-
gram in which employees were granted time from work to complete the
course of study for a doctorate in a field related to the employee's work
with the company. To qualify for the program, an employee was required
to sign a contract obligating himself to work for the company for two
years after he received his doctorate. When the course work had been
=Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752 (1969) (footnote omitted). See, e.g.,
George W. Stone, 23 T.C. 254 (1954).'H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (a) (1956). A fellowship is an amount "... paid or
allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study
or research." Id. § 1.117-3(c).
'Id. § 1.117-4(c) (1).'Id. § 1.117-4(c) (2).
'394 U.S. 741 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissented on the grounds of the circuit
court holding). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that the
amounts received under the program were excludable. Johnson v. Bingler, 396
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968). In reaching its decision that court held Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.117-4(c) invalid as being contrary to congressional intent and an
improper reading of section 117. Id.
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completed, the employee was granted an educational leave in order to
write his doctoral dissertation, the subject of which required company
approval. The employee received tuition expenses, a stipend based on his
current salary and number of dependents, and retained such employee
benefits as seniority.
The question presented to the Court was whether a stipend paid
under such an educational leave program constituted a "scholarship"
excludable from income under section 117. The Court held that the
amounts received under the program could not be excluded because they
failed to pass the employment relationship test. In upholding section
1.117-4(c) of the Treasury Regulations, the Court approved the tech-
nique that had been used by the lower courts and the Treasury Depart-
ment-application of the "primary purpose" test and the employment
relationship test to decide each case on its particular facts without estab-
lishing more definite standards.
Except where part-time work is required, scholarships or fellowships
have generally fallen within section 117 without having to survive such
tests. But the tests have been applied to stipends paid degree candidates
when more than mere class attendance is expected of them. The Code pro-
vides for the taxation of money received for ". . . teaching, research, or
any services in the nature of part-time employment. ."' even if the work
is mandatory for scholarship recipients. If the work is required of all
candidates for that degree, however, the pay is excludable.'
This rather straightforward provision has been inconsistently inter-
preted by the Treasury and the courts. For instance, the exclusion was
allowed nursing students who worked in a hospital and received room
and board;1" a doctoral candidate in psychology required to work part-
time at a Veterans Administration hospital;" students of medical tech-
nology doing laboratory work ;12 students attending a college that de-
manded work of every student ;1' a student conducting research in physics
where it was required of all candidates ;14 and to students receiving funds
BINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 117(b) (1).
'Id. See, e.g., Chandler P. Bahalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960).
"0Rev. Rul. 338, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 54.
"William Wells, 40 T.C. 40 (1963). The Tax Court reasoned that the pri-
mary purpose of the program was to train students. Id. at 48. Accord, Rev. Rul. 59,
1965-1 CUm. BULL. 67, suspending Rev. Rul. 118, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 41.
"Rev. Rul. 29, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 79.
"' Rev. Rul. 54, 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 81. The work here was termed an "in-
tegral part of [an] overall scholastic program."
14 Rev. Rul. 250, 1963-2 CUm. BULL. 79, acquiescing in Chandler P. Bahalla, 35
T.C. 13 (1960).
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under the War Orphans Educational Assistance Act of 1956." On the
other hand, the exclusion was denied to a state welfare worker who re-
ceived a grant and leave of absence to work on her master's degree;16
to seminary students required to be assistant pastors for a year with
pay;17 and to an education student required to be an "intern teacher"
in order to receive her master's degree.1 8
Some categories have not been explored by the courts or by the
Treasury Department. For example, services are expected of the college
athlete who wishes .to remain eligible for his scholarship, but whether
required participation in varsity sports should be considered "part-time
employment" is an open question. The answer might well depend upon
whether the main purpose of the athletic scholarship program is to edu-
cate the student or have a winning season.
Scholarship or fellowship holders who do not seek a degree have
given rise to most of the problems under section 117. Grants to such
students are excludable only if the grantor is a tax-exempt organization,
a domestic or foreign government, or one of certain international organi-
zations ;1 the exclusion is limited to three-hundred dollars a month for a
maximum of thirty-six months.20 It is in this area that the primary pur-
pose test and the employment relationship test have been most extensively
used. The courts have been obliged to examine the connection between the
scholar and his benefactor in applying these tests. If an employment rela-
tionship appears to exist, the income is generally taxed either as "compen-
sation" or on the theory that it is primarily for the grantor's benefit and
not for the recipient's education.2'
There can be no doubt that in deciding cases where the taxpayer was
not working toward a degree, the Treasury Department's rulings have
seemed inconsistent. For example, an individual given funds for pure re-
search by a qualifying grantor who did not exercise any control has been
"6Rev. Rul. 68-415, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 32, at 9, acquiescing in Mary
Keegstra, 48 T.C. 897 (1967), and revoking Rev. Rul. 355, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
1" Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966).
"'Rev. Rul. 522, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 50.
18 Elmer L. Reese, 45 T.C. 407, aff'd per curiant, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
Accord, Rev. Rul. 443, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 75.
"6 INT. RE V. CODE of 1954, §§ 117 (b) (2) (A) (i)-(iv).
"°Id. § 117(b) (2) (B).
2' Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Woodail v. Commis-
sioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1961); Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389 (1968); Elmer L. Reese, 45
T.C. 407 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Alex L. Sweet,
40 T.C. 403 (1963); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960); Frank Thomas Bach-
mura, 32 T.C. 1117 (1959).
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held to be an "independent contractor" and not allowed to exclude the
income under section 117.22 But an alien who conducted research for a
year under a grant from his government and who performed no services
either for his grantor or for the institute where he worked was not taxed
on the grant.
23
The importance of the employment relationship was demonstrated
in Revenue Ruling 58-222.24 A college teacher was given a leave of ab-
sence to work on a project over which the college had no control. His
expenses were paid in part by the college and in part by a private founda-
tion that donated enough to make the sum equal his former salary. The
Treasury Department held that the grant from the college was taxable as
"compensation" even though the college was under no obligation to give
either the grant or the leave of absence. However, the ruling permitted
exclusion from gross income of the amount provided by the foundation.
As for medical interns and residents, application of the employment rela-
tionship test has generally led to the taxation of their income.25
The primary purpose test and the employment relationship test ob-
viously are conducive to inconsistent holdings on similar facts and there-
fore frustrate congressional purpose. The Supreme Court in deciding
Johnson should not have endorsed these tests by sanctioning the regula-
tion2" that gave birth to them. Instead, the Court should have provided
some new solutions.
It has been suggested that the primary purpose test not be applied
at all in situations where every candidate for a particular degree does
"Rev. Rul. 127, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 275. Contra, Rev. Rul. 130, 1960-1
Cum. BULL. 46, holding on similar facts that amounts received were excludable."Rev. Rul. 292, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 280.
2 Rev. Rul. 222, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 54.
' 5Woodail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Quast v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1968); Ethel M. Bonn, 34 T.C. 64 (1960);
Rev. Rul. 68-520, 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 41, at 8; Rev. Rul. 117, 1965-1 Cum.
BULL. 67. Three recent cases indicate, however, that residents may, in some
situations, exclude their salaries. Pappas v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
84,029 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (jury to determine whether payments made to plaintiff
"were made primarily for the purpose of furthering his education and training
in his individual capacity."); Anderson v. United States, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
79,305 (D. Minn. 1960) (jurors instructed that if they found that the grant was
primarily for the taxpayer's education, that residents at other hospitals performed
the same work, and that the payments were not for past, present, or future services,
they could find for plaintiff); Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa.
1958) (plaintiff found primarily engaged in education for his own benefit). But
c.f. Quast v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1968).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c).
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the same work and receives pay for it.27 One court has stated that it will
look to the amount of a grant to a candidate for a degree as a factor in
determining whether it is compensation or a protected scholarship 28 al-
though the statute itself provides no dollar maximum. With respect to
interns and residents, one writer argues that since "[b]oth the interns
and residents and their employer expect the employment relationship
to end upon completion of the training... ," they should be treated
differently under section 117 than they generally are at present. He
furnishes what is perhaps a more workable approach to the employment
test:
Since Congress was concerned with the employment relationship
where a non-degree candidate is an employee, Section 117 should
be read in a way that denies the exclusion only where payment is
made by an employer for employment activities that are designed to
advance the business.30
Perhaps the best answer would be for Congress to discard section 117
and substitute a new statute excluding from gross income the expenses
of tuition, books, fees, and a fixed living allowance. The distinction be-
tween degree candidates and those not seeking a degree should be
abolished under this approach. Alternatively, the Code could be amended
to allow a deduction from ordinary income of the costs of higher educa-
tion. The Treasury, on the other hand, might provide a solution by pro-
viding a more definite test in its regulations such as allowing an ex-
clusion unless it is shown that an employee-employer relationship will
exist after the student has completed his studies. Past experience demon-
strates the need for a new approach. Whether either the Treasury De-
partment or Congress will provide it remains to be seen.
DONALD G. SPARROW
"'Tabac, Scholarship and Fellowship Grants: An Administrative Merry-Go-
Round, 46 TAXES 485 (1968).8 Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389, 398 (1968).
' Tabac, supra note 27, at 492.
Id. 493 (emphasis added). The distinction is between the business and the
educational activities of a particular grantor. If the employee is expected to use
his new learning for the grantor's future benefit, then the amount he receives
should be taxed. If the grant is supplied for purely philanthropic reasons, the
grant should be excludable.
[Vol. 48
SITE SELECTION FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
Poverty Law-Constitutional Law-Selection of Sites
for Public Housing
Dorothy Gautreaux and other tenants in, and applicants for, public
housing in Chicago filed suit against the Chicago Housing Authority
and its executive directors' for alleged violation of their rights under
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and section
2000d of title 42, United States Code.' Their case was based on two
theories. First, the plaintiffs alleged an intentional violation of the
fourteenth amendment and section 2000d by the housing authority
through (1) discriminatory tenant assignment procedures within the
public housing system and (2) discriminatory selection of sites for
public housing projects, both designed to maintain existing patterns of
residential separation of the races. The second theory alleged that the
housing authority, regardless of its intentions, violated plaintiffs' rights
under the fourteenth amendment and section 2000d by failing to alleviate
residential racial segregation in site selection procedures.'
On March 2, 1967, the court, holding that an affirmative intent to
segregate is necessary to state a cause of action for violation of rights
under the fourteenth amendment and section 2000d, dismissed the
counts concerning the unintentional violation of plaintiffs' rights.4 But
the court noted that if intent to segregate be proved the selection of
sites in Negro areas alone would violate plaintiffs' rights. "[P]laintiffs,
as present and future users of the system, have the right under the Four-
teenth Amendment to have sites selected for public housing projects with-
out regard to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighbor-
hood or of the projects themselves."' Based upon depositions and affi-
davits submitted by both sides, the court, finding an intent by defendants
to segregate by race, on February 10, 1969, granted summary judgment
for plaintiffs. The court held that the housing authority had violated the
plaintiffs' rights not only in discriminatory tenant assignment procedures
but also in discriminatory selection of project sites.' The court's decree,
7
'Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
242 U.S.C. §2000d (1964): "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
RId. at 583.
'Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1969).
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issued on July 1, 1969, ordered the housing authority (1) to cease all dis-
criminatory selection of project sites and (2) to disestablish the segregated
public housing system by dispersing all future public housing through-
out the city.
Tenant assignment procedures in public housing, by which Negro
and white applicants were placed in different projects by race, were one
of the main targets of the civil rights movement8 even before Brown v.
Board of Education,' and were among the first segregation schemes
prohibited upon its authority. In Detroit Housing Authority v. Lewis,' °
a leading case decided upon the assignment issue, Negroes had been
excluded from certain public housing because of race. They sued the
housing authority to enjoin the continuation of racially separate hous-
ing." The court, extensively citing Brown, ordered that housing units
be assigned without regard to race.
In Gautreau, the housing authority maintained four housing projects
in white neighborhoods in which the tenants were overwhelmingly white.
Its fifty other projects were located in Negro areas and the tenants were
ninety-nine per cent black."2 Despite a ninety per cent Negro waiting
list for all projects, this racial pattern was established and maintained
first by exclusion of, then by a fixed quota for, Negro families in the
predominantly white projects; by secret listing of the projects as suitable
for white families only; and by discouraging Negroes from expressing
an interest in these projects. 13 These facts having been proved, the court
had little difficulty in applying the holding in Detroit Housing Authority
v. Lewis 4 to order an end to further discrimination in tenant assign-
ment procedures.'5
Before Gautreaux, the only case that seems to have directly been
concerned with the use of site selection to promote segregation was
Thompson v. Housing Authority.'8  The court in Gautreau% cited
'See Vann v. Toledo Metro. Housing Auth., 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio
1953); Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
9347 U.S. 483 (1954)." 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
" Detroit Housing Auth. v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180, 181-82 n.2 (6th Cir. 1955).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 910-11 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
"' Initial Brief for Plaintiffs at 24, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
1,226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. i955).
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill.
1969)." 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
[Vol. 48
SITE SELECTION FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
it when dismissing plaintiffs' allegations of unintentional violation
of their rights?' The selection of sites in Negro areas was alleged in
Thompson to have diverted eligible low-income white families from
the public housing system, thereby furthering segregation. But the court
in Thompson dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to allege
the necessary intent to segregate, and it also questioned whether the
selection of Negro sites had in fact caused the low number of white ap-
plicants."8 Other than mentioning Thompson, which hardly supports
its position, the court in Gautreaux gave no authority for holding that
public housing sites must be selected without regard to the racial com-
position of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the projects them-
selves,' 9 and that there is an affirmative duty to integrate by placing the
projects in white neighborhoods.
The method of site selection used by the Chicago Housing Au-
thority was prescribed by law20 and provided for a canvass of the city
for future sites, which would be chosen upon considerations of cost,
slum clearance, accessibility, surrounding land uses, and municipal
planning.2 Proposed plans for projects for these sites were then de-
veloped and submitted to the city council for approval. Following such
approval, the housing authority would acquire the land and lease the
units, usually with considerable financial aid from the federal govern-
ment.2 2 The intent to discriminate and to segregate was alleged to lie
primarily with the city council, with which the housing authority had
collaborated and acquiesced by informal presubmission of each site to the
alderman in whose constituency the proposed site was located2 and by
the formal submission of proposed sites surviving this veto to the full
council to permit further weeding out of sites in white areas without
endangering the maximum utilization of Chicago's federal housing
aid.24
The court found that this method of site selection, in both its formal
' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill.
1967).Thompson v. Housing Auth., 251 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
2' ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 67Y, §§ 8.1-.3, 8.9-.11, 9 (1955).
"Initial Brief for Defendants at 9, 10, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth.,
296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914-15 (N.D. Ill.1969).
19 initial Brief for Plaintiffs at 7-8, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2" id. at 8-9.
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and informal aspects, was based upon racial considerations and in fact
was designed to perpetuate racial residential segregation. 25 Moreover,
the court decided that the selection of sites for public housing projects
in wholly Negro areas discouraged large numbers of eligible low-income
white families from applying for public housing." The final decree
seems to have been aimed not only at correcting this tendency toward
racial segregation in the public housing system but also at instituting an
affirmative duty to integrate. The court ordered that, with certain ex-
ceptions, the next seven hundred units built, and seventy-five per cent of
all units acquired by whatever means thereafter, be located in white
areas, defined as United States census tracts having less than thirty
per cent non-white residents.2
Further the court ordered that,
"[n]o Dwelling Units shall be located in any census tract if, following
such location, the aggregate number of apartments and single family
residences theretofore made available to low-income, non-elderly fam-
ilies, directly or indirectly by or through CHA [Chicago Housing Au-
thority], in such census tract would constitute more than 15% of the
total number of apartments and single family residences in such
census tract; ."28
To prevent the projects from becoming autonomous communities, the
court ordered that no project higher than three floors was to be built
for occupancy by families with children and no units over that height were
to be leased for such occupancy unless they were in structures in which
less than twenty per cent of the total units were leased by the housing
authority. An absolute maximum occupancy of 240 persons to each
project was established. 29 Finally, the court ordered that an extensive
publicity campaign be undertaken to inform eligible white families of the
,' The court found that only one out of fifty-one housing projects sites acquired
since 1955 had been in a white neighborhood, that several officials of the housing
.uthority believed that the city council was racially motivated, and that the hous-
ing authority gave no indication of the use of non-racial criteria in their decisions.
Upon these findings and upon the authority of Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24
(1967) and Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967), the court held that the city council acted with segrega-
tionist motives in which the housing authority participated. Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459, at 4 (N.D. Ill.
'July 1, 1969).
8d. at 6.
21 Id. at 5-6.
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new policies in site selection and tenant assignment to entice them into
the public housing system.30
Clearly, the court's decree goes farther than merely prohibiting
further acts of racial discrimination, or requiring the review of previous
discriminatory decisions upon relevant non-racial criteria such as ac-
cessibility, surrounding land uses, and cost. Instead, the court seems to
have held that not only site selection but also other relevant decisions,
such as project size, must be made for the purpose of alleviating resi-
dential separation by dispersing low income families of both races
throughout the city. Although the court provided neither authority nor
reasoning to justify either its holding that racial considerations in site
selection are unconstitutional or its decree ordering the elimination of
residential separation of the races through the dispersion of low-income
families in public housing, there are theories growing out of other
cases upon which the court's action in Gautreaux might be based.
In Brown v. Board of Education3 and other decisions involving
segregation in the public schools, the basic concepts of due process,
equal protection of the law, and the unequal nature of segregated
facilities were formulated. In them is to be found the original thinking
justifying the prohibition of racial segregation and a fundamental
dichotomy that greatly influences the analysis of the results of Gau-
treaux. The dichotomy is between the theory that there is an affirmative
duty to integrate and the concept that there is no such duty. 2
An affirmative duty to integrate means the duty to use both racial
and non-racial criteria for the purpose of eliminating racial imbalance,
commensurate with other acceptable goals. The absence of a duty to
integrate means that racial discrimination and segregation are constitu-
tionally prohibited and that only non-racial criteria may be used for the
purpose of achieving relevant goals, one of which need not, but may, be
the correction of racial imbalance. This dichotomy is the result of two
conflicting ways that Brown v. Board of Education"3 may be interpreted.
The interpretation that finds in Brown an affirmative duty to integrate
may be called the "sociological" view of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment while the "moral" view of the equal protec-
tion clause denies any affirmative duty to integrate.
34
30 Id. at 7.
,'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools? Some Judicial Responses and a
Statute, 46 B.U.L. Riv. 45 (1966).
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
,Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60.
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The "moral" view sees "[s]egregation with the sanction of law"'
rather than the separation of the races itself, as prohibited by the equal
protection clause. This concept of Brown is supported and clarified by
Bolling v. Sharpe,3" Brown's companion decision. Bolling, which in-
volved the public schools in the District of Columbia, could not be based
upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
that provision is not specifically binding upon the federal government.
Therefore, the Supreme Court decided it upon the authority of the line
of anti-discrimination decisions based upon the concept that racial dis-
crimination by government involves the deprivation of personal rights
without due process of law. One case in this line, Buchanan v. Warley, 7
held that different treatment accorded to any group by the government
must be justified by a permissible governmental objective. Bolling
expanded this decision by holding that the separation of the races is
never a permissible governmental objective.8  This Buchanan-Bolling
rationale looks upon discriminatory intent of the government as the
crux of the matter, not the unequal social situation proscribed by the "so-
ciological" view.39
In Bell v. School City of Gary,4 ° the "moral" view is most clearly
expressed. 4' There considerable racial imbalance in the public schools
resulted from patterns of residential separation of the races.42 Plaintiffs
argued that this racial imbalance engendered the same inferior educa-
tion as legally imposed segregation. Finding that the acts and decisions
of the school officials were not racially motivated,4" the court held that
no state act had caused the imbalance or any resulting unequal educa-
tion and, therefore, no rights of the plaintiffs under the fourteenth
amendment had been violated. In other words, the court decided that
the correction of racial imbalance that is not the result of any state act
is not a constitutionally required goal of the public school system, and
there was no affirmative duty to integrate.44
Contrary to the "moral" view, the "sociological" view holds that
it is the provision of unequal educational opportunity resulting from
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
"'245 U.S. 60 (1916).
S347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
" Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60-61.
40 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
' Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60.
'2 Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1963).
Is Id. at 213.
" Id.
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the separation of the races in schools that constitutes in itself unequal
protection of the laws. 45 Brown was decided within the context of the
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Fergusson,46 which upheld racial
discrimination as permissible so long as equal services were provided for
all. In a long line of cases ending in Brown,4' this doctrine was modified
by the sociological concept of the inherently unequal nature of racially
separate education. Upon considerable sociological and psychological
evidence,4" the Supreme Court in Brown decided that separation of the
races in the public schools serves to deter the development of Negro
children. This "sociological" interpretation considers the unequal con-
dition of the Negro resulting from the separation of the races to be the
objectionable aspect of segregation in any government facility. 9
The "sociological" view of Brown was adopted by federal district
courts in Massachusetts and the District of Columbia in Barksdale v.
Springfield School Committee 0 and Hobsen v. Hansen.51 In Barks-
dale, a situation similar to that in Bell had developed. Considerable
racial imbalance in the schools, though not as pronounced as in Bell,
had prompted several Negroes to seek affirmative integration of the
system.52 The arguments were the same as those in Bell. In Hobsen,
the school system for the District of Columbia also maintained many
racially imbalanced schools" and had developed a track system whereby
college-bound students, who were predominantly white, were separated
early from the others and given special instruction." In both Barks-
dale and Hobsen, such racial imbalance, however caused, was held to
be a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the fourteenth amendment,
even though no intent to segregate was proved, and the existing sys-
tem had never been structured with overt reference to race. The courts
ordered the respective school systems to correct the imbalance as much
"Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 61-64.
,163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'"McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 3,39 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Cannada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
,8 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
,Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra 32, at 61-64.
80237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st
Cir. 1965).
11269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
"Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 544-46 (D. Mass.
1965).
Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 410-12 (D.D.C. 1967).
8' Id. at 451-55.
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as possible, commensurate with other relevant educational goals." In
other words, the courts found an affirmative duty to integrate.
In Hobsen, the court ". . . draws the conclusion that the doctrine
of equal educational opportunity-the equal protection clause in its
application to public school education-is in its full sweep a component
of due process binding on the District under the due process clause
of the fifth amendment."56 This conclusion erased, in the court's view
at least, any distinction between the legal foundations of the decisions
in Brown and Bolling and thereby freed the courts in the District of
Columbia from any restrictions in applying the reasoning of the "so-
ciological" view of the equal protection clause to the federal govern-
ment.
In analyzing the three separate opinions by the court in Gautreaux,
it can be seen that this dichotomy pervades the court's reasoning. In the
1967 opinion,"7 in which the court first noticed the right to have sites
selected without regard to race, the court cited Bell v. School City of
Gary" ' and several other decisions expressing, in general, the "moral"
view of discrimination. It used these as authority for holding an af-
firmative intent to segregate a necessary allegation to state a cause of
action under either the fourteenth amendment or title 42 of section 2000d
of the United States Code."9 This view is not contradicted by the opinion
of February, 1969,60 finding the intent to segregate proven. At this
point, however, a consistent adherence to the "moral" view would have
required no more than ordering the housing authority to refrain from
further discrimination and possibly to review past decisions upon rele-
vant non-racial criteria.6 But the court's decree in July, 1969,02 or-
dered that future decisions on site selection and other matters be made
upon criteria designed to correct racial imbalance not only within
public housing but also within the residential areas of Chicago in gen-
eral.
The decree may be far more rationally based upon the "sociological"
"Id. at 514-17; Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 23'7 F. Supp. 543,
546-47 (D. Mass. 1965)."6 Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
" 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"x See Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
"Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1969).
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view of Brown than upon the "moral" view. In Brown, the Supreme
Court noted that enforced separation of the races itself caused a sense
of inferiority, a sense of being excluded from the rights enjoyed by
whites. 3 This sense of inferiority, the court continued, affects the moti-
vation for Negro children to learn and has a tendency to retard their
educational and mental development. 4 A sense of inferiority that results
from racial segregation six hours a day in the public schools could not
differ greatly from the feeling of inferiority which would develop from-
indeed, which would be nourished by-segregation twenty-four hours
each day in public housing." A child will not notice that no law requires
either sort of separation. The sense of exclusion would remain though
it be proclaimed that both schools and neighborhood were open to
whites.60 That there is a sense of inferiority induced by racial separation
is confirmed by the stigma attached by both communities to any school,
public facility, or neighborhood utilized or frequented almost solely
by Negroes."' Another result of separation of Negroes from whites is
that, inasmuch as the white culture is the dominant one, the Negro is
thereby excluded from contact with the culture within which he must
live.0 8 A Negro raised in a racially imbalanced neighborhood is cut off
from most forms of white culture. Not only is his school overwhelm-
ingly Negro, but also all the other contacts in his life. He is made un-
able to cope with the dominant culture, to meet or even to understand
its standards."9 Two cultures come to exist, black and white, between
which barriers are perpetuated by stereotypes, misunderstandings, ha-
treds, and an intensified inability to communicate.
The above reasoning supports a court's decreeing that housing de-
cisions be directed toward the goal of residential integration. Consistent
with this reasoning, the decree in Gautreaux goes farther than mere
correction of the imbalance caused by the selection of wholly Negro sites
for public housing projects, by establishing standards for maximum
occupancy, height, and density of public housing units. Dispersion of
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
Id.; Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 420-21 (D.D.C. 1967); Note,
Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60-61.
" Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobsen v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967).
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 504 n.189 (D.D.C. 1967).
' Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 495, 497, 501 (D.D.C. 1967).
8 Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra notes 32. at 46-47, 62-63.
"Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 505 (D.D.C. 1967); Note, Duty to
Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 47.
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public housing tenants does not so much cause white families to take
public housing as it puts the tenants in contact with white non-tenants,
thereby acting broadly to correct the evils of residential separation of the
races. The change in the basis of the court's reasoning between the
first opinion in March, 1967, and the issuance of the decree in July,
1969, may indicate a change in constitutional theories upon the part
of the court; but it does not leave the final decree without sufficient
justification. Thus Gautreaux raises for the first time the question of
whether racial imbalance in public housing is a denial of equal protection
of the laws,7" which the Constitution would require government to seek
to correct.
HUGH J. BEARD, JR.
Poverty Law-Garnishment-Protection of Debtors' Rights
Garnishment' is a remedy of ancient origin and doubtless has served
the interests of justice. But as wages have become the predominant
form of individual income, a once-valuable remedy has changed into an
instrument that too often shelters the unjust and defrauds the unfor-
tunate.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 the United States Supreme
Court attempted to eliminate some of the injustices of garnishment. The
Family Finance Corporation had initiated a garnishment proceeding
against Mrs. Sniadach, and against her employer as garnishee. Defendant
was served with summons and complaint the same day that her employer
was served with process. In accordance with Wisconsin law, defendant's
employer paid her a subsistence allowance of fifty per cent of her accrued
wages and retained the other half pending disposition of the case. De-
" In Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), a Federal district
court, upon the authority of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, stopped
housing project construction in Bogalusa, Louisiana, on sites selected with regard
to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the
projects themselves.
1 Garnishment is an action that brings the defendant's property into legal
custody either to provide security for a claim that may be established in the
future or to satisfy a judgment already rendered for the plaintiff. Beggs v. Fite,
130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937). Attachment is a similar remedy but it
reaches property held by the defendant himself, while garnishment is appropriate
for reaching property of the defendant held by a third party. 6 Am. JuR. Attach-
inent and Garnishment § 3 (1963). A garnishment proceeding cannot stand alone,
but is ancillary to the principal action in which the validity of the plaintiff's claim
is determined. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.1 (1953).
'395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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fendant then moved in county court that the garnishment proceedings be
dismissed for failure to satisfy the due process requirement of the four-
teenth amendment, in that notice and hearing were not given prior to
the freezing of her wages. The county court and subsequently the Wis-
consin Supreme Court3 declared that the constitutional standard of due
process had been met. Speaking through Justice Douglas, a majority of
seven of the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding a fatal lack
of due process in the Wisconsin garnishment scheme.
4
The Court emphasized two factors in reaching its decision. The first
was the creditor's failure to show that the use of pre-judgment garnish-
ment was required by the existence of an "extraordinary" situation,
which the Court defined as one "requiring special protection to a state
or creditor interest."5 Although the opinion does not otherwise describe
such a situation, the examples of extraordinary circumstances cited by
the Court are cases in which the debtor's actions or status in some manner
jeopardized the creditor's access to the debtor's assets' or the court's
jurisdiction over his person.7  The fact was emphasized that Mrs.
Sniadach was a resident of the state in which the suit was instituted, and
that in personam jurisdiction was thus readily obtainable over her.8 The
Court did not say that either the absence of personal jurisdiction or the
existence of extraordinary circumstances is a prerequisite for pre-judg-
ment garnishment, although the absence of these factors appears to mili-
tate against its use. The case may be a step toward ultimately prohibiting
garnishment in any case where "extraordinary" circumstances are ab-
sent and where in personam jurisdiction is available.
A second factor cited by the Court is the special nature of wages as an
asset. In specifically approving9 McKay v. McInnes,"° which upheld the
prejudgment attachment of real estate and stocks without notice and prior
hearing, the Court indicated that it is not garnishment per se that is of-
Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 103, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1968).
'395 U.S. at 342.
1 Id. at 339.
'Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of
mislabeled tonic before hearing); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (bank
conservator appointed without prior hearing); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S.
29 (1928) (bank stockholders required, without prior hearing, to contribute to
bank's solvency).
Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (property of debtor who had fled
the jurisdiction attached before hearing).
'395 U.S. at 339.
'Id. at 340.
1 279 U.S. 820, aff'g neme. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 600 (1928).
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fensive, but the taking of assets in the form of wages. The opinion seems
to suggest that the taking without notice of non-wage assets generates
fewer hardships and permits fewer abuses, and will therefore not be af-
fected by the holding in Sniadach.
To understand the significance of Sniadach, one must appreciate the
hardships garnishment visits upon the wage-earner under present law
in most jurisdictions. The Court attempted to develop such an ap-
preciation by devoting more than a third of the decision to a discussion
of the impact of garnishment on the defendant." The most obvious
hardship is that in all but a few states12 some income will be temporarily
withheld from the wage earner. In states such as Missouri18 and New
York, 1 4 this deprivation may be a fairly minor annoyance since ninety
per cent of a worker's wages are exempt from garnishment. However,
in states such as Arizona, 5 which exempts only fifty per cent of a wage
earner's income, garnishment can precipitate a major financial crisis.
The inadequacy of most exemptions" is dramatized by statistics:
22 395 U.S. at 340-42.
12 The following laws exempt one-hundred per cent of accrued wages from gar-
nishment: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 30-207 (1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 690.10-.11 (West
1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 575.05 (1945); MONT. REv. CODE ANx. § 93-5816
(1947); NEV. REV. STAT. §21.090(h) (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 (1953);
PA. STAT. tit. 42 § 886 (1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1731 (1962); S.D. ComP.
LAWS § 15-20-12 (1967); TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 28.
1 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.030 (1952).
1 4N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 5205(e) (2) (1963).
1 2ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1594A (1956).
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (1958) (seventy-five per cent of wages exempted);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1594A (1956) (fifty per cent exempted when needed
for support of debtor's family); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-4 (1963) (seventy
per cent exempted for heads of families, and thirty-five per cent for single persons) ;
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361 (b) (1958) (sixty-five dollars per week exempt) ;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4913 (1953) (sixty per cent of wages exempt in Kent and
Sussex County, but ninety per cent except in New Castle County when used for
articles found in the home); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (1965) (three dollars per
day exempt plus fifty per cent of the excess over three dollars) ; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 11-205 (1947) (seventy-five per cent exempted if earnings are necessary for
use of debtor's family residing in Idaho, but only fifty per cent exemption if debt
is incurred for necessaries actually furnished); IOwA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (1950)
(thirty-five dollars plus three dollars for each dependent under eighteen); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 427-010 (1964) (seventy-five per cent exempted except when debt
incurred for necessities, in which case exemption is only fifty per cent); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2602(6) (1964) (thirty dollars exempt); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 9, §§ 31(a), (b) (1957) (one-hundred dollars exempted except in Cecil,
Caroline, Kent, Queen Anne's and Worchester Counties where seventy-five per
cent is exempted); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 246, § 28 (2 Pov. L. REP. 9906 (June
16, 1969) ) (eighty dollars per week) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.7511 (2) (1962) (in
most cases, sixty per cent exempted for a householder, and forty per cent for a single
person); Miss. CODE ANN. § 307(10) (1942) (seventy-five per cent exemption);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 512:211 (1955) (no exemption for wages earned but not
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In this country, eighty-five per cent of all personal income is used for
current consumption;'1 at lower income levels the percentage is higher.1"
Therefore, in states exempting eighty-five per cent or less,1" the average
individual is forced to reduce his accustomed level of consumption fol-
lowing garnishment; and the impact is proportionally greater on indi-
viduals with less income. Moreover, many states' garnishment schemes
that feature generous exemptions do not provide in practice the relief
that they offer in theory. Many states require of the defendant some
affirmative action-most commonly filing an affidavit with the clerk of
court-to claim the statutory exemption. 20 Because of ignorance of the
exemption, or because of unwillingness to expend the necessary time and
paid before service of process); ch. 92, [1969] N.J. Acts (2 Pov. L. REP. 9969
(June 30, 1969)) (forty-eight dollars per week or ten per cent exempted if salary
does not exceel 2,500 dollars per year) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-27 (1953) (eighty
per cent of first seventy-five dollars exempt, but one-hundred per cent of wages
above seventy-five dollars per month may be garnished) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09-
02 (1960) (thirty-five dollars per week exempt for resident who is not head of fam-
ily; for head of family fifty dollars plus five dollars for each dependent exempt);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 23.181 (1965) (fifty per cent exempt but in no case less than
twenty-five dollars); R.I. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-244 (1956) (in most cases, a
straight fifty-dollar exemption); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-207 to -208 (1968)
(fifty per cent for head of family but in no case less than twenty dollars nor more
than either of fifty dollars, or seventeen dollars and fifty cents per week plus two
dollars and fifty cents per dependent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-1(7) (1953)
(fifty per cent but only for head of family who needs earnings to support depen-
dents); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3020(5) (1959) (thirty dollars per week plus
fifty per cent of all wages in excess of sixty dollars per week exempted); VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-29 (1950) (exact exemption computed on maximum-minimum
table, but the thirty-five dollars weekly minimum and one-hundred fifty dollars
monthly maximum indicate the general inadequacy of the provision); ch. 264, § 28,
[1969] Wash. Laws (2 Pov. L. REP. 9899 (June 16, 1969)) (seventy-five per
cent exempted); ch. 127, [1969] Wis. Laws (2 Pov. L. REP. 10,218 (Aug. 8,
1969)) (seventy-five per cent exempted); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-422 (1957) (fifty
per cent exempted).
" U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTIcS 281 (1968).
8Id.
1 9In addition to the states cited in note 16 supra, the following states also
exempt eighty-five per cent or less of an employee's wages: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 62,
§ 73 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (forty-five dollars per week or eighty-five per cent of
gross wages, whichever is greater, exempted); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881
(1968)) (eighty per cent of wages exempted, but in no case will the exemption be
less than one-hundred dollars per month); OnIo REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2329.66(F),
2333.21 (Page 1954) (eighty-two and one-half per cent of monthly wages exempt,
but only sixty per cent of biweekly wages, and thirty per cent of weekly wages
exempt).
2 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 8-527, 11-203 (1947); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 627.10 (1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2310 (1964) ; Nnv. REv. STAT. § 21.090(h)
(1967).
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effort, the exemption is rarely claimed in states where the appropriate
portion of the wage-earner's pay is not automatically exempted.
21
Garnishment may also cost the defendant his job; the firing of workers
whose wages are garnished is a widespread, if not universal, practice.1
2
Employers are required to answer the garnishment complaint, keep sep-
arate accounts for the employee's exempt and non-exempt wages, and
in some states even appear in court.23 The expense involved can be tre-
mendously burdensome. 24 Because prospective employers feel that gar-
nishment of a debtor's wages reflects poorly on his integrity and ability,
and because employers seek to avoid future garnishment expense and
trouble, they rarely hire individuals whose wages have been garnished
in the past.25 The total economic impact of prejudgment garnishment
is described accurately in Sniadach: "The result is that a prejudgment
garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage
earning family to the wall." 6
No one would argue that the law should not provide for the collection
of just debts. Viewed in this light, the debtor has brought garnishment-
generated hardships on himself. But too often, the defendant is the
victim not of reluctance to pay his debts, but of sharp or illegal practices
sheltered and encouraged by the garnishment process. Such practices are
nurtured by the economic pressure exerted on the garnishment defendant,
which makes it impossible for him to await a hearing of his case on the
merits, particularly where there are crowded court dockets. Empirical
research shows that few suits preceded by an ancillary action in garnish-
ment are ever heard on their merits and that the typical outcome in such
cases is a default judgment for the plaintiff.2 7 Perhaps the defendants
21 Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1219 (1965).
'2 D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MoRE 157 (1967); S. MARGOLIS, THE IN-
NOCENT CONSUMERS VS THE EXPLOITERS 100 (1967); Wage Garnishment in Wash-
ington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 735, 756 (1968); Note, Wage
Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759, 761.
22 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 22, at 755.
" Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Conmm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 197 [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. In 1966, Inland Steel spent $500,000 to cover costs of garnish-
ments of its employees' wages. Id.
22 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 22, at 790.
26 395 U.S. at 341. The language of Sniadach emphasizes the effect of garnish-
ment on the family, but it is the individual not supporting a family who receives
the smaller benefit from state exemption statutes. See notes 16 & 19 supra.
1A 1967 survey in one Washington jurisdiction showed that of 227 cases
involving prejudgment garnishment reported over a six-month period, not one case
went to trial. Out of an undisclosed number of similar cases over a period of a
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in these studies could not have presented valid defenses, but it is probable
in many cases that garnishment prevented their assertion. Many creditors,
aware that garnishment can be invoked to prevent a disgruntled debtor
from airing his grievances in court, enrich themselves at little risk by
engaging in patently fraudulent practices.2"
Two escape routes exist under current law for a debtor to avoid the
rigors of garnishment. First, he can make new arrangements with his
creditor for the liquidation of the debt. This option is the one most often
chosen by debtors, and desired by creditors. By making such arrange-
ments, the debtor not only waives his best opportunity to assert defenses,
but he may also be required by the creditor to defray all costs of asserting
the legal process of garnishment, including attorney's fees, filing fees and
court costs,29 and be forced as well to pay all of the creditor's personal
expenses in the matter."0 Alternatively, the debtor may declare bank-
ruptcy. The incidence of personal bankruptcy has been increasing at a
phenomenal rate when one considers that the past several years have
been periods of economic prosperity."' Even bankruptcy may not provide
the debtor the relief he seeks; a surprising number of bankrupts reaffirm
debts that had been released in bankruptcy. 2
The methods used by states to comply with the Sniadach decision
will determine its effectiveness. Clearly, they must set up machinery to
provide the garnishment defendant a hearing prior to the time that his
wages are suspended. The sort of notice received by the defendant is
critical because the right to be heard will not be exercised unless it is
known to exist. If the debtor is notified only of the main action on the
debt, and if his notice and summons contain no mention of a hearing on
the propriety of prejudgment garnishment, he will be forced to rely on
the same informal sources that have been unsuccessful in informing him
year, only one went to trial. Patterson, Wage Garnishment-An Extraordinary
Remedy Run Anuck, foreword to Wage Garnishnent in Washington-An En-
pirical Study, 43 WASH. L. tEv. 735, 735-36 (1968). For other studies with
similar results, see id. 764; Hearings 435.
8 Hearings 500.
" W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 94
(1968); S. MARGOLIS, supra note 22, at 102.
" W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 29, at 94; S. MARGOLIS, supra note
22, at 102.
1, ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STA-
TISTICS 3-5 (1967). The total number of bankruptcies in 1966 was 208,392, an
increase of 8.3 per cent from the previous year. Personal bankruptcies accounted
for ninety-two per cent of the total. See also Hearings 413-50.
"2 Brendes & Schwartz, Schlockineister's Jubilee: Bankruptcy for the Poor, 40
REF. J. 69 (1966).
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of the availability of exemptions. The promise of a day in court to the
garnishment defendant will le realized only if he is informed both of the
availability of a hearing and of the mechanics required to secure it.
Assuming the debtor seeks and secures a hearing prior to garnish-
ment, what matters are in issue? Would the hearing be proper for con-
sideration of the action "on its merits," i.e., could the debtor raise his
defenses to the underlying transaction? Or would consideration of only
demurrable errors or the garnishment equivalent of probable cause be al-
lowed? There is language in Sniadach indicating that the hearing
would be on the merits:
But in the interim the wage earner is deprived of his enjoyment
of earned wages without an opportunity to be heard and to tender
any defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise.
88
If states choose to set up hearings on the full merits of the underlying
claim, two possible consequences are apparent. First, if the pre-garnish-
ment hearing on the merits were res judicata in the subsequent principle
action on the debt, there would be no need for a second trial-a pre-
garnishment hearing administered in this fashion would mean the end of
pre-judgment garnishment. Legal writers have long argued that such a
change would eliminate the worst abuses of the procedure.8 4 Second, faced
with a reasonable certainty of having to show a meritorious case before
being able to invoke the coercive machinery of garnishment, creditors
would be discouraged from engaging in fraudulent practices.
The debtor with a valid defense will face a dilemma if the hearing on
garnishment is not made binding at the later trial of the underlying
claim. If he presents his defenses at the pre-garnishment hearing in
order to save his job and his income, he "educates" his opponent and
gives him a second chance at a later determinative trial. Few garnish-
ment defendants would want to save money temporarily by defending
vigorously and winning at the pre-garnishment hearing, only later to lose
to a better-prepared creditor at full trial. However, the debtor's only
alternative to defending at a prior hearing is to await trial, which can
lead to economic disaster if he has a low income. If the Sniadach de-
cision is implemented by a hearing that a non-determinative on the merits,
the protection intended by the court will be significantly vitiated.
A third possibility would be to limit the issue at the hearing to the
33 395 U.S. at 339.
" Wage Garnishinent in California, supra note 21, at 1248; Wage Garnishment
in Washington, supra note 22, at 785.
[Vol. 48
REQUIREMENTS FOR GARNISHMENT
existence of the garnishment equivalent of probable cause: The creditor
would be required to show that there is probable cause for the court to
believe that the defendant is in default on a legitimate debt. A hearing of
this sort would prevent the wage earner's income from being garnished
to pay a patently fraudulent debt, but it would not completely do away
with pre-judgment garnishment. The defendant could choose to defend
with vigor and educate the creditor on his defenses or remain silent and
await trial on the merits. Here, of course, the creditor would also be
required to disclose some of his case against the defendant.
Finally, the hearing could be one at which only demurrable errors
could be raised. Evasion of such a hearing would be simple: the creditor
willing to run the risk of being found out later could file a complaint that
was false but that appeared regular on its face. This type judicial pro-
cedure would afford the debtor little protection.35
The Supreme Court in Sniadach intended to protect the garnishment
defendant; but, administered improperly, the decision could generate
abuses by the debtor. Sniadach clearly indicates that a hearing must pre-
cede garnishment. This requirement gives a defendant with notice of the
garnishment an opportunity to go to his employer before the hearing and
collect his accrued wages; only subsequent wages would then be left for the
creditor. If the employer were required to freeze the defendant's wages at
the time he is notified of the action, then the defendant's wages would be
in fact garnished prior to hearing, probably in violation of Sniadach.
A reasonable compromise between the interests of debtor and creditor
would be for state law to prohibit the employer, once notified of the
garnishment, from paying the defendant his accrued wages. However,
the hearing would be required to be held within an appropriately short
time-a week or less-after service of process on the employer, with a
provision that the defendant's regular pay day not fall in the period be-
tween service and hearing. This procedure would not technically satisfy
Sniadach's prohibition of freezing of wages before a hearing, but, prop-
erly applied, it would avoid all the abuses by creditors mentioned by the
Court, as well as protect their interests.
Prior to the decision of Sniadach, several legislative solutions to the
problems of garnishment had been enacted. 36 The most important of these
is the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), which becomes effective
"See, e.g., Wis. STAT. AxN. § 263.24 (1957). It is under FED. R. Civ. P. 11
and its state counterparts that the potential for this abuse is most apparent.
" 2 Pov. L. RziP. 9970 (June 30, 1969) (New York); 2 Pov. L. REP. 9899
June 16, 1969) (Washington).
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on July 1, 1970.s" The Act prohibits the firing of an employee "by reason
of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any
one indebtedness."8 8 This language will benefit few employees because em-
ployers rarely discharge for the first garnishment.80 The Act prohibits
firing for "garnishment for any one indebtedness," rather than for any
one garnishment, so that an employee who is garnished several times for
a single obligation is protected. The statute's psychological impact may
ultimately prove more important than its substantive provisions. Since
Congress has indicated that firing for one garnishment is objectionable
and is therefore prohibited, the way may be paved for state legislation
preventing firing for any number of garnishments. The measure could
also have the opposite effect of providing employers who do not discharge
for garnishment, or who discharge only for multiple levies, an excuse
for firing an employee after the second garnishment of his wages for
separate debts. The fact that, subsequent to the passage of the CCPA,
two states further restricted the discharging of employees for garnish-
men ° indicates that the CCPA will probably have the former effect.
The CCPA also exempts seventy-five per cent of an employee's wages
from garnishment.4" This increases the exemption in only twenty-three
states and is inadequate to protect most defendants awaiting trial. The
exemption however, is automatic,42 requiring no affirmative action on the
part of the defendant to claim it.
The solutions offered by the Court and by Congress to the problems
of garnishment differ greatly in approach and application. The protection
afforded the garnishment defendant by the CCPA will be of great assis-
tance, regardless of the validity of the underlying debt, while the hearing
guaranteed by the Sniadach decision will be of small use to the wage-
earner whose income is suspended because of a just debt. The CCPA
enables the debtor to await trial by preserving his employment and
" 82 Stat. 162 (1968). This measure was enacted in May, 1968, but its effec-
tive date was delayed to give the states an opportunity to avoid federal regulation
by enacting similar legislation. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Opinion of Wage-Hour Ad-
ministrator, No. 956 (March 12, 1969), reported in 2 Pov. L. R P. 9593 (April 7,
1969).
9682 Stat. 163 (1968).
Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 22, at 757.
° 2 Pov. L. RaP. 9970 (June 30, 1969). New York now flatly prohibits firing
for any number of garnishments. 2 Pov. L. Rar,. 9899 (June 16, 1969). Wash-
ington permits firing only after garnishments for three or more separate indebted-
nesses within a year.
4182 Stat. 163 (1968).
42Id.
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most of his income, while Sniadach goes directly to the heart of the prob-
lem by requiring that a hearing precede garnishment. The degree of
protection Sniadachl will ultimately provide depends upon the administra-
tive techniques the states choose to implement it, while the CCPA's
mandate cannot be avoided.
CLINTON EUDY, JR.
Real Property-Direct Restraints on Alienation
Owners who dispose of property frequently attempt to attach restric-
tions on its further sale or disposition. In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
John Thomasson Construction Co.,' a case recently before the North
Carolina Supreme Court, property had been conveyed in trust for the
use of Alexander Children's Home, a non-profit charitable corporation,
with the provision that the trustees should have no power to sell or con-
vey it. The court upheld this restriction against sale by saying in part
that it would be a strange deviation to permit creation of perpetual
charitable trusts while preventing the donor from restraining the sale
of the trust corpus. Since direct restraints on alienation are normally
void, and this decision reversed the court of appeals and overturned
strong dicta which had earlier been generally accepted as indicating such
restraints would be void in North Carolina,2 the decision suggests a re-
view of the case law concerning direct restraints on alienation.3
Direct restraints, as discussed in this note, are terms incorporated
in the devise or grant that would preclude or limit alienation or set up
penalties for attempts to alienate. If the restraint is phrased so that the
power to alienate is withheld or limited, as was the case in Thomasson,
it is termed a disabling restraint. If the restraint calls for forfeiture of
the interest to a third party or for reversion back to the grantor when the
prohibition is violated, it is, quite naturally, termed a forfeiture re-
straint.4 As will be seen, forfeiture restraints are sometimes valid where
a similar disabling restraint is void.
-275 N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969).
'Hass v. Hass, 195 N.C. 734, 741, 143 S.E. 541, 544 (1928).
'See generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY pt. 26 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]; J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROP-
ERTY (2d ed. 1895) [hereinafter cited as GRAY]; 6 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY §§ 839-48 (recomp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as POWELL] ; IV RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-38 (1944) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1111-71 (2d ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as SIMES & SMITH].
'6 A.L.P. § 26.1.
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LEGAL ESTATES
Fee Simple
If a devise or grant is expressed in terms serving to pass a legal fee
simple, the courts normally will void any attempt to attach restrictions
to the fee that would deny or limit the taker's right to alienate. In the
early case of Monroe v. Hall,5 land and slaves were conveyed "provided
always, that neither [of the grantees] shall sell or dispose of any part
of the above named land and negroes in any manner whatsoever."0 The
court held that such a proviso was "repugnant to the fee simple estate...
and is therefore simply void."' Similar decisions have been reached on all
attempts at absolute preclusion of sale of a fee simple,' even those in which
the restraint is imposed for a limited time.' In Latimer v. Waddell"0 the
grantor retained a life estate for himself and directed that the remainder-
men not dispose of their interest during the grantor's life or for five
years thereafter. The court held that a condition annexed to a conveyance
in fee simple preventing alienation of an estate by the grantee within a
certain period of time was void.
Where an attempt is made to limit the manner in which alienation
of a fee may be made, the restraint is also void. Thus, if the grantor
attempts to exempt the property from involuntary alienation to satisfy
the claims of creditors of the grantee, the attempt is void.:" Similarly,
provisions dictating who will take upon death of the grantee are void if
the words preceding the provision conveyed a fee simple.1 2 The case of
597 N.C. 206, 1 S.E. 651 (1887).
6 Id. at 207, 1 S.E. at 652.
7 Id. at 210, 1 S.E. at 653.
'Murdock v. Deal, 208 N.C. 754, 182 S.E. 466 (1935); Short v. Gurley, 172
N.C. 866, 90 S.E. 891 (1916).
' Restraint for a specified period: Johnson v. Gaines, 230 N.C. 653, 55 S.E.2d
191 (1949) (thirty-five years after testator's death); Douglas v. Stevens, 214
N.C. 688, 200 S.E. 366 (1939) (forfeiture if sold within fifty years); Williams v.
Sealy, 201 N.C. 372, 160 S.E. 452 (1931) (fifty years). Restraint for lifetime:
Buckner v. Hawkins, 230 N.C. 99, 52 S.E.2d 16 (1949); Welch v. Murdock, 192
N.C. 709, 135 S.E. 611 (1926) ; Combs v. Paul, 191 N.C. 789, 133 S.E. 97 (1926);
Pilley v. Sullivan, 182 N.C. 493, 109 S.E. 359 (1921); Holloway v. Green, 167
N.C. 91, 83 S.E. 243 (1914); Foster v. Lee, 150 N.C. 688, 64 S.E. 761 (1909);
Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N.C. 521, 18 S.E. 668 (1893). Restraint until a certain
age is reached: American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152
(1913) (until youngest child was twenty-one); Twitty v. Camp, 62 N.C. 61
(1866) (until age thirty-five reached).
'o 119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896).
"1Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N.C. 31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910) ; Ricks v. Pope, 129 N.C.
52, 39 S.E. 638 (1901).
" Croom v. Cornelius, 219 N.C. 761, 14 S.E.2d 799 (1941); Hambright v.
Carroll, 204 N.C. 496, 168 S.E. 817 (1933); Daniel v. Bass, 193 N.C. 294, 136
S.E. 733 (1927); Carroll v. Herring, 180 N.C. 369, 104 S.E. 892 (1920).
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Newland v. Newland 3 aptly illustrate how a testator attempting to satisfy
two desires violated this rule. In attempting to provide for his wife, the
testator devised property to her to "have and hold and [dispose] of at
her own discretion while she lives."' 4 Then, in order to keep the property
within the family, he added, "and at her death, so as not to be disposed
of out of the family."' 5 The court held that the first clause, giving an
absolute power of disposal, was the equivalent of conveying the fee and
that any subsequent restraints were therefore void. Problems such as this
one may often be avoided, and the desires of the grantor fulfilled, by care-
ful wording of the grant so as to convey a life estate with limited powers of
disposition or appointment or a defeasible fee with a limitation over."e
Faced with a statutory admonition to construe devises or grants as pass-
ing a fee simple whenever possible,17 North Carolina courts require clear
and technically correct wording to create any lesser estate.' While this
situation apparently often leads to a court interpretation that does not
precisely reflect the intent of the grantor, 9 it does further the policy of
ensuring maximum alienability. 20
It is a general rule that restrictions that would preclude sale without
prior approval, or without giving the grantor or some third party an op-
portunity to repurchase, are void.2' Following the decision in Hardy
Brothers v. Galloway,22 it appears that the North Carolina court also takes
' 46 N.C. 463 (1854).
l& Id.
1 Id.10See generally 6 A.L.P. § 26.47, and cases cited therein. In Foster v. Lee, 150
N.C. 688, 64 S.E. 761 (1909), the testator willed land to his daughter in fee and
added the condition that she should not dispose of it, but that it should descend
to her children; and the court held the restraint void. By wording the device
so as to give a life estate to the daughter with remainder to her children, it would
appear that the testator could have effectively achieved his purpose.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-1 (1966).
"See Taylor v. Taylor, 228 N.C. 275, 45 S.E.2d 368 (1947); Holloway v.
Green, 167 N.C. 91, 83 S.E. 243 (1914). But cf. Hampton v. West, 212 N.C. 315,
193 S.E. 290 (1937); Bryan v. Dunn, 120 N.C. 36, 27 S.E. 37 (1897) (dictum);
Hall v. Robinson, 56 N.C. 348 (1857) (dictum).
"' The intent of the grantor is uniformly stated to be the primary object of
consideration in the interpretation of grants and wills. See, e.g., Carroll v. Her-
ring, 180 N.C. 369, 104 S.E. 892 (1920); Newland v. Newland, 46 N.C. 463
(1854).
"See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 228 N.C. 275, 45 S.E.2d 368 (1947); Hambright
v. Carroll, 204 N.C. 496, 168 S.E. 817 (1933); Foster v. Lee, 150 N.C. 688, 64
S.E. 761 (1909)." 6 POWELL § 842 n.11; RESTATEMENT § 406, comment h at 2404.
111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892). The deed involved in this case purported
to retain for the grantors the right to repurchase the land whenever sold and to
render void the deed if the grantee attempted to convey or mortgage without giv-
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this position although the court had some difficulty in reaching such a
result. There have been some convincing arguments given by the com-
mentators that this is an area of restraints in which the courts should
avoid an arbitrary declaration of invalidity and instead look at the utility
of the restraint to uphold those serving a valid interest.2 The Illinois
Supreme Court has recently recognized this argument by enforcing
reconveyance to a cooperative housing association when deeds had been
given to association members to enable them to obtain mortgages.24 There
is some doubt that the decision in Hardy Brothers would be binding
precedent to void such a restraint in North Carolina if it were worded in
terms of a first-refusal option at ascertainable terms.25 Indeed, the de-
cision in Hardy Brothers may be read as lending support to the validity
of this type term since the court treated the provision for repurchase as -a
restraint on alienation only after declaring it to be void as a contract to
reconvey because of the uncertainty of the terms.2 6
For one reason or another attempts are often made to limit the persons
to whom alienation is permitted, either by specification of a small group
to whom alienation is allowed or by the exclusion of certain groups.
Attempts to exclude all but a small group most often occur when the
grantor wishes to have property retained within the family. This situa-
tion occurs in Langston v. Wooten,27 where the testator directed that
land be divided among his children and that they should have the right
to sell it only to each other. The court held that attempted restraints
permitting alienation among only a limited group are void. 28 Although
there are no cases specifically on the point in North Carolina, many
ing the grantors the privilege of repurchasing. The court held that the provision
was too uncertain to be effective as either a conditional sale or a contract to re-
convey since it was for an unlimited time and no terms were fixed; and since the
deed had already recited words passing the fee simple, it was void as a restraint
if considered a condition subsequent.
"See, e.g., 6 A.L.P. § 26.29.
2 Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30
(1960), noted in 14 VAND. L. REv. 1535 (1961).
" See P. RoHrAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOmINiUM LAW AND PRiAcTICF § 10.03[1]
(1968).
"The courts have no difficulty in upholding options Which in effect preclude
alienation to all except the optionee until he has had an opportunity to refuse to
purchase, and they are seemingly unconcerned with the restraint aspect when it is
a contract right. Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N.C. 612, 31 S.E.2d 854 (1944);
Chadwick v. Blades, 210 N.C. 609, 188 S.E. 198 (1936).
2'232 N.C. 124, 59 S.E.2d 605 (1950).
"8Accord, Early v. Tayloe, 219 N.C. 363, 13 S.E.2d 609 (1941); Williams
v. McPherson, 216 N.C. 565, 5 S.E.2d 830 (1939); Norwood v. Crowder, 177
N.C. 469, 99 S.E. 345 (1919) ; Brooks v. Griffen, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919).
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writers have expressed the view that restraints specifically excluding
one person or a limited few from purchasing may be valid.29 It can be
inferred from the court's approval, prior to the decision in Shelley v.
Kramer3 of covenants restricting alienation to racial and social groups81
that this view is accepted in North Carolina.
Life Estates
The courts have been more willing to tolerate restrictions on the
alienation of life estates, primarily due to the presence of a third party
who has a very legitimate interest in how the property in question will be
maintained and preserved and hence an interest in who possesses the life
estate. 2 Where the restraints are disabling, however, the courts refuse to
allow them to stand.3 3 Disabling restraints would often permit continued
enjoyment of the estate by the life tenant while he refused payment to
creditors with legitimate claims, a situation that obviously offends the
court's sense of fairness. When the restraint is a valid forfeiture over
for attempted alienation, it should be upheld since continued denial of
creditors is no longer a factor. There is much support for this view in
dicta in the North Carolina cases"' although the court has never spe-
cifically decided the point. In Mizell v. Bazemore, 5 a life estate was given
with the provision that if any creditors of the life tenant should seek to
subject the land to payment of his debts, the life estate would end and
the remainderman take at that instant. But it also was provided that
the life tenant would continue to have the use of the lands for life with
no rent. The court said that there was in fact no limitation over because
of the continued use by the life tenant and declared the restraint void since
it was disabling in fact, if not in form."
Estate for Years
A term in a lease that would preclude or limit the alienation of the
lessee's interest by assignment or subleasing is valid if it results in a
2' 6 A.L.P. § 26.33; GRAY §§ 40-44; 6 POWELL § 843; RESTATEMENT § 406, com-
ment '.
fo 334 U.S. 1 (1948), zoted in 27 N.C.L. REv. 224 (1949).
'Vernon v. R.J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946).
See Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N.C. 290, 37 S.E.2d 895 (1946).
" See 6 A.L.P. § 26.48.
"Beam v. Gilkey, 225 N.C. 520, 35 S.E.2d 641 (1945) ; Stokes v. Dixon, 182
N.C. 323, 108 S.E. 913 (1921) ; Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
"See Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916) ; Bryan v. Dunn, 120
N.C. 36, 27 S.E. 37 (1897) ; Pace v. Pace, 73 N.C. 119 (1875).
"194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927).
"Id. at 327, 139 S.E. at 454.
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forfeiture or termination of the lease.87 There is some disagreement
among the writers as to the validity of disabling restraints on leases 88
and the point apparently has not been decided in North Carolina. Draw-
ing an analogy to life estates, where there is the same balancing of the
interest of the fee holder as to who occupies against the desire for free-
dom of alienation, it would seem that disabling restraints in leases are
void. As a practical matter, the point is not likely to arise since restric-
tions in leases are nearly always worded so as to give a right of re-entry
or termination to the lessor upon breach by the lessee.
The courts, while accepting restrictions in leases, have confined them
as closely as possible by declaring waivers of the restraints wherever
possible39 and by strictly construing any restraints within the technical
meaning of the language used.4 ° A clause precluding subleasing will not
prevent assignment41 and a clause precluding assignment will not prevent
subleasing.42 As leases are used more and more in strictly commercial
transactions, it would seem that where the lessor does not intend to per-
sonally re-occupy, the courts could take a stricter view and void re-
straints extending for long periods of time and not essential to the pro-
tection of the lessor. Such a rule would be hard to apply, however, and
the courts have not indicated any trend in this direction.
Rights of Partition of Concurrent Estates48
Restrictions are often used that require tenants in common to occupy
property while specifying that there will be no partition. Such re-
straints are often determined by the courts to serve a valid and worth-
while purpose, such as maintenance of a home until the youngest child is
of age; and where they are limited in time, the courts generally accept
"' Carson v. Imperial '400' National, Inc., 267 N.C. 229, 147 S.E.2d 898
(1966); Rogers v. Hall, 227 N.C. 363, 42 S.E.2d 347 (1947); Hargrave v. King,
40 N.C. 430 (1848).
"8 Compare GRAY § 278 and RESTATEMENT § 410 with A.L.P. § 26.51.
"9 Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., 246 N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957),
where a lessor was held to have waived the right to declare forfeiture for assign-
ment by continuing to accept rent from the original lessee after an assignment had
been made even though he refused to accept rent from the assignee and notified
the lessee that he did not consent to the assignment.
,o Rogers v. Hall, 227 N.C. 363, 42 S.E.2d 347 (1947).
'1 Id.
J . D. Cornell Millinery Co. v. Little-Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 148 S.E. 26
(1929).
"' Technically speaking, partition is not a form of alienation. The practical
effect, however, of prohibiting partition is so much like a restraint on alienation
that they are usually considered together.
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them. 4 However, where partition is perpetually or unreasonably re-
strained, the restraint is void.
45
The North Carolina court's treatment of these attempts may be seen
by considering three cases. In Anderson v. Edwards,46 the court, taking
notice of an outstanding ten-year farm mortgage and other factors, up-
held a provision that there should be no partition of the farm for ten years
although this restraint also essentially precluded alienation for that
period. In Mangum v. Wilson,47 the court held that a direction by the
testator that property devised to his five children should "stand as it is
altogether,"4  with no limit as to time, was void if considered a restraint
on either alienation or partition even though the children could sell parts
of the property by mutual agreement under the terms of the will. Ameri-
can Trust Co. v. Nicholson49 involved a provision in a will that the prop-
erty devised should not be partitioned or sold until the youngest child
reached the age of twenty-one. The court in this case, while recognizing
the valid purpose of the restraints, in a decision consistent with the ac-
cepted rules held that the property could be sold since the attempted re-
straint on alienation was void. But the court effectively enforced the re-
straint on partition by upholding the lower court's order that the proceeds
of the sale be re-invested in other property to be held in common by the
beneficiaries. 9
In condominiums restraints on partition actions are essential because
the occupants rely on free access to common area stairs, halls, and entry
ways. The North Carolina Unit Housing Act, in recognition of this need,
makes a specific statutory exception to the judicial rules against restraints
by declaring that common areas of condominiums may not be partitioned
or divided and that any covenant to do so is void.5'
Future Interests
The North Carolina cases on restraints on future interests appear to
follow the rule expressed in the Restatement of Property that a restraint
"Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N.C. 445, 152 S.E. 398 (1930) ; EX parte Watts, 130
N.C. 237, 41 S.E. 289 (1902); cases cited notes 45-47 infra.
"Mangum v. Wilson, 235 N.C. 353, 70 S.E.2d 19 (1952) ; Pardue v. Givens,
54 N.C. 306 (1854).
'°239 N.C. 510, 80 S.E.2d 260 (1954).
'235 N.C. 353, 70 S.E.2d 19 (1952).
,8 Id. at 356, 70 S.E.2d at 20.
" 162 N.C. 257, 78 S.E. 152 (1913). Although this case involved a trust,
which made the court's decision easier to implement, the comparison is valid.
Id. at 262, 78 S.E. at 155."N.C. GEx. STAT. § 47A-7 (1966).
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on future interests will be valid only if a similar restraint on a legal pos-
sessory estate of the same duration would be valid. 2 There has been no
express indorsement of this rule by the court; however, previous decisions




The general rule in North Carolina seems to be that restraints against
alienation of equitable interests in private trusts are treated the same as
legal interests. That is, if the beneficiary has the equitable interest that
would enable him to claim, by right, the property or income therefrom,
he is treated as the legal owner and is entitled to the common law power of
alienation of his interest, and the property is subject to actions by his
creditors." In Pace v. Pace,56 property was placed in trust with the re-
striction that none of it should be subject to the disposal or debts of the
grantees; the court, holding the restraint void, said that "by no form of
words, can property be given to a man, or to another in trust for him, so
that he shall not have a right to dispose of his estate in it .... ,,17 To the
same effect is the statement in Lee v. Oates.P that "this court has for many
years consistently held that the doctrine as to restraints on alienation ap-
plies . . . to equitable estates as well as to legal estates.""0
However, there are instances in which property held in trust cannot
be reached either by the beneficiary or his creditors, as where the interest
will not vest until the happening of a certain event,"0 where there is a
52 RESTATEMENT § 411.
"' Restraints were held void in: Johnson v. Gaines, 230 N.C. 653, 55 S.E.2d
191 (1949) (remainder after life estate not to be sold for thirty-five years);
Douglass v. Stevens, 214 N.C. 688, 200 S.E. 366 (1939) (same, for fifty years);
Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N.C. 460, 48 S.E. 785 (1904) (life estate and remainder
not to be sold during tenant's life). SIMES & SMIT11 § 1159 n.79 cites Latimer v.
Waddell, 119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896) (remainder not to be sold during life
estate or for five years thereafter held void) and Pardue v. Givens, 54 N.C. 306
(1854) (remainder in fee never to be sold held void).
See generally Christopher, Spendthrift and Other Restraints in Trusts:
North Carolina, 41 N.C.L. REv. 49 (1962).
"' Bank of Union v. Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924) ; Smith v. Witter,
174 N.C. 616, 94 S.E. 402 (1917); American Trust Co. v. Nicholson, 162 N.C.
257, 78 S.E. 152 (1913) ; Christmas v. Winston, 152 N.C. 48, 67 S.E. 58 (1910) ;
Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N.C. 460, 48 S.E. 785 (1904); Mebane v. Mebane, 39
N.C. 131 (1845); Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837).
S73 N.C. 119 (1875).
r Id. at 125.
6" 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
rId. at 721, 88 S.E. at 891.6 0Ashe v. Hale, 40 N.C. 55 (1847) (property in trust for the use of W to vest
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valid restriction on partition or division of the property, 1 or where
there are contingent trust interests outstanding that may affect the bene-
ficiary's share.0 2 By analogy to legal life estates and the cases cited in
note 34 supra, it would appear that forfeiture restraints on an equitable
life estate or estate for years would be valid, and this reasoning is borne
out by dicta in several cases."3
Despite the absolute terms used in Pace and Lee, North Carolina pro-
vides a very limited exception to the general rule by a statute0 4 permitting
spendthrift trusts for the support and maintenance of certain relations
of the settlor with maximum annual incomes of five hundred dollars at
the time established. The courts require strict compliance with the terms
of the statute in order for the settlor to establish a spendthrift trust ;65 but
once it is established, there is a disabling restraint in effect: The bene-
ficiary may not alienate his interest by voluntary action, and it cannot be
reached by action of his creditors. 6' The trustee is to disburse the money
as required for the support of the grantee and may not pay the money
directly to himY As would be expected, a settlor may-not put property in
trust for his own support under this statute. s Spendthrift trusts have re-
ceived much more lenient treatment in other jurisdictions; indeed, a ma-
jority of the states' courts accepted them without legislation. 9
in H only when H was free of debt); Bank of the State v. Forney, 37 N.C. 181
(1842) (devise to executors to hold property until testator's sons were out of debt
and then to divide the estate). See also Green v. Green, 86 N.C. 546 (1882).
1 Hill v. Jones, 123 N.C. 201, 31 S.E. 474 (1898) ; Blake v. Blake, 118 N.C.
575, 24 S.E. 424 (1896). In both of these cases there was a provision in the trust
instrument that the property was not to be partitioned or divided until the youngest
beneficiary was of age, and the court refused to order partition either for the
parties or for their creditors.
" Dick v. Pitchford, 21 N.C. 480 (1837). Here the cestui qui trust was per-
mitted to assign his interest, but the assignee could not get possession since the
property was still subject to the trust and the contingent interests created thereby.
"Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916); Pace v. Pace, 73 N.C.
119 (1875); Bank of the State v. Forney, 37 N.C. 181 (1842).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1966). See Stephenson, The North Carolina Spend-
thrift Trust Statute, 31 N.C.L. REv. 175 (1953) for recommendations on changing
the statute.
"See, e.g., Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N.C. 31, 67 S.E. 33 (1910), in which the
court stated that the statute is to be strictly construed and Gray v. Hawkins, 133
N.C. 1, 45 S.E. 363 (1903), in which the will specifically stated that its purpose
was to establish a trust under the provisions of the statute, but the court dis-
allowed the trust on technicalities.
" Chinnis v. Cobb, 210 N.C. 104, 185 S.E. 638 (1936) ; Fowler v. Webster,
173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917).
" Fowler v. Webster, 173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917).
" Pilkington v. West, 246 N.C. 575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957); GRAy §§ 90-99.
60 6 A.L.P. §§ 26.94-.95.
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Public Charitable Trusts
The courts have quite naturally sought to validate gifts to charity and
this fact has had an effect on the treatment of restraints on alienation at-
tached to such gifts. Aided by an early recognition that it was in the
public interest for charities to be allowed perpetual existence, the ma-
jority of jurisdictions in the United States have decided that the donor
should be permitted to restrict the use of his gift to the one purpose
that he wished to benefit. Restraints on alienation in support of that
desire have been upheld"° in these states. With the decision in Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. John Thowasson Construction Co.,71 North Caro-
lina also has clearly adopted this position and will permit grantors to for-
bid sale or disposition of property by the trustee holding for a public
charity.
It does not appear, however, that acceptance of the restraints will
have any great effect on the way that courts will decide cases in which a
trustee is seeking to obtain court approval of a sale of trust property.
Even without valid restraints, sales will normally only be approved when
they are required to affect the intent of the settlor or to preserve the
trust ;72 and when there are restraints, the court may still authorize a sale
if the circumstances warrant it.73
CONCLUSION
While it is acknowledged that restraints on alienation of property
sometime serve a valid purpose, they quite often reflect only the grantor's
personal whims or doubts about the future. In Brooks v. Griffin 74 the
judicial attitude toward restraints on alienation was expressed as follows:
It is a singular commentary upon human nature that, knowing the
difficulty of managing to the best advantage one's own estate while
living, with full knowledge of changing conditions, that any man should
wish, or think himself competent, to restrict by deed or will the con-
trol of property in the hands of a grantee or devisee after the grantor
shall have passed hence. No one can foresee the changing conditions
which may arise and which will require a change in the investment or
o70 CJ.S. Perpetuities § 68 (1951); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1965).
71275 N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969).
7"But see id. at 409, 168 S.E.2d at 365 (concurring opinion), where it is sug-
gested that different criteria be used when there is a term of restraint in the trust
instrument.
7 Id. at 408, 168 S.E.2d at 364 and cases cited therein.
7" 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919).
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in the management of property in the always uncertain future....
It is the vanity of human nature that one out of whose hands property
is passing should seek to control it after it has ceased to be his.75
DONALD W. HARPER
Trade Regulation-Price Discrimination under Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act
In the recent case of Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.,1 the United States
Supreme Court examined an aspect of section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman ActY to which it had never before affixed a decisive interpreta-
tion. The Court considered the issue of whether the protection afforded
by section 2(a) extends to competitors on the fourth, and by necessity,
the third functional level. The narrow questions presented by the Perkins
decision are whether that section logically dictated the Court's holding
and what the possible ramifications of the decision may be.
The Robinson-Patman Act' was born of a Depression fear that the
small-scale merchant was on the verge of obliteration by the newly-arisen
chain-store giants. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act of 19144 had
'1 Id. at 9-10, 97 S.E. at 732.
1395 U.S. 642 (1969).
215 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: . . . And pro-
vided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes
from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the
market ....
15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
'The previous section 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) read in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities on
account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity
sold, or that makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling
1969]
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provided against price discrimination; but largely because that section
included an exemption for quantity discounts ("so that even a minor
difference in quantity could support a vast difference in price" ' ), the law
was easily evaded. The Robinson-Patman Act not only amended that as-
pect of the section by requiring quantity discounts to be cost-justified but
it also added a very important phrase. The old section had made it un-
lawful for a supplier to discriminate in price between purchasers where
that discrimination might substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. The Robinson-Patman amendment made price
discrimination unlawful not only if the effect of that discrimination were
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly, but
also if the effect were to injure specific competitors: "to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them."' It is with this added phrase, and particularly the aspect of "with
customers of either of them," that the Perkins case, and thus this note,
are concerned.
Until 1957 Clyde A. Perkins was a large independent distributor of
gasoline and oil in the states of Washington and Oregon. In 1945 he
contracted to buy his gasoline requirements from Standard Oil Co. of
California, a billion-dollar corporation and the largest gasoline supplier
in the Northwest. He continued buying gasoline from Standard until
November, 1957, when he leased his stations to a subsidiary of Union
Oil Co. of California.
In 1959 Perkins brought suit against Standard to recover treble
damages for injuries resulting from price discriminations that Standard
had allegedly perpetrated against him in the months prior to November,
1957. Perkins accused Standard of selling gasoline more cheaply to a
major wholesaler, Signal Oil & Gas Co., than it sold to him, as well as of
providing price assistance during price wars to dealers reselling under
Standard's brands, but not providing him with such assistance.
Standard admitted selling to its "branded dealers" more cheaply than
to Perkins for a very short period and selling to Signal at approximately
a half-cent-per-gallon more cheaply than to Perkins, beginning in Janu-
or transportation, or discrimination in price in the same or different com-
munities made in good faith to meet competition ....
IF. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 7
(1962) [hereinafter cited as ROWE].
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). Note that the section speaks of injury to competi-
tion, not in regard to parties injured, but in regard to parties favored.
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ary, 1957. Signal had in turn sold to its (sixty-per-cent owned) sub-
sidiary, Western Hyway Co., which had in turn sold to its (fifty-five-
per-cent owned) subsidiary, Regal Stations Co., the operator of three
stations in Portland, Oregon. Due to his contract with Standard, Per-
kins could not sell gasoline in Portland, but he did sell in nearby Van-
couver, Washington, and thus was in competition -with Regal Stations.
Perkins claimed that the lesser price to Signal was "passed on" through
Western to Regal, which was then able to undercut him. Standard
argued that for most of 1957, Signal's price to Western was higher than
or about the same as Standard's to Perkins. However, the jury, evi-
dently finding a "causal connection" between the lesser price offered Sig-
nal and Perkins's departure from the gasoline distributing field, found
for the plaintiff.7
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the
jury was warranted in finding competitive injury to Perkins due to the
discrimination in favor of the "branded dealers," it also said that Regal
Stations Co., being a customer of a customer of a customer of the sup-
plier, was too far removed from Standard for the law to recognize any
requisite causal nexus: hence, the court held that section 2(a) does not
apply to the fourth line of competition. Because a substantial part of
the verdict depended on the injury by Regal, the court ordered a new
trial.8
The United States Supreme Court reinstated the verdict. Justice
Black wrote that the lower court's limitation of the authority of section
2(a) to either sellers, customers, or customers of customers9 was "wholly
an artificial one."10 Since under the decision of the court of appeals,
Standard apparently would have violated the Robinson-Patman Act had
Signal sold directly to Regal, it is clear that the basis for that decision
was the presence of Western Hyway in the distribution chain. The
The foregoing is but a bare outline of a complex fact pattern taken from the
following sources: Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 643-44 (1969);
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 396 F.2d 809, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1968); Brief for
Petitioner at 4-24, and Brief for Respondent at 3-19, Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
8396 F.2d at 812-13.
9justice Black actually spoke of limitation to
(1) the seller ('any person who .. .grants .. .such discrimination'),
(2) the favored purchaser ('any person who . . . knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination'), and (3) customers of the discriminating
seller or favored purchaser ('customers of either of them').
395 U.S. at 646-47.
20 Id. at 647.
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Supreme Court wrote that limiting the coverage of section 2(a) in this
way "would allow price discriminators to avoid the sanctions of the Act
by the simple expedient of adding an additional link to the distribution
chain."" Justice Black placed major reliance on the 1968 case of FTC
v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,' in which the Court had held that the word "cus-
tomer" (as used in section 2(d)' 3 of the Act) was not to be narrowly
defined.
If the Perkins holding is seen strictly in light of its particular facts,
it is no more than an ordinary price discrimination case. Because
Western was sixty-per-cent owned by Signal and Regal was fifty-five-
per-cent owned by Western, the Signal-Western-Regal chain may be
considered a single entity, a single "knowing recipient" of a price dis-
crimination deemed by the jury to have caused injury to competition be-
tween two integrated wholesaler-retailers.' 4
The presence of majority-ownership impressed Justices Marshall
and Stewart so much that, although skeptical of the decision, they con-
curred in reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals (though not
in the reinstatement of the verdict). Justice Marshall wrote,
Since we are dealing with a chain of majority-owned subsidiaries, it
seems quite likely that the discriminatory price given Signal would
have a vital effect on the pricing decisions of the stations which
eventually marketed Signal's gasoline. Even if the lower price were
not passed on to the company marketing the gasoline, that company
would be more willing to accept losses in a protracted price war if it
knew that its "grandfather" corporation were making some extra, and
partially off-setting, profits. For this reason... I would treat Signal,
the beneficiary of the discriminatory price, as if it were directly com-
peting with petitioner's stations.15
11 Id.
12390 U.S. 341 (1968). See note 34 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964). See note 33 infra.
1 However, some courts have tended to find independence of action among
commonly owned corporate entities even though these decisions might not be
upheld by the United States Supreme Court today. For example, the court in
Bairn & Black, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), held
that:
The fact that Philco Distributors was a wholly owned subsidiary of Philco,
and that the officers of Philco Distributors [with one exception] . . . were
also officers of Philco, fails to demonstrate that the subsidiary was merely
the alter ego of the parent.




He would have explicitly limited the holding to the facts of the case. He
criticized its imprecision and breadth: "I can see no reason to intimate,
even by indirection, what the result would be if wholly independent firms
had intervened in the distribution chain."' 6
Although the opinion of the Court does allude to the double ma-
jority-ownership, it does not focus upon this seemingly crucial point.
One is thus left to conclude that the decision extends to cases involving
"wholly independent firms." Perkins is definitely treated by the Court as
a "fourth level" case, not a traditional "second level" case. There are a
number of reasons why this interpretation is significant.
In the first place, never before in the thirty-three-year history of the
Robinson-Patman Act has the purview of the Act been held to extend
to the fourth level. Prior to the decision of the court of appeals, in fact,
only injury to competition resulting from price discrimination involving
suppliers or immediate favored purchasers had been deemed within the
purview of the Act. The Perkins litigation made a jump of two steps, not
one, in widening the effective Robinson-Patman ambit.
The apparent breadth of Perkins does not mean that the Supreme
Court has overthrown any prior precedent with a startling new doctrine.
Only once did the Court have the opportunity to decide the Perkins issue,
and that was in the famous Standard Oil Co. 7 litigation of the late
forties and early fifties, which involved a fact pattern of favored retailers
on the third level. However, in that litigation the Supreme Court never
decided the question of whether Standard (of Indiana) should have
been liable for injury to competition two levels removed.' s
181d.
1 In re Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946),
miodified, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), nodified,
49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), set aside, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396
(1958).
1 Standard Oil of Indiana had sold gasoline more cheaply to four "jobbers"
than to its own retail dealers. The court of appeals agreed with the FTC that
section 2(a) had been violated, but the court emphasized that the supplier must
have knozwi of the illicit lesser price. Said the court:
The petitioner has no control and can have no control over the price of
the gasoline after it is sold to the wholesalers. The latter may put any
price on it they choose. They may give it away if they like. The petitioner
should not be required to police its wholesalers and to sell to them at the
petitioner's peril. The petitioner shall be liable if it sells to a whole-
saler it knows or ought to have known is engaging or intends to engage
in the competitive practices condemned by this proceeding.
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1949). The United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision on the unrelated ground of
"meeting competition." 340 U.S. 231 (1951). When the case came before the
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Impressed by the absence of decision as to "third-line" competitive
injury in the Standard Oil Co. litigation and, in fact, by the absence of
any decision on that point since passage of the Robinson-Patman Act in
1936, Frederick Rowe wrote in 1962 that the theory of "third-line" com-
petitive injury was in all likelihood "discredited"'" and "buried."' 20
Perkins, of course, demonstrates that that theory was not "buried," and
in light of the wording of the statute, which embraces that theory with
the words "injure . . . competition . . .with customers of either of
them," one scarcely can imagine how the theory could have been "buried"
lawfully, absent Congressional action.
This analysis must be carried beyond considerations of third-line com-
petitive injury, however, because Perkins does take the aforementioned
additional step to the fourth level. While section 2(a) may speak, as
noted above, of customers of customers, it does not speak of customers
of customers of customers. Standard relied heavily on this point in its
brief:
... Congress recognized the realities of the marketplace by focusing on
specific competition at distinct levels in the chain of distribution. If it
were otherwise, the elaborate definitional language in the Robinson-
Patman amendment would have been superfluous, for Congress could
simply have forbidden price discrimination whose effect may be 'to in-
jure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person.'
21
Court again seven years later, the Solicitor General failed to pursue that portion
of the FTC order impugning Standard's discounts to the four "jobbers." The
Solicitor General indicated that such an order would likely compel resale price
maintenance on Standard's part, which would be in direct conflict with antitrust
policy. See RowE 200.
o ROWE 205.
" Id. 200. Rowe very much wanted the theory of third-line competitive injury
to be "discredited" and "buried," no matter how incorrect he was in so labeling it.
[T]his esoteric doctrine appears of dubious validity today. For it not only
regulates competitive effects which are only remotely related to the seller's
price differentials, but invariably entails controls by the supplier over his
distributors' resale prices capable of creating serious antitrust conflict.
Id. 196.
" Brief for Respondent at 41, Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642. It
should be pointed out that on two occasions the United States Supreme Court
has emphasized that Congress clearly delineated in section 2(a) the exact levels
to which that section extends. The Court in Fred Meyer, 390 U.S. at 356-57,
placed reliance on the statement in FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963),
that "Congress expressly demonstrated in [section 2(a)] that it knew how to
expand the applicable concept of competition beyond the sole level of the seller
granting the discriminating price ... with clarity of expression. . . ." Id. at 514-
15 (emphasis added). With Perkins the Court indicates that perhaps Congress
was not so exact in section 2(a), after all. Speaking of the "intent" of Congress
in the area of Robinson-Patman is in reality fruitless: "[I]f ever there were a
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As a rationale for the possible desire of Congress to end Robinson-Pat-
man jurisdiction at the third level, the defendant argued that with every
addition of a link to the distribution chain another source of independent
judgment is interposed, so that by the fourth level proof of the requisite
causal nexus between price difference and alleged injury has become
more a matter of guesswork than of solid reasoning.22 The Court was
apparently unimpressed by these contentions; no doubt it believed that
any possible obstruction to the analysis of causation would be less in-
jurious to society than permitting large suppliers to avoid the effect of
the Act by adding a link to the distribution chain.
Not surprisingly, Perkins may upset certain standard practices. Sup-
pliers have traditionally been permitted to sell to wholesalers and re-
tailers at the same prices and to sell to wholesalers at lower prices than
to either retailers or wholesalers who also retail.23 The question pre-
sents itself whether suppliers will be permitted to continue selling in this
manner.
If a supplier sells to two customers, one of which is a wholesaler
and one a retailer or an integrated wholesaler-retailer, he logically has
three pricing options: to sell at the same price to each, or at a higher
price to one than the other. Until now, only a scheme permitting sales
to the wholesaler at a higher price than a direct-buying retailer has been
held to be forbidden by the Robinson-Patman Act. This rule was enun-
ciated by FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,24 and it is clearly dictated by the lan-
guage of section 2 (a), even if that section is stripped of its "third-line"
wording; for, where the direct-buying retailer is favored, competition has
been injured with the immediate recipient of the discrimination, even if
the disfavored direct competitor is separated from the seller by an inter-
mediary.
Section 2 (a) has also been held to sanction without reservation com-
perfect example of the legislature not knowing the consequences of its actions, and
not knowing what it intended, this was it." Adelman, Price Discrimination as
Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 233 (1955).
" See Brief for Respondent at 34.
See Rown 32-34. Integrated wholesaler-retailers have not been permitted
the wholesale discount despite their having provided suppliers with identical
valuable wholesaling functions as "pure" wholesalers.
2' 334 U.S. 37 (1948). The respondent had taken issue with a portion of the
FTC order barring "respondent from selling to a retailer at a price lower than that
charged a wholesaler whose customers compete with the retailer." 334 U.S. at 55.
With little effort and no explication, the Court replied, "Section 2(a) of the Act
specifically authorizes the Commission to bar [such] discriminatory prices .. .
Id.
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plete price uniformity as to all immediate purchasers, whether whole-
salers, jobbers, direct-buying retailers, or whatever.2 ' A case in point is
Klein v. Lionel Corp." The plaintiff was a retailer who bought toy trains,
manufactured by the defendant, through a middleman at a forty per cent
discount. Competing chain retailers bought directly from the defendant
at a fifty-two percent discount, the same discount afforded the plaintiff's
middleman. Relying upon the phrase "or with customers of either of
them," the plaintiff contended that section 2(a) required him to receive
the fifty-two percent discount. The court disagreed, construing that
phrase not to define the word "purchaser" found earlier in the section
but to indicate "the conditions under which a discrimination is action-
able."
2 7
There was of course no immediate price discrimination in Klein;
however, the retailer in direct competition with the direct-buying re-
tailer with a more favorable price was clearly disadvantaged. How
well does this fact comport with the "ultimate intention" of the Robin-
son-Patman Act? More particularly, how well does it comport with
"the broad, and somewhat vague"28 Perkins holding-that injury to
competition on the third level (or fourth level) is not to be tolerated?
Seen in light of this question, Perkins may have initiated a trend that
will eventually spell the downfall of even the venerable sanction of price
equality.29
'" This sanctioning of price equality without regard to function of the purchaser
brings about price discrimination in the economic sense. To the extent that a
wholesaler provides a supplier with valuable warehousing and distributive services
not provided by retailers, the supplier reaps an unearned profit from the whole-
saler by charging a uniform price. Retailers who buy from the wholesaler are
also disadvantaged in the process, if the wholesaler makes any profit at all.
26 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), af'd, 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
= Id. at 563. The court elaborated as follows:
In effect [plaintiff] contends that in order to obtain the same discount that
the chain stores and mail order houses enjoy and at the same time allow a
reasonable profit to the middleman, or jobber from whom Klein must pur-
chase, that the discount allowed to the middleman or jobber must be con-
siderably in excess of that allowed to chain stores and mail order houses.
It is difficult to see, however, how the conclusion contended for would not
result in a flagrant violation of the Robinson-Patman Act and accomplish
that which the Act was intended to prevent, viz., a discrimination in price
between two purchasers from the same seller.
Id. at 565.
26395 U.S. at 650 (Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
" Whatever the "ultimate intention" of the Robinson-Patman Act, the exact
words of section 2(a) make it unlawful "to discriminate in price between dif-
ferent purchasers," and if the sanction of price uniformity as to all immediate
purchasers is indeed jeopardized by Perkins, such jeopardization shall have to be
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It is more likely that Perkins will have an effect upon the last of
the three above-delineated pricing options-the practice of offering
wholesalers lower prices than retailers or integrated wholesaler-retailers.
The FTC has traditionally permitted price differentials between pur-
chasers performing different distributive functions where such dif-
ferentials have been biased in favor of the (unintegrated) purchaser
performing the more valuable function and such purchasers have not di-
rectly competed with one another." The differentials have not had to
be "cost-justified" with any sort of accounting precision.8" Suppliers
have been permitted to take cognizance of the different distributive ser-
vices provided by their different customers and reward them appropri-
ately through simple "functional discounts" without much concern with
the technical accounting problems involved in demonstrating precise sav-
ings.
It is true that Perkins is by no means a "pure" case of retailer
versus wholesaler. On the contrary, Perkins was primarily a whole-
saler, although he did operate one gas station in Vancouver, Wash-
ington, and leased many others. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
treated Perkins as primarily a retailer. Signal was no ordinary whole-
saler, but a gigantic conglomerate that had power enough to force a
price concession from Standard, "allegedly because [Signal] furnished
Standard with part of [Standard's] vital supply of crude petroleum."32
Despite this divergence from the above-described "pure" paradigm,
Perkins bears enough similarity to it that speculation as to the case's
effect on the "functional discount" is not unwarranted. Signal, so far
as this case is concerned, was solely a wholesaler; and it was Signal
that received the discount. The facts presented no Morton Salt situa-
tion. Neither was there a Fred Meyer situation, despite the Court's
reliance on that case. Fred Meyer was a promotional allowance (sec-
in the face of that wording. However, this fact did not daunt the Court in Fred
Meyer, a decision which the Court in Perkins seems to rely upon heavily. Fred
Meyer, a section 2(d) case, determined that a purchaser from a wholesaler is a
purchaser from the seller. See note 34 infra.
See RowE 174.
The usual FTC attitude toward cost-justification has not been so lenient.
According to Rowe, the FTC has required unrealistically strict accounting-ob-
jective exactitude-before accepting a section 2(a) cost-justification defense
(see note 2 supra). RoWE 303-12.
" 395 U.S. at 647. Standard certainly did not "offer" Signal the discount, but
rather Signal insisted upon it. Moreover, Standard never satisfied Signal: About
the time Perkins terminated his contract with Standard, the contract between
Signal and Standard also was terminated. Brief for Respondent at 10.
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tion 2(d) ") case, in which the direct-buying retailer, and not the whole-
saler, was favored.3 4 The facts in Perkins bear repeating: One powerful
315 U.S.C. §§ 13(d) & 13(e) (1964) provide that:
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay
or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through
such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering
for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for
sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on pro-
portionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution
of such products or commodities.
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one
purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought
for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnish-
ing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities con-
nected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such com-
modity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on propor-
tionally equal terms.
"' Fred Meyer, Inc., a chain store in Oregon, had initiated a promotional pro-
gram whereby suppliers' products were advertised, and given a reduced price,
in a coupon book that consumers could purchase for a dime. To participate in
this program, certain suppliers had to pay Fred Meyer, Inc., 350 dollars; naturally,
wholesalers who bought from these suppliers were not afforded the same "pro-
motional allowance." The FTC sought to force the suppliers to provide the
wholesalers with the promotional allowance in much the same way as the Morton
Salt Co. had been forced to provide wholesalers with price discounts similar to
those that had been provided giant retailers in Morton Salt. However, the FTC
encountered the major obstacle of the difference in wording between section 2(a)
and section 2(d) ; the latter does not speak of "customers of customers."
The court of appeals adhered to the strict statutory wording of section 2(d)
and held that since Fred Meyer, Inc., and the "disadvantaged" wholesalers were
not "customers competing," the suppliers were not obligated to pay the wholesalers
"proportionally." FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 359 F.2d 351, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1966).
The Supreme Court found this result insufferable since the lower court's holding
would protect the larger direct-buying retailers from the effects of 2(d) while the
smaller indirect-buying retailers would not be entitled to this protection. 390
U.S. 341, 352 (1968).
Adherence to the section 2(a) logic and to the seeming meaning of the word
"customer" in section 2(d) (or "purchaser" in section 2(e)) would require that
the wholesaler be provided with payment for the promotional scheme. However,
since the Court felt that the wholesaler "might or might not pass [the allowances]
on to the level where the impact would be felt directly," 390 U.S. at 357, it held
that "'customers' in §2(d) includes retailers who buy through wholesalers and
compete with a direct buyer in the resale of the supplier's product ... ." Id. at 354
(emphasis added). Moreover, "the most reasonable construction of § 2(d)," the
Court said, "is one which places on the supplier the responsibility for making
promotional allowances available to those resellers who compete directly with the
favored buyer." Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
The effect of placing this responsibility squarely on the supplier's shoulders
has been two-fold. First, suppliers now face an incredible amount of administra-
tive problems when seeking to promote an advertising scheme. See FTC Guides
for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 16
C.F.R. § 240 (1969); Note, Trade Regulations-Robinson-Patman Act Section
2(d)-Promotional Allowances, 47 N.C.L. Rlv. 243, 251 (1968); Note, The FTC
and Promotional Allowances: The Fred Meyer Quagmire, 55 VA. L. REv. 718,
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wholesaler exacted from the supplier a discount (not offered in repay-
ment for functional services) that caused eventual injury to a whole-
saler-retailer buying directly from the supplier. Unless the Court in the
future proceeds with caution in restricting Perkins to these facts, the
previously sanctioned functional discount may be threatened with ex-
tinction. For it is no great jump to proceed from the Perkins fact pat-
tern, which does not involve a functional discount, to the similar, and
simpler, paradigm of a price discrimination offered a typical wholesaler
not immediately competing with a direct-buying retailer.
If Perkins does indeed jeopardize the functional discount, it con-
travenes a long-accustomed and much-supported 35 way of doing busi-
ness. Suppliers are by now acquainted with the rigors of Fred Meyer;
if the Perkins decision is not contained within narrow limits, then to-
gether these decisions may presage an era of hardship for suppliers in
formulating and executing pricing policies. The Fred Meyer decision
has led to much added administrative complexity for suppliers in the
area of promotional allowances and, coincidentally, has made it more
likely that suppliers will encounter Sherman Act penalization. 6 Sim-
ilarly, it would seem that Perkins, if it is to mean the attenuation of the
functional discount, will extend these problems of "busy work" and the
Sherman Act into the area of pricing. This burden will be consider-
ably greater, of course, if suppliers are no longer allowed to rely on the
safe measure of offering all customers the same price on commodities of
like grade and quality.
HAYWOOD RANKIN
738 (1969). Second, as Justice Harlan emphasized in his dissent in Fred Meyer,
a supplier may possibly run afoul of the Sherman Act either by forcing whole-
salers to pass on an allowance or by bypassing the wholesaler and dealing directly
with the retailers. 390 U.S. at 361.
al The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
rendered a very favorable opinion on the subject of functional discounts:
The Committee recommends . . . that suppliers granting functional dis-
counts either to single-function or to integrated buyers should not be held
responsible for any consequences of their customers' pricing tactics. Price
cutting at the resale level is not in fact, and should not be held in law, 'the
effect of' a differential that merely accords due recognition and reimburse-
ment for actual marketing functions. The price cutting of a customer who
receives this type of differential results from his own independent decision
to lower price and operate at a lower profit margin per unit. The legality
or illegality of this price cutting must be judged by the usual legal tests.
In any event, consequent injury or lack of injury should not be the sup-
plier's legal concern.
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE AN-
TITRUST LAws 208 (1955).
" See note 34 supra.
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